


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TIME

KUWAIT CITY
FEB. 27, 1991



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
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It was a week of triumph for the U.S. and for its Commander in Chief. George Bush had led his nation into war—and brought it out a winner.

Vol. 137, No. 10

MARCH 11, 1991

TIME

THE WEEKLY NEWSMAGAZINE

THE GULF WAR: George Bush leads the allies to a military and moral victory

Desert Storm was about more than oil and jobs. **20**

Schwarzkopf's plan worked like a charm. **22**

Joy and revenge mingle in Kuwait's liberation. **38**

U.S. firms get the edge in rebuilding Kuwait. **42**

Peace may be harder to win than the war. **46**

Goodbye Vietnam: America savors its triumph. **52**

The Pentagon enlists the press as an unwitting ally. **56**

How Washington spent a decade boosting Saddam. **59**

14 Critics' Voices

67 Business

69 Milestones

73 Books

73 Cinema

76 Essay

Cover:

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LETTERS

THE WAR COMES HOME

"No one is worthier than Thomas Jenkins to be on your cover."

Fred Kettman
San Francisco



Please continue to print photographs of these who die in the Persian Gulf war [THE GULF WAR, Feb. 18]. People need to be reminded that these deaths are not just statistics, that they represent real human beings, with hopes, families and faces. The cost of war is very high.

Melinda L. Fryer
Seymour, Conn.

I was grossly offended by TIME's total lack of sensitivity and taste in placing on the cover a photograph of one of the soldiers who died in the gulf war. It shows poor judgment and inconceivable unprofessionalism, and it strongly suggests a not-so-hidden agenda for your magazine to pander to the antiwar segment.

Dennis O. Laing
Richmond

The day your magazine arrived, my brother-in-law, a Marine awaiting deployment to Saudi Arabia, happened to call and spoke to me of death. He said that if he died, it would have no "ripple effect" as he had not yet started a career or fallen in love, married and begun a family. The death of our youth is the ultimate

tragedy because the nation's vigor, idealism, passion and future die with them. The ripple effect is indeed widespread and profound.

Kathryn A. Watson
Indianapolis

When this war ends, coalition members should consider introducing a resolution in the U.N. that would set a limit on the sale of arms to countries with a history of human-rights violations. Saddam has clearly proved how friends of today can become enemies of tomorrow.

Janet L. Sciallo
Corbin City, N.J.

Kuwait is a country that has a rare opportunity to begin again. I stand in the sand with my life in the balance to help build the foundation of an international community that will not tolerate aggression and violence. It is worth risking my life for the possibility that when this crisis is over, global peace and stability will allow a reallocation of resources so that the many living in poverty and hunger in the Middle East will have the opportunity for a first chance.

Victoria Hudson
Lieutenant, U.S. Army Reserve
Desert Storm, Saudi Arabia

Defining a Jihad

I commend Richard N. Ostling on his article "Islam's Idea of 'Holy War'" [THE GULF WAR, Feb. 11]. Finally a Westerner has conveyed the concept of jihad as it was meant to be. No practice of Islam has been more misunderstood than jihad, often disdainfully labeled as a holy war and used to portray Muslims as violent and warring people. Ostling convincingly presents the noble spirit of jihad: the struggle to the utmost of one's capacity, the striving in the way of God with one's wealth and life, but above all, the spiritual striving.

Sabecha Rehman
New York City

Ostling has clarified the misunderstood idea of jihad. Intended to be resorted to by Muslims only in times of oppression or unjust attack, it has been much abused by demagogues. It is time the myth of Islam's militant character, perpetuated by the likes of Saddam, be dispelled.

Zeeshan Zaidi
Manila

What Kind of Energy Policy?

I support the war in the gulf 100%, but if it does not lead to some sort of comprehensive energy policy for the U.S., one with clout and vision, I will be very angry and disappointed [NATION, Feb. 18]. Cheap oil must not be seen as a birthright. Gasoline in the U.S. is cheaper per gallon than milk, soda pop, beer and, in some cases, water.

ROBERT DE NIRO



In the 1950's a war was being fought in the U.S. A committee of Congress sought to control the creative community through fear and censorship. Anyone who disagreed with them became...


GUILTY BY SUSPICION

All it took was a whisper.


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HONDA

Would a federal gasoline tax of 50¢ per gal. or so ruin the economy? Or would it encourage conservation and provide money to search for alternative energy, reduce the deficit, improve our educational system, and demonstrate to the world that we really do care about more than cheap oil?

Douglas C. Egan
New Orleans

The U.S. does have an energy policy. But it's being run by the environmentalists. The guidelines are quite simple: Don't allow exploration for oil in the most promising places—like the North Slope of Alaska and offshore California. Don't allow the building of any more nuclear power plants. Don't allow any more coal-fired power plants—they cause acid rain and global warming. Don't allow any more hydroelectric projects. The energy policy in the U.S. is clear: Don't do anything; it might cause damage to the environment.

Robert T. Forest
Sparks, Nev.

O.K., America. Get in your cars, start 'em up, and let 'em run until President Bush gives us a rational energy policy!

Stephen T. Abedon
Tucson

The Controversial Bishop

I am distressed by the inaccurate and misleading story published by TIME about my book *Rescuing the Bible from Fundamentalism* [RELIGION, Feb. 18]. You have twisted my words and thoughts so that even I am offended by them. For the record, I do believe in the truth contained in the traditional Christian doctrines of Jesus' divinity, the Incarnation, the Atonement and the Trinity. I have written another book seeking to demonstrate to modern critical minds the reality of Jesus' Resurrection. The fact that I do not use medieval language to speak of these truths may have confused your writer.

(The Rt. Rev.) John S. Spong
Episcopal Bishop of Newark
Newark

St. Paul was unmarried. He struggled with personal sin. Therefore, Bishop Spong concludes, the apostle was a repressed, self-loathing homosexual. Does anyone really believe the third statement logically follows from the first and second? In addition to abandoning the clear teaching of Holy Scripture on human sexuality, Bishop Spong is dispensing with logic.

(The Rev.) Kendall S. Harmon
Oxford, England

McNamara's Chilling Words

I am a three-tour Vietnam War veteran, and I found that the comments by ex-Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara stimu-

lated in me a gamut of emotions, from coldheartedness to boiling anger, but no sympathy [INTERVIEW, Feb. 11]. Whether or not there is blood on McNamara's hands is open to discussion, but he was the architect of a bloodbath. I do not think history will or should treat him kindly.

Larry Ashby
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S.A.F. (ret.)
Albuquerque

The interview with McNamara was in chilling contrast to the certainties of the carefully choreographed gulf war. One wonders how Bush will answer similar questions in years to come.

Jean Brady
San Francisco

McNamara's last line in the interview, "You grow, you grow. If you survive, you grow," will probably be on Dick Cheney's lips in a very few years. Let's hope that heads of state and defense secretaries read this interview twice.

Paul Sanchez
Mexico City

American involvement in Vietnam was not a mistake. At the time, communism was a widespread menace in Southeast Asia, and the presence of Americans in South Vietnam stopped it from immediately becoming a communist state. The history of Southeast Asia would have been very different if the North Vietnamese had succeeded in taking over South Vietnam in 1964 rather than 1975. Americans are to be thanked for delaying that. You did not fight a useless war.

L. Ann Phillips
Singapore

Warranties for the Three Rs

You stated that some schools are offering warranties guaranteeing that recent graduates can read, write and calculate proficiently [EDUCATION, Feb. 11]. Excuse me, but isn't that what a high school diploma is supposed to represent? Does everyone who gets a diploma automatically receive a warranty card? If the diploma no longer means a student is literate and can do math, what happens if the warranty cards eventually become meaningless? Will schools then start offering warranties on their warranties?

Jean K. Wheelock
Springfield, Va.

If U.S. businesses expect warranties on high school graduates, those businesses that employ high school students should be willing to limit their working hours and make continued employment contingent on academic success. As a teacher, I have seen countless students doze through early-morning classes, if they make it to school at all, because of late hours on

the job. Grades suffer when the part-time job takes precedence over homework. For many of today's teens, the immediate reward of a minimum-wage paycheck far outweighs the long-term rewards of a good education.

Sharon A. Leuschen
Omaha

Music Helps

I am writing in response to the complaint from one of your readers about being subjected to music while in restaurants and grocery stores [LETTERS, Feb. 11]. Have you ever worked in a supermarket? I have for more than two years. Listening to the radio helps me and other workers do a better job. If you want to shop in silence, don't expect employees to give you the best possible service.

Bruno M. Roberto
Palos Heights, Ill.

A Drubbing for Depardieu

Movie actor Gérard Depardieu may have a thirst for wine and stardom [SHOW BUSINESS, Feb. 4], but many of our readers have lost their appetite for the forthright Frenchman since he discussed with TIME his going along on his first rape at age 9, and admitted to many rapes thereafter, saying, "It was absolutely normal in those circumstances." Karen Stinnett, in Jefferson, Va., wondered, "Were the many women Depardieu claimed he raped able to shrug it off as 'absolutely normal'?" Barbara Till Betz of Devon, Pa., asked, "Are we expected to pardon his criminal behavior as being a kind of perverted method-acting preparation for earthy masculine roles?" In Chicago, Conrad R. Metz was shocked: "Have the women forgotten? I doubt it. Has he expressed regret? I didn't hear it. Monsieur, after America reads about you, there will be no career breakthrough for you here."

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
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THE NEC COMMITMENT:

PART 3

ESTABLISHING ROOTS IN THE COMMUNITY

By Neil A. Martin

McDonough, Ga.—Joseph Booth was 22 last August. For the past year, he has been working in the sub-assembly area at NEC Technologies' Georgia plant, where he boxes computer and monitor cables.

What he really likes about working at the plant is that his routine varies. He gets to change jobs frequently, and life never gets boring on the assembly line. Indeed, during the past 13 months he has handled some 14 different sub-assembly tasks.

Normally there would not be anything unique about an employee stapling instruction manuals on some days and bagging AC power adaptors on others. But Joe is mentally retarded and until going to work at the NEC plant had never held a "regular" job in his young life.

"He is one of our most productive and enthusiastic workers," says Susan L. Wolfe, director of the Georgia Association of Business Leaders and Employers (GABLE), who runs the innovative "supported employment" program at the plant. "Joseph takes pride in doing well, and it is reflected in the high quality of his work. Being productive makes him feel good about himself."

ENCLAVES OF SUPPORT

■ Joe is one of six mentally retarded hourly employees at the Georgia plant hired under a special, company-sponsored program that provides transitional employment experience to persons with disabilities. Joe, along with his colleagues Randy, Nancy, Tim, Mack, and Doris, works in a special "enclave" area and all of them are involved in sub-assembly sorting and packing tasks.

"We saw this program as a way to make a contribution to the community," says administration director Sam S. Mavros. "It is part of NEC's commitment to help people with disabilities enter the work force. These individuals work every weekday and receive a paycheck each Friday, like any other worker."

Training is tailored to the individual and usually takes several weeks of intensive supervision, which is provided by GABLE. With offices at the plant, GABLE staff members are around for ongoing support and re-

training (if needed) and generally available to handle any problems that come up.

"The program has been very successful," says Wolfe, who points out that problems are few. "We use the NEC program as a demonstration of the concept in action, and we are starting to get inquiries from other companies and organizations interested in similar programs," she adds, noting that GABLE's long-term goal is to promote the "supported employment" idea among the state's business leaders.

And is the work produced by the handicapped up to snuff?

"Yes, it is," says Mavros. "Of course, the community support aspect of the program is very important to us. But, on the other hand, we have to maintain certain quality standards for whatever is done. Our experience with the people in the enclave has been excellent. They turn around work fast and the quality is excellent."

One goal of the program is to help the disabled workers become permanent employees. "We would like to get them integrated into the work and life of the plant as quickly as possible," says Wolfe, who has worked with mentally and physically disabled people for more than four years.

In addition to teaching the enclave workers new skills and turning them into productive citizens, the plant's enclave effort has given members a sense of self-fulfillment and personal identity.

"The changes in some of the people have been incredible," says Wolfe. "It is amazing to see so many of these people come out of their shells and exude a new sense of self-importance. It is very heartening."

According to administration director



▲ Vannolot Vongsenesouk, Terry Jenkins, Tammi Rentz, and Carol Middlebrooks exemplify NEC's plant slogan, "Pride, Teamwork and Caring: the Heart of Our Quality Product."

Mavros, NEC's enclave program is a triple victory for the workers, the plant, and the taxpayer. "The individual who has the disabilities wins through supported employment in a community business, generating social and economic opportunities previously unavailable," he explains. "The public taxpayer wins with decreased contribution, since employees who have disabilities pay taxes and need less subsidies."

"The company wins as it experiences a reduction in hiring, training, and supervision costs which are absorbed by the support organization," he continues. "The 'win-win-win' nature of the enclave approach to supported employment is an attractive business option."

CONFIDENCE IN THE COMMUNITY

■ Besides providing work for the disabled, the Georgia plant is also one of Henry County's largest sources of regular employment. With a decline in both the textile industry and small farming over the past decade, Henry County has a large pool of available labor.

"A lot of people want out of the [textile] mills," says Martha Nevill, placement administrator with the state's department of labor. Nevill manages to find jobs for about a third of the 600 or so monthly applicants with major companies like NEC in an eight-county area, including Henry County.

"NEC is one of the best and most popular companies in the eight-county area," she adds. "The word gets around that it is a pleasant,

Advertisement



◀ Prestigious members of the Chamber of Commerce, David Shedd, president; Sharon Wilder, executive director, Henry County Development Authority; and State Senator Mac Collins on a plant tour by Nobuyuki Maeda, senior vice president; and Sam Mavros, director of administration.

CONTRIBUTING TIME AND SERVICE

■ But beyond the donations of cash and products, the company has contributed to community efforts in the areas of education, job training, charitable functions, and social and community services.

Among other things, the plant offers tours to various education and charitable institutions like the Greater Atlanta Christian School, Goodwill, Clayton County Rehabilitation Center, and various Henry County public schools. Plant employees are active in numerous local organizations such as the Henry County Rotary Club, the county chamber of commerce, United Way, Griffin Employer Committee, and the Upson Technical Institute Advisory Board. And as a company, NECT participates in various job fairs such as the Upson Tech Center Career Awareness Day, Southern Tech Career Day, and the Devry Institute of Technology Career Fair. The company also takes part in "open houses" and "skills seminars" at area high schools.

In addition, the Georgia plant is active in several community service projects, including the annual "Geranium Festival Road Race"—a popular eight-kilometer run through the countryside that the company has sponsored for three of the past five years.

"You couldn't ask for a better corporate citizen," says Mayor Copeland. "The people at the NEC plant have been very responsive to our needs over the years."

Such activities are undertaken not just for altruism alone, according to Mavros. "We want to maintain a high visibility so that we can attract the kind of personnel we need for our type of operation," he says. "We want to be recognized as a good place to work."

General manager Nobuyuki (Nobby) Maeda agrees: "Our involvement and contributions to many services, clubs, charitable organizations, community events, and cultural activities have helped to demonstrate NEC's commitment to be an excellent corporate citizen of Henry County

and the state of Georgia."

In the process, NEC has become something of a beacon to other Japanese companies considering investing in America. Explains an international business specialist with the state economic development commission: "Next to California and Oregon, few other states have attracted as much interest among the Japanese as we have."

"NEC has been a flagship company in our effort to lure more companies here," says David G. Shedd, president of the Henry County Chamber of Commerce. "People pay attention to what it does."

An official with the Henry County Development Authority agrees: "In the past five years, we have had two major Japanese-owned corporations—NEC and Toppin Interamerica—move into the county, which has created additional jobs, tax revenues, and many other intangible benefits. Their presence brings considerable prestige to the county."

Naturally, this pleases NEC officials. Says general manager Maeda: "We are proud to be a part of the rich, productive life in Georgia. Since we opened, we have felt a special energy and a strong sense of partnership. We are an American company—a Georgia company," he adds.

MAEDA: "I BLEND IN EASILY"

■ No one blends in better with the Georgia landscape than this electrical engineer from Japan who has spent better than half his professional life outside of his native Japan. When Maeda came to this rural Georgia community in July 1985 to open the color television plant, he wasn't sure what he would find.

"I had only read about the Deep South in books," Maeda recalls. "I had no idea what to expect."

What he found was a pleasant, picture-book community where the people were friendly and easy to communicate with. In short, McDonough proved to be anything but a "hardship" post, and over the next five years, Maeda integrated himself smoothly into community life. "I blend in easily," he admits. "Cultures differ but I find that no matter where I am, people are pretty much the same."

As a credit to the ease with which he became a part of the community, Maeda was recently selected to join the Henry County Rotary Club. "Nobby is a well-known presence in the county," says chamber of commerce president Shedd. "He is an excellent representative for NEC in the state."

Maeda's feelings about Henry County are mutual. "It is a great place for a plant," Maeda says. "The people are friendly, have strong community values, and are as productive and hard-working as any place I have ever worked, including Japan."

And he says he even likes grits. "Good stuff," he laughs.

Neil A. Martin is a writer-consultant who divides his time between Japan and the U.S.



▲ Work can be fun, as is evident in this picture of Barbara Hann and Marilyn Battle, who prepare back covers for NEC monitors.

clean place to work, with good pay and benefits. It has the image of being a family-oriented company."

Obviously, such talk pleases city and county officials. Says McDonough Mayor Billy Copeland: "The expansion of NEC's Georgia plant over the past five years is a tribute to the confidence and trust the company places in our people and community. NEC is making a genuine contribution to our community."

NEC also contributes to the community by way of support for local and national organizations. Over the past five years, NEC has donated more than \$27,000 to such groups as the Henry County school system, hospital, and sheriff's department. At a national level, the company supports the American Heart Association, the American Cancer Society, the Japan America Society, and the United Negro College Fund.

"When United Way first began its campaign in Henry County four years ago," says Mavros, "we were one of the first contributors. Over the past two years, NEC has contributed more than \$8,000 to United Way through corporate and individual employee donations."

CRITICS VOICES

BY TIME'S REVIEWERS. Compiled by William Tynan



TELEVISION

ANYTHING BUT LOVE (ABC, March 6, 9:30 p.m. EST). Hannah and Marty (Jamie Lee Curtis and Richard Lewis) finally end the will-they-or-won't-they tension and spend a night together. It's a welcome new turn for TV's smartest relationship comedy.

YEARBOOK (Fox, debuting March 7, 8:30 p.m. EST). Cameras follow the lives of real students at Glenbard West High School, eavesdropping on everything from math classes to private boy-girl moments. One video-vérité show too many from the Fox network.

THE FRED ASTAIRE SONGBOOK (PBS, March 8, 9 p.m. on

most stations). His singing was as heavenly as his dancing, as this wonderful tribute shows.



ART

BLACK ART: ANCESTRAL LEGACY, Virginia Museum of Fine Arts, Richmond. An exhibition of 156 sculptures, paintings and other works by 49 20th century African-American and Caribbean artists who examine, explore and celebrate their heritage through the interpretation of ancient secular and spiritual motifs. Through March 24.

EASTMAN JOHNSON: THE CRANBERRY HARVEST, National Academy of Design, New York City. This small show focuses on the studies and early paintings that culminated

in Johnson's famed, and newly restored, work depicting Nantucket berry pickers. Through March 24.



MUSIC

KITCHENS OF DISTINCTION: STRANGE FREE WORLD (A&M). A band of genially berserk Brits, turning out tunes with wit and—hard to believe in this dance-mad age—melody. With echoes of mid-period Beatles and backlash art-rock, this is pop with heart and promise.

MARCUS ROBERTS: ALONE WITH THREE GIANTS (Novus/RCA). How old do you have to be to take on a giant? David was a mere slip when he brought down Goliath, but jazz pianist Marcus Roberts, 27, isn't interested in confrontation. He's paying tribute to Ellington, Monk and Morton, re-interpreting them in a way

that's full of warmth, empathy and musical surprise.

EVGENY KISSIN: CARNEGIE HALL DEBUT CONCERT (RCA Red Seal). From his daringly slow opening statement of Schumann's *Symphonic Etudes*, and throughout this recital of challenging works by Liszt, Chopin and Prokofiev, the Soviet prodigy, now 19, shows a potential for future greatness, with a command of tone, dynamics and phrasing that is always at the service of musical ends.



MOVIES

L.A. STORY. Steve Martin's *Annie Hall*: that's one way to describe this blithe, witty take on the most American of cities. Martin, who wrote the film, stars as a TV weatherman with a head for romance and a hard time finding it. Victoria Tennant, Marilu Henner and Sarah Jessica Parker offer the femi-



nine options, and Brit TV maven Mick Jackson supplies the directorial dazzle. But this is a very personal Martin project—the sweet-souled, nonstop-funny testament of a native Angeleno. Sly and soulful, it's the comedy that dares to be dippy.

1900. In 1976 Bernardo Bertolucci assembled an all-star cast (Robert De Niro, Gérard Depardieu, Burt Lancaster, Stefania Sandrelli) for a history of 20th century Italy that played like a Marxist *Gone With the Wind*. Now the full version—all 5 hr. 11 min.—is premiering in the U.S. Don't miss the grandest folly of a great director.



ETCETERA

JOFFREY BALLET. For its New York season, this troupe is on a youth kick, with brand-new ballets from young choreographers Christopher d'Amboise, Alonzo King, Charles Moulton

and company member Edward Stierle. Through March 17.

THE KISS. Smetana's idyll gets its first professional U.S. production from the Sarasota (Fla.) Opera. Czech melodies, Bohemian brio, English surtitles. Performances through March 12.



THEATER

THE SPEED OF DARKNESS. Guilt about his conduct in Vietnam comes back, in the literal form of an accusatory Army buddy, to haunt a successful middle-aged man in this gripping Broadway drama by Oscar-winning screenwriter Steve Tesich (*Breaking Away*). Stephen Lang (*A Few Good Men*) repeats his electrifying Chicago performance as the accuser.

WHEN WE DEAD AWAKEN. In Europe, Robert Wilson is the most famous American stage

director. In the U.S., the anti-verbal, visually lyrical elder statesman of the avant-garde is little known. He designed, mounted and adapted for Harvard's American Repertory Theater this spellbinding Ibsen dreamscape about an artist looking back and summing up.

HENRY IV. Both parts of Shakespeare's chronicle play in rotation at Joseph Papp's Public Theater off-Broadway, in a fiercely idiosyncratic staging by Papp's heir apparent, director JoAnne Akalaitis, featuring a multiracial cast and minimalist music by Philip Glass.

SMALL WORLD

In *Lonely Hearts of the Cosmos* (HarperCollins; \$25), Dennis Overbye has discovered a fiendishly clever way of tricking readers into understanding cosmology, the study of the entire universe. Instead of focusing on the nuts and bolts—exotic particles, black-body radiation and the like—Overbye draws intimate portraits of such people as Allan Sandage, once a “lean, Jimmy Stewartish” youngster and now the grand old man of cosmology; David Schramm, a Porsche-driving physicist and ex-wrestler; and Yakov Zeldovich, a sort of “Zorba the Cosmologist,” who dazzled colleagues with his intuitive genius and women with his charm. By describing the quirky personalities and brilliant minds of these and other scientists, Overbye reveals cosmology to be a human and passionate enterprise. This lures the reader into wanting to know something of the science as well, which Overbye explains with care and clarity. The book should be required reading for anyone who is terrified by scientific literacy.

SOME GUYS GET ALL THE BREAKS.

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FROM THE PUBLISHER

As the guns went silent across the gulf, there were victory celebrations on the home front, but for *TIME* correspondents covering the war, few moments of exhilaration. The road to Kuwait City was a desolate highway lined by unlit Iraqi fire trenches, burning oil wells and refineries, power lines to nowhere. When it rained on Thursday, correspondent William Dowell looked down at his soaked shirt and saw that it was black with soot, sifted through skies darkened by smoke from burning oil fields.

"One of the grisliest sights," said Dowell, "was the morgue at Al-Sabah Hospital. All of the bodies had been mutilated." Reporter Lara Marlowe found a resistance headquarters in the suburb of Qarain, where she was shown 16 Iraqi prisoners. "No one realized what evil the Iraqis had done until we got here," she said. "It was hard to understand how these frightened, wounded people could be part of a war machine that raped and tortured."

TIME's Kuwait headquarters was in the Kuwait International Hotel, which featured such amenities as no electricity, water or food, exactly the situation on which photographer Rudi Frey

thrives. Rudi is our man on the scene who makes things happen—in this case orchestrating a generator, spark plugs and picture-transmission equipment in a nonfunctioning capital to begin sending *TIME* copy and photographs. He also performs as local chief of morale, finding rooms on a low floor to spare staffers the stairs and even coming up with a rare set of clean sheets.

Most of our people were on the move. Cairo bureau chief Dean Fischer interviewed General Norman Schwarzkopf at his Riyadh headquarters and recalled the time last September when the general told him the terrain was ideal for tank maneuvers. From Cairo, senior correspondent James Wilde reported a mood of apprehension mixed with relief; during the ground war the city was "tense to bursting." Not all our correspondents have war-zone stories to tell. Robert T. Zintl,


whose job has been to coordinate the flow of all briefings and pool reports, found the enemy, and it was Arabic street signs in Riyadh. Amid a profusion of expressways, he drove around for two hours. "The next time I got lost," he noted ruefully, "I flagged a taxi and paid the driver to lead me out of the maze."

Robert L. Miller



Frey (inset), Marlowe and Dowell in Kuwait City

"No one realized what evil the Iraqis had done until we got here."





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
Once a year, *Motor Trend* subjects America's best new cars to a battery of rigorous tests ranging from acceleration and braking to hours of on-the-road driving. And when the results were in, *only one* car stood apart from the rest.

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
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THE 100-HOUR WAR FEB. 24-28


ALLIED MOVEMENTS

-  Feb. 24 a.m. (local time)
-  Feb. 24 p.m.
-  Feb. 25-26
-  Feb. 27
- Cease-fire Feb. 28 8 a.m.**

IRAQI TARGETS

-  Infantry
-  Armored and mechanized divisions
-  Forces weakened below 50% strength as of Feb. 24
-  Forces between 50% & 75% strength
-  Forces above 75% strength

 Special forces deep in Iraq for reconnaissance



THE BUILDUP

AUG. 7, 1990-FEB. 23, 1991


The air war began on Jan. 17. For more than five weeks, the allies continuously bombed targets in Iraq, the Republican Guard and other troops in Kuwait, softening up the Iraqis for the ground war.

Once the Iraqi air force was put out of action, allied troops could shift undetected to the west.

There were also heavy operations at sea. U.S. battleships pounded Iraqi positions while many amphibious landing rehearsals were conducted, luring Iraqi forces to remain along the coast and allowing the allies to attack from the west.

50 mi.
50 km

S A U



WHAT EVER HAPPENED TO...

THE REPUBLICAN GUARD

The nine divisions of the 125,000-strong Republican Guard were supposed to be Saddam's strategic reserve, his fearsome ace in the hole, the best-equipped and -trained of his soldiers. If the allies broke through fixed Iraqi defenses and the armored divisions backing them up, the Guard would pounce and drive the intruders back. When the allied invasion came, the Iraqi plan fell apart. Coalition forces broke through in several places along the Kuwaiti border and swept into Iraq far to the west. Without air reconnaissance, neither Baghdad nor the Guard's division commanders knew where the main thrust was nor where they should direct a counterattack. They were unable to communicate with one another, and continuous air attacks kept them from moving out to reconnoiter. Though some of the Guards put up a fight and allied officers called them "good soldiers," they were destroyed piecemeal.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Before they launched their ground attack, allied commanders were concerned that Iraqi artillery might inundate their troops with poison gas and nerve agents. In fact, not a single chemical weapon was fired, even though U.S. Marines found stocks of poison-gas shells in frontline positions. General Schwarzkopf said he did not know why the Iraqis failed to use them, but he speculated that their artillery—the main delivery system for chemical shells—was too badly damaged to launch a concerted attack. It is also possible that the chemicals themselves were no longer potent after being stored for months at the front. Another explanation: allied forces broke through Iraqi defenses so quickly and were moving so fast that the surviving artillery units, lacking airborne spotters, could not locate their opponents. The fear of being held personally responsible for the use of chemical weapons may also have deterred Iraqi commanders or even Saddam from issuing the order. British officers said communications between Baghdad and the field were so disrupted that it might have been impossible for Saddam to transmit the order in any case. Finally, the weather had turned rainy and windy, a less than ideal environment for using gas or nerve agents, and the wind was blowing from the south, which could have carried any chemicals in the air right back into Iraqi faces.

AIR DEFENSES

Iraqi skies were protected by an air force of 800 combat planes and thousands of anti-aircraft missiles and artillery pieces. These defenses looked more capable than those of North Vietnam, which ended up destroying hundreds of American aircraft. But Iraq's forces proved far less effective. Only 36 U.S. and allied planes were shot down, though Washington had been expecting to lose as many as 200. After 36 of his aircraft were destroyed in combat, Saddam sent most of his best planes to sanctuary in Iran and grounded the rest of the air force. Allied electronic jamming and anti-radiation missiles put Iraq's radar tracking systems out of operation. Iraqi missiles and anti-aircraft guns could then only be fired blind. While they filled the sky with fire, they presented little threat to allied bombers.

THE FRONT LINE

With elaborate fortifications in the sand, Saddam tried to fight his last war over again. His frontline troops built triangular forts, dug bunkers, sowed minefields, piled up barriers and filled ditches with oil. Attackers were to be channeled into killing zones targeted by Iraqi artillery, which was the strongest weapon Iraq had used against Iran. This time the static defense did not hold. Preoccupied with hanging on to newly conquered Kuwait, Saddam did not extend his fortifications more than a few miles beyond the Saudi-Kuwaiti border. Coalition forces easily outflanked the "Saddam line." Even along the gulf coast, where U.S. and Saudi troops did attack straight north into Kuwait, Iraq's war-weary, underfed frontline army lacked the will to man the barricades. The allies quickly slashed through.



The Gulf War

CONSEQUENCES

White Flags In the Desert

**Now that Iraq is defeated,
the world must take up the
more challenging task of
keeping the peace**

By STROBE TALBOTT




Suddenly, there he was, the only major participant in this most televised war in history who had remained off-camera. For weeks, the world had watched the nightly pyrotechnics over Baghdad, the battered allied pilots on Iraqi TV, Patriots rising to meet Scuds, the nose-camera view of smart bombs at work, the artificial twilight above the burning oil fields, top guns catapulting into the mist, even Saddam Hussein presiding over his Revolutionary Command Council. Only the frontline Iraqi soldier had stayed out of sight.

But he was never out of mind. The briefers in Riyadh referred to him constantly in the anonymous yet curiously familiar third-person singular: "He's dug in along the border . . . He's taking quite a beating . . . If he heads north, we'll cut him off." As long as he was invisible, he was easy to imagine as one of half a million clones of Saddam himself, smug, defiant and murderous.

So it came as something of a shock when he scrambled out of his hole in the ground. He was thin, pitiable, and quivering with the fear that his captors were going to shoot him on the spot. He knew what execution squads attached to his unit were doing to others who tried to give up. Why should he expect better from the enemy? When he realized he was going to be fed and cared for, he fell to his knees and kissed the hands of a U.S. Marine.

They surrendered all along what was supposed to be the mighty "Saddam line," in squads, then platoons. Many waved tattered pieces of white cloth. Some held aloft the Koran.



These were the most telling images of the entire war. For one thing, they put faces to the staggering estimates of many tens of thousands of Iraqi casualties, making them less of a box-score abstraction.

At the same time, the gratitude with which many Iraqis turned themselves in hammered home the justification for this war, terrible as it was. They were not just relieved to be alive or trying to please their new masters. Several groups of prisoners even began chanting the name of George Bush. It was as though they sensed that their defeat was a necessary step toward the liberation not only of Kuwait but of Iraq as well.

Certainly that is how Bush has come to see this war. Time and again, he made clear that for him, the rationale was not merely geopolitical; there was more at stake than Persian Gulf oil or, as James Baker once put it, American jobs. The President's critics, from Mikhail Gorbachev to protesters on the home front, were right when they accused him of having an objective that went beyond the United Nations mandate of expelling Iraqi forces from Kuwait. For its Commander in Chief, Desert Storm became a moral crusade, targeted against a leader whose very regime was an abomination. "Saddam tried to cast this conflict as a religious war," said Bush in a speech in January, "but it has nothing to do with religion per se. It has, on the other hand, everything to do with what religion embodies: good vs. evil, right vs. wrong."

Even after he had inflicted on Iraq the mother of all defeats, Bush left no doubt, as he said Friday, that in his own mind, there would be no "definitive end" to the war so long as Saddam was "still there." For the next phase of the campaign, Bush needed only to revert to the advice that the doves were



FREDERICK STEVENS—GUPA FOR TIME

offering him before he ordered the bombers into action on Jan. 16: Give sanctions a chance.

The U.S. public welcomed last week's triumph in the gulf as much more than a mission accomplished. It has been 46 years since Americans were able to celebrate a real victory in a real war. Only about 30% of the country's 250 million citizens were even alive on Aug. 14, 1945, when Japan capitulated at the end of World War II. Bush can remember listening to that news on the radio as a junior naval officer, and Brent Scowcroft was a cadet at West Point. But for the others who ran Desert Storm, the memory of the U.S.'s last "good war"—best defined as an unambiguous win against an unambiguous villain—is probably dim at best: Dick Cheney was four years old on V-J day, Colin Powell was eight, and Norman Schwarzkopf, 10.

Since then, the U.S. has settled for a draw in Korea and swallowed a defeat in Vietnam. The invasions of Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989 did not qualify as wars; they were neighborhood busts. For decades, many Americans were worried that the U.S. suffered from a national character flaw, a syndrome of flabbiness and faintheartedness. Perhaps, mused some, it was a side effect of too much democracy, too much safety behind the oceans and too little gumption.

Such self-doubts never made much sense. For more than four decades, the exertion of U.S. power was, quite properly, inhibited by the cold war and its twin, the ever present danger of a global conflagration. Over the horizon of every battlefield was the Soviet nuclear arsenal. If tangling with Kim Il Sung or Ho Chi Minh could lead to World War III, it was only prudent to pull back to the DMZ in Korea and, eventually, all the way home from Vietnam.

Prudence is George Bush's favorite word. Yet he has led his nation into battle and won decisively. That's a credit to his personal determination, the prowess of the armed forces he commands, the steadfastness of the alliance he has assembled and the wizardry of military technology he has at his disposal. But last week's stunning conclusion would not have been possible if the U.S. and the Soviet Union were still competing on every issue, at every level, at every point in the world. Had the Kremlin been playing its old, deadly zero-sum game, threatening to intervene on Saddam's behalf with its still formidable military might rather than just kibitzing diplomatically, Kuwait might be a DMZ today.

Now that both the cold war and the gulf war are over, the United Nations, with the U.S. more than ever its senior partner, will be more credible when it vows to punish—and thus deters—would-be aggressors. However, in almost every other respect, the happy ending of the gulf crisis does little, in and of itself, to advance the much vaunted new world order. Whatever challenges to international security and stability lurk in the future, chances are they won't be so morally stark and politically compelling as this one was. Therefore, it won't be so easy to mobilize a multinational coalition. In that sense, while Bush was masterly as a war President, he was also lucky.

Successful as it was in its own terms, Desert Storm was the consequence—indeed, a tacit admission—of a massive failure. The international community has had to pay a vast price for waiting too long to put in place arrangements that will control the spread of weaponry, ameliorate the social pressures that feed extremism and, above all, keep the peace. Creating those structures now will be every bit as important as rebuilding Kuwait and Iraq.

The Gulf War

THE BATTLEGROUND

The 100 Hours

In a battle for the history books, the allies break the Iraqi army—quickly, totally and at unbelievably low cost



By **GEORGE J. CHURCH**



The most stunning, overwhelming victory in war is a beginning as well as an end. Diplomatic problems will persist long after the burned-out hulks of Iraqi tanks and the bodies strewn across the cratered battlefield are buried by sand. Political dangers will explode after the last of thousands of mines are dug up. Psychological reverberations will be felt when the final echoes of cheers for the victors have died away.

Saddam Hussein remains in power, at least for the moment, shorn of the military

might that made him a menace but not of all capacity for troublemaking. Containing him may require not only a long-lasting arms embargo but also some sort of regional security scheme. Kuwait is liberated, but a smoldering wreck needing perhaps years of reconstruction. Then come the broader difficulties: trying to forge a stable regional balance of power—or balance of weakness, as some commentators suggest—and defuse the hatreds that have made the Middle East the world's most prolific breeding ground for war. French President François Mitterrand ticks off a laundry list of regional troubles that must be addressed: "The Arab-Israeli conflict, the Palestinian problem, the problem of Lebanon, the control of

weapons sales, disarmament, redistribution of resources, reconstruction of countries hit by the war."

The U.S. emerges with new power and credibility; any pledge it makes to defend an ally or oppose an aggressor means far more than such a promise would have meant prior to Jan. 15. But the U.S. also urgently needs to define George Bush's vision of a new world order. To what extent is America ready to assume the role of world policeman? More specifically, under what circumstances might it—and some of its allies—again mount a military effort

Protected against poison gas that never came, Marines fire on Iraqis in Kuwait City



CHRISTOPHER MORRIS FOR TIME



An injured U.S. soldier weeps on learning the body bag holds a fellow tank crewman

comparable to the one in the gulf? Certainly that cannot be done in response to every case of aggression anywhere, but how does Washington pick and choose? What kind of relationship can it forge with the Soviet Union, which gave crucial support to the anti-Saddam coalition but also served brief notice, in its efforts to mediate a political settlement, that ultimately it will follow its own interests?

Among Americans, the war has finally laid to rest all the ghosts of Vietnam. Self-doubt, deep divisions, suspicions of national decline—the very words suddenly seem quaint. The problem now may be to contain the surge of pride and unity before it bursts the bounds of reason and passes into jingoism, even hubris.

None of that, however, can detract from the awesome speed, power and total-

ity of the allies' military victory. The war, particularly its climactic 100-hour campaign, bids fair to be enshrined in military textbooks for as long as the annihilation of a Roman army by Hannibal at the battle of Cannae in 216 B.C. That is still a model for a strategy of encirclement, like the one followed by General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the allied commander in the gulf.

The war as a whole might be the most one-sided in all history, as indicated by the casualty figures. Latest count for the full 43 days: 149 killed and 513 wounded among the allies, vs. perhaps more than 100,000 deaths and injuries among the Iraqis, though an accurate total may never be known. The conflict challenged a whole series of military shibboleths: generals always refight the last war (Saddam in fact planned a rerun of the 1980-88 war with Iran, but allied strategy and tactics bore no resemblance to Vietnam or Korea); air power alone cannot win a war (maybe not,

but it destroyed up to 75% of the fighting capacity of Iraq's front-line troops in Kuwait, making the remainder a pushover); an attacking army needs at least a 3-to-1 superiority in numbers over a defending force, maybe 5-to-1 if the defenders are well dug in (allied forces routed and slaughtered, by a combination of firepower, speed and deception, Iraqi troops that outnumbered them at least 3 to 2 and were extremely well dug in).

Another shibboleth is that no battle ever goes totally according to plan. The final land campaign, however, may become the classic example of a battle in which everything happened exactly as planned, on the allied side—except faster and better.

Even before the ground campaign began, the war had been won to a greater extent than allied commanders would let themselves hope. It was known that five weeks of bombing had destroyed much of the Iraqis' armor and artillery. But not un-



DAVID THORNTON - GLOBE PHOTOS



DAVID LONGSTREET/ATLANTA

A G.I. walks through wreckage of Dhahran barracks where 28 Americans died from a Scud hit

Bush's Demands

After halting allied assaults, the President required that Iraq:

- **Release immediately all prisoners of war, third-country nationals and the remains of all who died in Iraqi hands.**
- **Release all Kuwaiti detainees.**
- **Inform authorities in Kuwait of the location and nature of all land and sea mines planted there.**
- **Comply fully with all relevant U.N. resolutions. These include a rescinding of Iraq's annexation of Kuwait and acceptance of responsibility for all financial losses resulting from its invasion.**

til coalition soldiers could see the corpses piled in Iraqi trenches and hear surrendering soldiers' tales of starvation and terror did it become obvious how bloodily effective the air campaign had been. One of the key questions about the bombing was how much it had disrupted Iraqi command and communications. The damage turned out to be almost total. Iraqi troops could not communicate even with adjoining companies and battalions; they fought, when they did fight, in isolated actions rather than as part of a coordinated force. One unit of the Republican Guard was caught and devastated on the war's last day while its members were taking a cigarette break; comrades in surrounding units had been unable to warn them that onrushing American forces were almost on top of them.

Bereft of satellites or even aerial reconnaissance, Saddam's commanders could not see what was going on behind allied lines. Thus Schwarzkopf was able to hood-

wink Baghdad into concentrating its forces in the wrong places until the very end. Six of Iraq's 42 divisions were massed along the Kuwaiti coast, guarding against a sea-borne invasion. U.S. Marines repeatedly practiced amphibious landings, as conspicuously as possible, and as zero hour approached, an armada of 31 ships swung into position to put them ashore near Kuwait City. The battleships *Missouri* and *Wisconsin* took turns, an hour at a time, firing their 16-in. guns at Iraqi shore defenses. It was all a feint; the war ended with 17,000 Marines still aboard their ships.

Most of Iraq's front-line troops hunkered down behind minefields and barbed wire along the 138-mile Saudi-Kuwait border, awaiting what Baghdad obviously expected to be the main allied thrust. Coalition troops did in fact initially concentrate in front of them. But in the last 16 days before the attack, more than 150,000 American, British and French troops moved to

the west, as far as 300 miles inland from the gulf, setting up bases across the border from an area of southern Iraq that was mostly empty desert. Part of that allied force was to drive straight to the Euphrates River, cutting off retreat routes for the Iraqi forces in Kuwait; another part was to turn east and hit Republican Guard divisions along the Kuwait-Iraq border, taking them by surprise on their right flank.

The battle plan did call as well, however, for narrowly focused thrusts through the main Iraqi defensive works. Concerned that his troops would get caught in breaches and slaughtered by massed Iraqi artillery firing poison-gas shells, Schwarzkopf ordered a shift in the bombing campaign during the last week to concentrate heavily on knocking out the frontline big guns. The planes succeeded spectacularly, destroying so much Iraqi artillery that its fire was never either as heavy or as accurate as had been feared. Also in the last week, special-

The Gulf War



The detritus of defeat: remains of Iraqi vehicles bombed as they fled litter a highway north of Kuwait City



A dead Iraqi lies where he fell

operations commandos expanded their activities deep in Iraqi territory. Many additional units landed by helicopter, checking out the lay of the land and fixing Iraqi troop, tank and artillery positions so they could guide both air strikes and, later, advancing ground units.

Schwarzkopf had initially got Washington's agreement to Feb. 21 as the day to begin the ground assault. But some subordinates thought they needed two more days to get ready. So he and George Bush fixed 8 p.m. Saturday, Feb. 23—noon in Washington—as zero hour, and Bush made that the expiration time of a final ultimatum to Saddam. As the deadline approached, tanks equipped with bulldozer blades cut wide openings through the sand berms Saddam's soldiers had erected as a defen-

sive wall along the border, and tanks and troops began pushing through on probing attacks; some were across hours before the deadline.

During the night, B-52s pounded Iraqi positions and helicopter gunships swept the defense lines, firing rockets at tanks and artillery pieces and machine-gunning soldiers in the trenches. Allied artillery opened an intense bombardment from howitzers and multiple-launch rocket systems that released thousands of shrapnel-like bomblets over the trenches. Everything was ready for the ground troops to begin moving in the last hours of darkness, taking advantage of the allies' superior night-vision equipment.

SUNDAY: THROUGH THE BREACH

Between 4 a.m. and 6 a.m., allied forces jumped off at selected points all along the 300-mile line. Though Hollywood has long pictured the desert as a place of eternal burning sunshine and total aridity, the attack began in a lashing rain that turned the sand into muddy goo. The first troops through were wearing bulky chemical-protective garb, in keeping with the allied conviction that Saddam would use poison gas right from the beginning. In fact, the Iraqis never fired their chemical weapons.

Saudi and other Arab troops hit the strongest Iraqi fortifications near the coast. To their left were the U.S. 1st and 2nd Marine divisions, which had moved inland. The Marines attacked at points known to allied commanders as the "elbow" of Kuwait, where the border with Saudi Arabia turns sharply to the north,

and the "armpit," where it abruptly sweeps west again. They were led in person by Lieut. General Walter Boomer, the top Marine in the gulf area, according to operational plans he had forwarded only 16 days earlier to the Pentagon, where they caused raised eyebrows because of their audacity. But they worked.

The allied troops had built in Saudi Arabia sand berms and replicas of the other Iraqi entrenchments and practiced breaching them until they could virtually do it blindfolded. Among the tactics: Remotely piloted vehicles, or pilotless drone planes, guided soldiers to the most thinly held spots in the Iraqi lines. Line charges, or 100-yd.-long strings of tubing laced with explosives, blasted paths through minefields. Tanks and armored personnel carriers drove through those paths in long, narrow files, observing strict radio silence. Their drivers communicated by hand signals—even in the dark, when night-vision devices worked perfectly.

Much had been written about the inferno the Iraqis would create by filling trenches with burning oil. But in the Marines' sector, U.S. planes had burned off the oil prematurely by dropping napalm. The Saudis did encounter trenches filled with blazing petroleum and in some cases with water, but crossed them by the simple expedient of having bulldozers and tanks fitted with earth-moving blades collapse dirt into the trenches until they were filled. It took only hours for the allied troops to burst through the supposedly impregnable Iraqi defenses and begin a war of maneuvers, sweeping right past some of the heaviest concentrations of troops and armor,

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The Gulf War

Sayings of Stormin' Norman

In an interview with TIME's Dean Fischer and another magazine correspondent in Riyadh last Friday, General Norman Schwarzkopf reviewed the allied campaign, including the surprise flanking movement of 150,000 troops into western Iraq. Highlights:

Colin Powell and I understood very early on that a strategic bombing campaign in and of itself had never ever won a war and had never forced anybody to do anything if they wanted to sit it out. I don't think we ever believed exclusively that that would be it. So therefore we had already started talking about a ground campaign.

In one of my very first briefings with the President, we discussed ejecting Iraq from Kuwait. I gave the President terrible advice because I told him that in order to do the job, I needed about five times more force than I ended up getting, and that it would probably take about seven or eight months longer than it actually took to do the job. By the middle of October, we had a completely robust strategic air campaign that was very executable, right down to a gnat's eyelash. We went back to Washington to brief the President, and we were told, "Oh, by the way, brief the ground plan at the same time." The ground campaign left everybody saying "umm,



A pep talk from the general: Schwarzkopf visits Marines before the ground war begins

gee, uh," because my assessment as commander was you can't get there from here. So then the decision was made to send over the remainder of the forces.

If you go back and look at the battle of El Alamein, where Montgomery defeated Rommel, one of the things the British did extremely well was a deception operation that caused the Germans to think that the main attack was going to come someplace else. I remembered that. Way back in August we had launched the amphibious-landing deception plan. So when I saw the way he had stuck all of his forces in this one bag down there, I started thinking. I was worried about the barrier they were building [in southern Iraq] and the troops they were digging in behind them. The worst case would be for our troops to go in there and get hung up on the wire and have chemicals dumped on them. Every morning I had that map in my office. I was watching that obstacle system, and it was right across the tri-border area, and it was getting thicker and thicker and heavier and heavier, but it wasn't going any further out to the west. So I remembered the fact that in desert warfare you can deceive your enemy as to the point of the main attack, and I said that's it, that's the key.

Let me tell you why we succeeded. Superb equipment. When you stop and consider that our tanks and armor traveled 200 miles in a period of two days, O.K., I was confident that we could travel those great distances before the enemy could react. I am sure that at one point somebody said, "What about this great big open flank over there?," and the Iraqi generals or Saddam Hussein said, "Hey, nobody could drive over all that desert that far without their tanks breaking down and their equipment going to hell. They'll never make it."

There were several Achilles' heels. Dhahran was No. 1. All you have to do is stand in Dhahran and look at the huge amounts of equipment we were bringing in there. If they had launched a persistent chemical attack that had denied the port of Damam to us, obviously this would have been a major setback. Or take Riyadh air base—you know three good fighter planes making a run down there could have taken out huge assets. But once the air campaign started, his air force went away, so I no longer worried about Dhahran and Riyadh. ■

and calling in withering air strikes and tank and artillery fire on those that fought. Throughout the 100-hour campaign, the allied soldiers avoided hand-to-hand fighting wherever possible, preferring to stand off and blast away at their foes at more than arm's length.

At the far western reach of the allied line, the French 6th Light Armored Division jumped off before dawn Sunday, attacking across the Iraqi border with the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division toward a fort and airfield named As Salman, 105 miles inside Iraq. On the way, American artillery and French Gazelle helicopter gunships firing HOT antitank missiles subdued a force of Iraqi tanks and infantry, many of whom surrendered.

To the right of the French, the U.S. 101st Airborne Division mounted a deep-penetration helicopter assault into south-eastern Iraq. Chinook helicopters, some skimming only 50 feet above the sand, others slinging Humvees, modern versions of the old jeeps, below their fuselages, ferried 4,000 men with their vehicles and equipment into the desert. The force established a huge refueling and resupply base, then jumped off again from there deeper into Iraq and struck out for the Euphrates River. Other units—the British 1st Armored Division, seven U.S. Army divisions, and Egyptian, Saudi and Syrian units—attacked at various times throughout the morning and early afternoon at points along the Saudi-Iraq border into the western tip of Kuwait. All moved fast and attained their most ambitious objectives. The 1st Marine Division, for example, by Sunday night had reached al-Jaber airport, half the 40-mile distance from the Saudi border to Kuwait City.

MONDAY: SPEEDING UP

Nearly all units continued moving at rapid rates: the Saudis and U.S. Marines in Kuwait toward the north; American Army units toward the Euphrates; British, other American, Egyptian and Syrian forces to the east. The French, having taken As Salman in 36 hours, stopped at midday on Schwarzkopf's orders to set up a defensive position guarding the units to their right against any Iraqi attack from the west.

Mass surrenders began almost with the first breaches of the Iraqi lines Sunday and by Tuesday had reached 30,000; the allied command stopped counting then. By war's end the number had easily passed 100,000. They came out of collapsed bunkers, waving handkerchiefs, underwear, anything that was white. Everyone on the allied side had a favorite surrender story.

Two striking ones: about 40 Iraqis tried to surrender to an RPV, turning round and round, waving their arms as the pilotless drone circled above. An Iraqi tank and another armored vehicle bore down on a U.S. Humvee driven by a lone soldier and stuck

Why reforming our liability America is to succeed

EXCESSIVE LIABILITY AWARDS MAKE IT TOUGH FOR U.S. COMPANIES TO COMPETE.

We are a compassionate society. We want to compensate those who have suffered.

But when our courts expand the traditional concepts of liability, causing defendants to pay excessive compensation, we add to the costs we all pay for goods and services. We encourage companies to stop research and development on new products. And we even make it harder for American companies to compete overseas.

PAYING A HIDDEN TAX.

In reality, the American system of liability has become the source of a hidden tax on our economy—a tax that can account for as much as 50% of the price paid for a product.


What's worse, it has been estimated that this hidden tax amounts to \$80 billion a year—a sum equal to the combined profits of the nation's 200 largest corporations.

Our economic competitors' legal systems do not encourage litigation to the extent we do. Consider, for example, that there are 30 times more lawsuits per capita in the U.S. than in Japan.

Is it any wonder that America is having a tough time competing in overseas markets?

UNCERTAINTY STIFLES ENTERPRISE.

The unpredictability of our liability system is also enormously costly to American competitiveness. For example, in a recent survey of CEOs, the Conference Board found that worry about potential liability lawsuits caused 47% of firms surveyed to discontinue one or more product lines. What's more, 25% stopped certain product research and development, and 39% decided



against coming out with a new product. Meanwhile, our overseas competitors continue to research and develop new products at an ever-increasing pace.

ARE WE CONTROLLING RISKS OR INCREASING THEM?

When we give a drunk driver the right to sue an automaker or highway engineer for a million dollars after a crash, are we controlling risk?

Or just encouraging risky and careless behavior?

If you are a manufacturer, you can be sued even if your product has state-of-the-art safety features. Even if your customer misused it against your instructions. Even if the risks of misuse were obvious.

When fear of lawsuits causes physicians to limit

Liability system is essential if in overseas markets.

services to patients—or worse, to abandon their practice altogether—lack of adequate treatment means greater risks for everyone.

Is this controlling risk or increasing it?

It's an unhealthy and dangerous situation that needs correcting.

WE MUST REFORM OUR "DEEP POCKETS" APPROACH TO LIABILITY.

Specifically, we need to change our approach and base liability suits on fault.

Our current system often encourages the frivolous suing of those with the ability to pay—in other words, those with "deep pockets." But does it make sense to hold such parties entirely liable, even if they were only minimally at fault?

A MORE RATIONAL APPROACH.

Those who suffer economic losses because of another's negligence should be fairly reimbursed. No one could argue with this principle. There should also be just compensation for pain and suffering resulting from real and severe injuries.

But can we afford to continue a system that encourages litigation and financial judgments bearing little direct relationship to fault or to the actual cost of injuries suffered?

Clearly, a better approach is needed.

CONGRESS HAS A ROLE.

Legislation providing a uniform product liability standard would allow American companies to compete without the burdens of excessive liability risks. And this would unclog the courts and put American business in a stronger position as barriers to international trade and investment fall.

There is proposed legislation before Congress

dealing with these issues. A solution to the liability crisis is vital to American competitiveness, and Congress can play a role in restoring the right balance.

SO DO THE COURTS.

When all is said and done, our courts are the interpreters of our laws and our values. It's our values as a society that count, especially as reflected in the courts and individual jury decisions.

Together our legislative and judicial branches must recognize the damage being done to American competitiveness from the current liability system. And help America restore the proper balance.

WHY IS AIG RUNNING ADS LIKE THIS?

AIG (American International Group) is the largest underwriter of commercial and industrial insurance in America, and the leading U.S.-based international insurance organization.


Since we deal every day with issues affecting the future of the world economy, it's understandable that we champion reform designed to strengthen the competitive stance of American business in global markets.

Perhaps you'll want to keep the ball rolling by contacting your elected officials—judges and legislators—with your own views.

Or if you prefer, write Mr. M.R. Greenberg, Chairman, AIG, 70 Pine Street, New York, NY 10270.

AIG World leaders in insurance and financial services.

The Gulf War



Flashing an international hand signal, Kuwait City residents celebrate the end of Iraq's seven-month occupation

helplessly in mud. The Iraqi vehicles pulled the Humvee out of the mire; then their crews surrendered to its driver.

Schwarzkopf was careful to state that the mass surrenders did not necessarily mean the Iraqis were poor fighters. Most, he noted, had no belief in what they were doing and did not regard holding on to Kuwait as a cause worth dying for. They were starved, thirsty, often sick—medical care was atrocious to nonexistent—and some had been terrorized by their own commanders, who employed roving execution squads to shoot or hang troopers who had attempted to desert or defect. That barbar-

ic method of keeping discipline backfired: soldiers gave themselves up as soon as the guns pointing at them were American, British or Arab.

Baghdad radio on Monday broadcast an order, supposedly from Saddam, for his forces to withdraw from Kuwait; many complied with alacrity. Those who paused to fight were often cut to pieces. On Monday afternoon, for example, the 1st Marine Division encountered Iraqi units in the Burgan oil field near Kuwait International Airport and flushed them out with "time on target" fire, the opposite of a rolling barrage: all guns in the entire division opened up at the same time to lay down a devastating curtain of explosives on the same limited target area. That forced the Iraqis out of the oil

field. Emerging into the open, they were hit with more fire from artillery, Cobra attack helicopters and Marine tanks. Some 50 to 60 Iraqi tanks were reported destroyed in this brief engagement. Marine losses: zero.

Oddly, though, this day of burgeoning victory brought the one U.S. tragedy of the war. An Iraqi Scud missile heading for Saudi Arabia broke up in flight: the warhead plunged onto an American barracks near the huge base at Dhahran. The blast killed 28 soldiers, causing in an eye blink almost a third of all American battle deaths in the entire war. An additional 90 soldiers were injured, many seriously.

TUESDAY: BUGGING OUT

Residents of Kuwait City awoke to the sound of tank engines revving up. The Iraqis were pulling out, sparing the city, its inhabitants, and the allied forces closing in the agonies of house-to-house fighting. By afternoon Kuwaiti resistance fighters said they were in control of the city, though sniper fire continued for a while and Saudi and Kuwaiti troops did not stage their victory parade into the city until the following day.

Outside the city, said a U.S. briefing officer, "the whole country is full of people escaping and evading." Though some allied commanders described the Iraqi pullback as an orderly fighting retreat, at times it looked like a pell-mell bugout. Roads leading north toward the Iraqi city of Basra, military headquarters for the Kuwait theater, were so jammed with vehicles and troops that a pilot from the carrier U.S.S. *Ranger* in the gulf said it looked like "the road to Daytona Beach at spring break." Allied bombing of roads and bridges had created bottlenecks from which mammoth traffic jams backed up, making for still more inviting targets. So many allied planes converged on the main road from Kuwait City to Basra that combat air controllers feared they might collide, and diverted some of the attackers to secondary roads.

Pilots flying off the *Ranger* were so eager to refuel and get back into the air to kill more tanks that they had their planes loaded with whatever bombs or missiles happened to be available on the flight deck, rather than waiting for the ship's slow elevators to bring up ordnance specifically chosen for their mission. Pilot after pilot described attacks in which, after the first tank in a column was hit, the crews would abandon the others and set out on foot for home. Correspondents touring the road at week's end found mile after mile of blasted, twisted, burned, shattered tanks, trucks and other vehicles, many still incongruously carrying loot from Kuwait City: children's toys, carpets, television sets. Those Iraqi soldiers who reached the Euphrates threw up pontoon bridges to replace sturdier spans that

had been destroyed by bombing; when more bombs wrecked the pontoon bridges too, some desperate troops crossed by walking along earthen dams.

WEDNESDAY: CLOSING THE RING

Some allied units had reached the Euphrates as early as Monday; by Wednesday morning they were established in enough force to prevent further crossings. British units cut the main Kuwait City-Basra highway early in the day; American Marines had reached it farther to the south the previous afternoon. The gate had slammed shut on Saddam's forces in Kuwait. Their escape routes were broken. Encirclement was complete.

The day was dominated by the two big tank battles of the war. U.S. Marines ran into a major Iraqi armored force at Kuwait International Airport. The sky was so dark because of the heavy smoke from oil wells set afire by the Iraqis that Marine Major General Michael Myatt had to read a map by flashlight. The Marines nonetheless resumed the battle by what light there was, and late in the day reported having destroyed all 100 Iraqi tanks they had engaged.

In a far bigger clash along the Kuwait-Iraq border, American and British troops pushing eastward after their flanking maneuver through the desert finally broke the Republican Guard. Schwarzkopf had defined these troops as the "center of gravity" of the Iraqi forces. Said a senior Army staff officer: "The whole campaign was designed on one theme: to destroy the Republican Guard."

British troops encountered some Guard units as early as Monday night, destroying a third of their armor at the first blow with long-range artillery fire and aerial attack.

Fighting between American troops and Guard units also began Monday and steadily intensified; by nightfall Monday a briefer reported one of the Guard's seven divisions in the area rendered "basically ineffective." The big battle raged all day Wednesday. Some allied officers reported that the Guard fought about as well as could have been expected of troops battling without air cover, with minimal, if any, communications and under relentless allied bombing. But one American officer asserted that "basically we are chasing them across the plains, shooting as we go."

The Guard fared no better than other Iraqi units. Not only was allied air power unchallenged and decisive; U.S. M1A1 tanks proved superior in maneuverability and firepower to Iraq's



A Kuwaiti salutes symbol of liberation

best, the Soviet-built T-72s. One correspondent witnessed a duel between an M1A1 and a T-72. When they sighted each other, the American tank backed up, outside the T-72's range. The Iraqi tank fired a round that fell short. The M1A1 fired its longer-range cannon, scoring a direct hit that put the Iraqi tank out of action, then promptly swiveled and went looking for another victim.

By Wednesday evening Schwarzkopf, in a masterly briefing on the war about to end, began by saying that Iraq had lost

more than 3,000 of the 4,700 tanks it had deployed in the Kuwait theater at the start of the war—then added, "As a matter of fact, you can add 700 to that as a result of the battle that's going on right now with the Republican Guard." Saddam's forces lost similarly high proportions of their other armored vehicles, artillery and trucks. The result, said Schwarzkopf, was that Iraq was left with only an infantry army, no longer capable of offensive operations and therefore not a threat to other countries in the region. That fulfilled one of the two principal allied war aims; the other, clearing Iraq out of Kuwait, was just about accomplished as well. The war was as good as over.

THURSDAY: VICTORY

In a few more hours, the shooting officially ended. At 5 a.m. (9 p.m. Wednesday in Washington) Bush went on the air to announce that he was ordering a suspension of all offensive action, to take effect three hours later. Since it was a unilateral action rather than an agreement negotiated with the Iraqis, it was not officially a cease-fire, but it had the same result. Shooting in fact stopped at 8 a.m., and only sporadic incidents broke the silence as the weekend began. Some Iraqi units appeared not to get the word at first; allied troops set up loudspeakers blaring over and over again the message in Arabic that Iraqis would no longer be attacked if they held their fire. A warning to those that did not: on Saturday, a column of 140 Iraqi tanks and other armored vehicles ran into a U.S. force and began shooting. The Americans counterattacked with tank and helicopter fire, destroying 60 Iraqi vehicles and capturing the other 80.

The task of negotiating an official end to the battle was only beginning. Iraq des-



Kuwait City residents rejoice in renewed freedom to be themselves

The Gulf War

igned a representative to meet with Schwarzkopf's officers and work out terms of a permanent cease-fire, but that was no simple task. The allies were pressing for a swift exchange of prisoners, but did that include the Kuwaiti civilians—as many as 40,000—believed to have been carried into Iraq by Saddam's retreating forces? And what would the coalition do with the many Iraqi prisoners who feared, with reason, that they might be shot if they went home? Should Saddam's forces be allowed to take out of Kuwait what heavy equipment they had left, or must they leave it behind as spoils of war?

Long-range planning began too. U.S. and British officials intended to begin some token withdrawals of troops from the gulf as early as this week, but Americans warned that bringing all the forces home might take longer than the seven months that had been required to complete the buildup. Most will have to stay on until some permanent peacekeeping arrangements can be forged. U.S. Secretary of State James Baker prepared to set out on a swing through the Middle East this week, including his first visit ever to Israel, to scout the possibilities for a wider regional settlement.

Postmortems had already begun. Baghdad Radio claimed that Iraq had won but could give no rationale except some mumblings about spirit. In Moscow generals hastened to proclaim that the destruction of Iraq's mostly Soviet-built equipment said more about the deficiencies of the Iraqi military than the quality of the weapons. Some of them hinted, however, that Soviet cuts in military spending, if carried much further, might begin to weaken the nation's defenses against the demonstrated proficiency of Western high-tech weaponry.

On the allied side, Schwarzkopf seemed right in terming the coalition's ability to achieve nearly total success with so few losses "almost miraculous." Not only were the pessimists and skeptics wrong, including all those who had said the aerial bombing was going badly, but the optimists were far off the mark too. American casualties were less than 5% of the lowest prewar Pentagon estimates. U.S. forces had prepared about 10,000 beds, aboard ships and in three field hospitals, to receive the wounded; only a tiny fraction were filled.

Such overwhelming success, in fact, may be unrepeatable. The U.S. and its partners are unlikely to face soon, or ever, another combination of a cause so clear that it unites a mighty coalition; ideal terrain for high-tech warfare; a dispirited and war-weary enemy army; an almost total lack of opposition in the air; and an adversary, Saddam, who made nearly every blunder in the book. —*Reported by William Dowell/Kuwait City, Bruce van Voorst/Washington and Robert T. Zintl/Riyadh*

FIVE DECISIVE MOMENTS

1 JANUARY 9 MISJUDGMENT IN GENEVA



Aziz and Baker at the eleventh hour

By RICHARD LACAYO


Scarcely had the meeting begun in the Salon des Nations conference room of Geneva's Intercontinental Hotel when U.S. Secretary of State James Baker handed Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz a brown manila envelope stamped with the presidential seal. Inside was a letter from George Bush warning Saddam Hussein to get out of Kuwait by Jan. 15—six days hence—or face the certainty that the 28-nation coalition would force him out. Aziz, fluent in English, carefully looked over a photocopy that had been provided for him. When he finished, the Iraqi lowered his heavy black-frame glasses. "I am sorry," he said. "I cannot receive this letter. The language in this letter is not compatible with language between heads of state."

When the talks ended 6½ hours later, Aziz's posture was unchanged. A senior member of the American team decided then and there that Saddam had never intended the meeting to have any chance of success. "These guys had not come to make a deal," he says. "War was inevitable."

But it may have been an Iraqi judgment at the meeting itself that made war inescapable. Throughout the talks Saddam's half-brother Barzan Tikriti had sat on Aziz's right, closely scrutinizing the American team. Soon after the session ended, Barzan called Baghdad. The Americans don't want to fight, he told Saddam. They want to talk their way out. They are weak.

It was a fateful misjudgment. Baker flew to Saudi Arabia the next day, where he told Saudi King Fahd that, barring any last-minute developments, the U.S. would begin an air battle within two days of the Jan. 15 deadline. In a meeting at the White House that Sunday, Bush and his advisers chose the hour to strike: 2:30 a.m., Jan. 17, Baghdad time.

2 JANUARY 17 THE HAIL MARY PLAY



To fool Saddam, U.S. tanks head west

On the day the allied air campaign began, a massive troop movement was secretly set in motion that would seal Saddam's fate. Fearing that a frontal assault on heavily dug-in Iraqi defenders could lead to thousands of allied casualties, Schwarzkopf launched the flanking maneuver he would later compare to the Hail Mary play—the football maneuver in which a quarterback praying for a last-minute touchdown sends his receivers far off to one side and then deep into the end zone.

Schwarzkopf did not find it easy to sell the idea to skeptical U.S. tactical commanders when he first proposed it last November. They argued that more than 150,000 soldiers could not be moved that far that fast, with all their armor, artillery and 60 days of ammunition and supplies, over a desert with only rudimentary roads. "I got a lot of guff," he recalls. "They thought that Schwarzkopf had lost his marbles." So stiff was their resistance that Schwarzkopf ordered his logistics commander, Major General William Pagonis, to sign his name to a pledge that the troops and their equipment would be in place by the Feb. 21 deadline.

Schwarzkopf reasoned that if his subordinates doubted it could be done, Saddam's generals would be quite certain that such a move was impossible and, lacking any aerial reconnaissance to indicate it was actually under way, would leave "this big, open flank" largely undefended. He was right.

3 JANUARY 31

THE BATTLE OF KHAJFI



Marines seek out Iraqi raiders

Khafji was already a ghost town when a sudden Iraqi thrust made it the site of the first large ground battle of the war. Six miles south of the Saudi border with Kuwait, the town had been abandoned two weeks earlier by residents who fled out of the range of Iraqi artillery fire. On Tuesday, Jan. 29, nine brigades of Iraq's 5th Mechanized Division—regarded by the U.S. as one of Saddam's better units—swept into Saudi Arabia. They entered along a stretch of border that began north of Khafji and ended at the town of Umm Hujul, 50 miles to the west. By the next night they had occupied the town. Supported by U.S. air and artillery attacks, troops from Saudi Arabia and Qatar retook Khafji the following day after 12 hours of fierce fighting.

If Saddam had intended the raid to lure allied forces into a ground war before they were ready, he failed. Not only did troops from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the U.S. repel the invaders, but Saddam's ploy actually contributed to the success of the allied ground offensive. The battle provided U.S. military planners with their first opportunity to see how Iraq's troops operated against American mobile tactics. The Iraqis performed badly, surrendering en masse when the Marines counterattacked. "They showed us they couldn't handle combined operations," says a senior Pentagon official. "They maneuvered but couldn't work effectively as a unit." Postbattle inspection disclosed that Iraqi tanks and armored personnel carriers were in terrible shape. As General Norman Schwarzkopf put it, Khafji "led us to believe that we were really going to kick this guy's tail."

4 FEBRUARY 11

KEEPING ISRAEL IN CHECK



A father and son survey Scud damage

When Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens arrived in Washington for a crucial White House meeting, Israel had withstood 11 attacks by Iraqi Scuds. Some had been shot down by the Patriot missiles that the U.S. had rushed to Israel after the first attack on Jan. 17. But a number had hit home, leaving four dead and 98 wounded. Though the restless Israelis had acceded to Washington's pleas not to retaliate, the continuing threat of Scud attacks and fear of chemical warheads had stretched Jerusalem's patience to the limit.

Sitting in the Oval Office, Arens unveiled a disturbing proposal: an Israeli air and ground operation in Iraq that could take place after the allied ground war had begun. American cooperation would be essential. To keep U.S. and Israeli pilots from accidentally attacking each other, Arens wanted U.S. planes to stay out of western Iraq skies where Israeli planes were operating.

Bush was sympathetic but refused to go along with the plan, and cautioned Israel against taking any action on its own. His reasoning: even in the midst of a ground war, an Israeli move against Iraq could split apart the allied coalition and enormously complicate battle plans. Israel's best deterrence, he argued, was to be a close ally of the foremost world power. But Arens did not leave empty-handed; shortly afterward, the U.S. increased its Scud-busting air sorties against Iraq.

5 FEBRUARY 27

GEORGE BUSH SAYS THE WAR IS OVER



At the end, the President decides

By last Wednesday the explosive gains of the allied advance had taken even the President by surprise. That afternoon he heard the full story in a private assessment from General Colin Powell. At 2:30 Bush gathered his war cabinet in the Oval Office. "I want to stop the killing," he told them. After Bush consulted by phone with Schwarzkopf in Riyadh, the group agreed on midnight as the hour for a cease-fire.

Though Bush had known for more than a day that the war was drawing to a quick conclusion, it required a change of heart for him finally to call off the fighting. Just two days earlier, after Baghdad radio announced that the Iraqi leadership had ordered a withdrawal, the President and his advisers had decided to keep the pressure on: no peace, the White House would declare, until Saddam "publicly and personally" agreed to the terms of the U.S. ultimatum outlined the previous weekend. By humbling the Iraqi leader Bush hoped to circumvent any prospect that Saddam might pluck political triumph from military defeat. "Bush was asking him to get down on his knees," says a presidential aide. "None of this face-saving stuff."

By midday Wednesday, however, allied forces were routing the Iraqis so thoroughly that U.S. military leaders could tell the President that field commanders were running out of things to shoot at. "It became harder to justify taking American and coalition casualties for diminishing returns," says a senior policymaker.

The Administration had also stopped worrying that a cease-fire might leave Saddam with no incentive to agree to allied demands about pawns or reparations. "The incentive was the fact that there is nothing between the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division and Baghdad but 150 miles," says a White House official. "The Iraqis had a choice: an easy peace or a hard peace."

—Reported by Michael Duffy/Washington, Dean Fischer/Riyadh and Ron Ben-Yishai/Jerusalem

MILITARY TACTICS

Could Saddam Have Done Better?

Though Iraq might not have prevailed, the war would have been far more ferocious if Baghdad had shifted its strategy

By BRUCE W. NELAN



When General Norman Schwarzkopf was asked to evaluate Saddam Hussein as a military leader last week, the allied commander telegraphed his answer with a derisive "Ha!" Then, with studied scorn, Schwarzkopf elaborated, "He is neither a strategist, nor is he schooled in the operational art, nor is he a tactician, nor is he a general, nor is he a soldier. Other than that, he's a great military man."

Because of the huge number of men and weapons Saddam poured into Kuwait, many military observers expected him to fight more effectively and inflict many more casualties than he did. As Schwarzkopf recounted at his wrap-up briefing, Iraqi combat forces outnumbered the coalition's 2 to 1 on the battlefield. In addition, the Iraqis had many more tanks and artillery pieces and had carefully dug them in.

The general's detailed account of the campaign was a pointed reminder that simple comparisons of numbers are of limited use in predicting a war's outcome. Much more important in this battle was a series of strategic mistakes that proved Saddam's military ineptitude.

The first, analysts now agree, was his failure to press ahead last Aug. 3 after his Republican Guard overran Kuwait. If Iraq's million-man army had gone on to invade Saudi Arabia and the gulf states, the whole shape of the struggle could have been different. "At that time there were no American forces in the area," says Andrew Duncan, assistant director of London's International Institute of Strategic Studies. "Saddam's troops could have swept down the gulf, toppling one state after another."

Says a senior Pentagon officer: "Had Iraq occupied Saudi ports and airfields, the [allied] buildup as we know it would have been impossible." If Saddam had seized control of so much of the region's oil, fears of devastating price rises or of losing supplies altogether might have deterred the allies from even considering the use of force against Iraq.

Having stopped at the Saudi border, however, Saddam developed a strategic fixation on keeping Kuwait. He declared it the 19th province of Iraq and concentrated more and more of his troops—535,000

eventually—on its soil or just north of the Kuwait-Iraq frontier. Apparently he hoped to re-fight his past war, the eight-year contest of attrition with Iran, battling from behind elaborate fortifications and minefields, with armored reserves quickly deployable to seal off enemy breakthroughs.

Saddam was so preoccupied with the defense of Kuwait that he did not extend his defensive line of berms, razor wire and mines more than a few miles west of the Kuwait frontier that faces Saudi Arabia. The struggle for Kuwait, he said in January, would finally depend on "the soldier who comes with rifle and bayonet to fight the soldier in the battle trench." In

static defense of Kuwait, simply had to dig in and take the pounding. That commitment only intensified after Saddam fell for allied bluffs that a seaborne invasion was coming. After six weeks of bombing, front-line units were isolated, mostly unable to communicate with Baghdad or one another, short of food and water. Many divisions had lost half of their equipment and, more important, their will to fight.

Victory in this war, as in all others, depended not so much on the weapons employed—although the allies on the whole had more sophisticated equipment than Iraq had—as on the determination of the men who had to use them. Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe during World War II, said that "morale is the greatest single factor in successful war." In the course of unrelenting bombing, weeks of hunger and Baghdad's dickering with Moscow about a withdrawal, Iraqi morale evaporated. The Saudi commander, Lieut. General Khalid bin Sultan, said Iraq's soldiers were com-



Charging into Iraq: an American column passes an enemy tank that never got out of its dugout

Saddam's attempt to fight this war with static defenses and layers of fortifications did not work.

that, he boasted, "we are people with experience."

The coalition did not give the Iraqis a chance to apply it. Once the air offensive began on Jan. 16, it became obvious that for the first time air power was going to play a decisive role in war. Again Saddam made a misstep: after losing 36 fighters to allied aircraft, fighters he sent aloft, he grounded his 800-plane air force and eventually dispatched 137 of his top-of-the-line combat and transport aircraft to sanctuary in Iran. Allied planes then flew 80,000 sorties virtually unhindered and lost only 36, dramatically fewer than the 200 the coalition command had braced for. Asked how Saddam might have made better use of his multibillion-dollar air force, a U.S. Air Force general says, "Could have flown 'em."

Iraq's field army, committed to the

petent enough, but "they don't believe in what they are fighting for."

The ground war proved this. While the coalition achieved victory with a wide, flanking sweep to the west, U.S., Saudi, Egyptian and Syrian divisions struck north from Saudi Arabia. They pushed directly into the Iraqi fortifications where Saddam had wanted to see them. Even there, Iraqi forces put up little resistance.

"They surprised me by not fighting harder," says Marine General Walt Boomer of the Iraqi forces. "But if they had fought for every bunker, the outcome would have been the same." There is little doubt of that, but allied casualties would have been much higher. The coalition's commanders and troops can say they did, in the end, play Saddam's game—and beat him at it. —Reported by Frank Melville/London and Bruce van Voorst/Washington

The Gulf War

IRAQ

With His Country in Ruins, How Long Can Saddam Hang On?

Probably longer than governments from Washington to Kuwait City would like, unless the suffering he inflicted inspires an uprising



Baghdad last week: no sight of the real Saddam

By SCOTT MACLEOD AMMAN



O Iraqis! Yes, you triumphed when you stood with all this vigor against the armies of 30 states! You triumphed while emphasizing your ability to face the showdown and confrontation! You have recorded for Arabs and Muslims bright pages of glory that will be remembered for generations!

—Baghdad Radio, following the Feb. 28 cease-fire

That report was a blatant rewriting of history. Across Iraq, the shattered hulks of planes and tanks lie strewn across airfields and battlegrounds. Power stations, telephone and telegraph centers, oil refineries and factories have been reduced to smoldering ruins. Dozens of bombed bridges are slumped into the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. Tens of thousands of Iraqi soldiers, as well as an unknown number of civilians, are dead. Many thousands more are either prisoners of the allied forces or straggling abjectly back to Iraq without their weapons. If this was victory, it is impossible to imagine what would constitute defeat.

Sooner or later—and probably sooner—Iraq's 19 million battered people will understand just how costly Saddam Hussein's miscalculation was. When they do, Saddam could face a fearful reckoning. The U.S. and its allies have made no secret of their desire that Saddam be overthrown by his own people. Most experts in Washington and other capitals say Saddam may be able to hang on, at least for a while, because he has so ruthlessly eliminated his internal rivals. But there was speculation that Saddam might flee. At week's end there were rumors that he might seek political asylum in Algeria, although officials there denied it.

Saddam's ouster or exile would end a bloody chapter in Iraqi history. But the one that follows could be just as sanguinary. In a country that has experienced five coups

since 1958, Saddam's 12 years in power are a record. His Baath Party has imposed stability through control of the army and a network of secret police and informers that penetrates every niche of Iraqi society. If that is swept away, simmering tensions between the Shi'ite Muslims (55% of the population), Sunni Muslims (20%) and Kurds (25%) could conceivably erupt into a communal bloodbath, fragmenting the country into another Lebanon.

That may be one argument for accepting Saddam's continuation in power, provided he has been weakened to the point that he can no longer threaten neighboring countries. The gulf states have an interest in maintaining Baghdad's sovereignty: a fragmented Iraq could give a resurgent Iran the chance to dominate the region. For the allies, the issues of putting Saddam on trial for war crimes and of Iraqi payment of reparations to Kuwait still need to be settled. Although he remains a hero to many of his followers, Saddam has proba-

bly ceased playing an effective role in Arab politics. Even such supporters as Jordan and the Palestine Liberation Organization are distancing themselves from Saddam in defeat.

It is hard to see how such a Saddam could ever be an international threat again. Alive, paradoxically, he is less of a hero than dead. His army is broken, his country is a shambles, and he has virtually no links to the outside world. Although the U.N. is likely to lift the economic sanctions fairly soon, the arms embargo will probably last as long as Saddam is in power.

There is little good news in Baghdad nowadays, but perhaps one bit is that people are beginning to voice criticism of their government in defiance of the dreaded *mukhabarat*, or secret police. The most common complaint has been the misery caused by the war. But this can be only the beginning. When the defeated troops return home with their stories of what really happened on the battlefield, Saddam's



Funeral of a bombing victim: Will Iraqis understand Saddam's blunders?

claims of a glorious victory will be further undermined. "There will be a lot of opposition to Saddam inside Iraq," observes Jamal Sha'ir, a former Jordanian Cabinet minister. "People will feel, 'You are the one who sank us. You can't be the one to correct things now.'"

Saddam has made so many enemies that it would be suicide for him to hand over power voluntarily—unless he could get political asylum somewhere else. The most likely scenario—one that has ample precedent in Iraqi politics—is a coup by military commanders who feel that Saddam must pay the price for his misguided venture into Kuwait. There is reason for their anger: at every stage in the confrontation, Saddam's blunders led to humiliation for Iraq. He personally devised a war-fighting strategy that resulted in the slaughter of large numbers of Iraqi soldiers while inflicting only a handful of casualties on coalition forces. He lost billions of dollars' worth of military hardware, transforming the world's fourth largest army into a military dwarf—all in a mere six weeks. With a debt of more than \$70 billion, the country will be destitute for years to come.

Saddam's hold on power has always relied on the placing of relatives from

WHAT'S LEFT OF IRAQ'S ARMY



Iraq's Takrit region in key positions of authority, and it might even be one of them who decides that the clan's survival is more important than Saddam's. In addition, two of his longtime associates appear to have more power than other members of the ruling circle: Deputy Prime Minister Taha Yassin Ramadan and Revolutionary Command Council Deputy Chairman Izzat Ibrahim. So far, neither has seemed ambitious enough to seize power for its own sake.

Another danger for Saddam is political unrest caused by Iraq's severe economic

crisis. Some experts believe that if protests start in Shi'ite Muslim areas south of Baghdad, it could bring down the regime.

Many Iraqis rallied around Saddam when their country was under attack by the allies, and felt betrayed by Arabs who didn't come to their side. But eight years of war with Iran brought nothing comparable to the misery that Iraqis are experiencing now. Gasoline is rarely available, and when it is, the lines are 400 cars long. Baghdad residents have had no tap water or electricity for more than a month. Sewage systems overflowing with garbage are creating a health hazard.

Surgical operations at hospitals have been conducted by candlelight without morphine. Food is still available, but prices have soared.

Last week an Iraqi official provided a glimpse into the kind of political difficulties Saddam may now face. Sharing a taxi into Baghdad with a foreign journalist, he openly speculated on what Iraq would be like without Saddam. That is an offense for which he could have been summarily shot. Sadly, the official took such a risk only to predict that Saddam's successor could well be simply another Saddam.

A Case of Nuremberg II?

As evidence—and rumors—of Iraqi outrages in Kuwait mounted last week, allied calls for legal action against Saddam Hussein and his minions were gaining momentum. For the moment, George Bush ducked the issue, declaring, "We have to just wait and see."

Among U.S. legal experts, there is wide agreement that Saddam Hussein, his Revolutionary Command Council and his military officers should be held accountable for three types of transgressions identified and prosecuted in the Nuremberg trials of German leaders after World War II: crimes against peace, crimes against humanity and war crimes. But since there is no permanent international criminal court, there are questions about who should conduct such prosecutions, what precise charges would be made—and whether the chief target, Saddam, could be brought to justice.

International-law specialists suggest several possibilities for convening a war-crimes tribunal—each with drawbacks. One would be via the U.N., whose General Assembly endorsed the Nuremberg principles in 1946. The U.N. could designate a panel of judges drawn from the allied coalition as well as from nations that were not involved in the Gulf crisis. Such a scheme, however, might face a veto in the Security Council by the Soviet Union or China.

A second option would see the coalition partners convene their own tribunal, using Nuremberg as a model. As in 1945, the judges would be drafted from among the victor nations. Experts caution that this approach might look like "victors' vengeance" and might offend those Arabs who still lionize

Saddam. Procedure could also become a sticking point since the coalition partners have different legal systems. A third scheme would have members of the six-nation Gulf Cooperation Council convene trials, possibly under Islamic law.

Even with agreement on the appropriate tribunal, questions would remain about precisely what crimes are punishable and who should be held responsible. Actions that breach the Geneva Conventions of 1949, to which Iraq is a signatory, are patently criminal: the use of civilians as human shields, the mistreatment of prisoners of war and the targeting of civilian populations. But was the polluting of the Persian Gulf during the second week of the conflict a war crime? There is room for doubt about the causes of the spill.

Whatever the legalities, unless the Baghdad regime is overthrown, it is unlikely that Saddam and his top henchmen will be placed in the dock. Some jurists suggest they should be tried anyway, in absentia. But even without that dramatic event, the meticulous documenting of atrocities and the punishment of Iraqis who carried out their superiors' most unconscionable orders would serve a deterrent purpose and underscore the justice of the allied cause. "The idea of a trial would be to show the Arabs that Saddam Hussein is not the great savior," says Howard Levie, professor emeritus of law at St. Louis University. At the very least, a prosecution would hold Saddam and his regime up to formal international scrutiny for deeds that much of the world has already judged to be barbaric.

—By Jill Smolowe

Reported by J.F.O. McAllister/Washington and Andrea Sachs/New York

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KUWAIT

Free at Last! Free at Last!

Amid the ruins of their capital, citizens celebrate the end of their ordeal—and ponder revenge against collaborators

By **BRUCE W. NELAN**




On Feb. 27, six months and 25 days after Iraqi tanks crushed Kuwait beneath their treads, another column of armored vehicles rumbled into the capital city. This time the advancing forces were greeted with an outburst of exultation that rivaled the liberation of Paris during World War II. As columns of Kuwaiti and Saudi tanks and personnel carriers rolled up the battered, wreckage-strewn express-

way into Kuwait City, civilian cars formed a convoy around them, horns honking, flags waving. Crowds along the way danced and chanted, "Allah akbar!" "U.S.A! U.S.A.!" and "Thank you, thank you!" Thousands swarmed onto the streets, embracing and kissing the arriving soldiers.

That joyful scene was staged amid the ruins of what had been a gleaming metropolis. It was backlit by towering orange flames on the horizon where hundreds of oil wells, torched by fleeing Iraqis, continued to burn and block the midday sun with huge curtains of dense black

smoke. The eerie pall was a visible symbol of the dark ordeal Kuwait had lived through during the Iraqi occupation and a final, horrifying week of murder, kidnapping and destruction.

Yet even the terrible memories could not still the celebration as the troops moved into the center of the city, where parking lots were carpeted with broken glass and scores of buildings that had been set on fire by Iraqi troops still smoldered. Members of the Kuwaiti resistance movement joined in the parade, shooting into the air with rifles from the back of pickup



Moment of retribution: an armed Kuwaiti resistance fighter, left, pulls in a suspected collaborator for questioning

The ferocity of the attack on the environment was matched by the depredations inflicted on the Kuwaiti people. The killing, torturing, kidnapping and theft that marked the entire occupation accelerated to an even more barbaric pace as the occupiers prepared to cut and run. The fleeing Iraqis apparently abducted thousands of Kuwaitis whose whereabouts remain unknown. Many Kuwaitis are convinced that the Iraqis dragged off the captives to use as bargaining chips in negotiations with the allies.

"My uncle was taken by the Iraqis on Thursday," Talal Attar, 29, an architectural engineer, said last week. "A lot of my friends and neighbors and cousins have disappeared." Enad al-Ban, a 24-year-old member of the resistance, said he was rounded up by the Iraqi security forces on Feb. 22 after he had finished Friday prayers at a mosque; he was one of hundreds of Kuwaitis taken almost at random by the security forces that day. "They were trying to catch any Kuwaiti they could," he said. "They put me in prison, and I was surprised to see that 3,000 others like me were also there."

Before Al-Ban managed to escape, he claimed, he witnessed a sickening display of savagery. "The Iraqis took a six-year-old girl as hostage," he said, and demanded a car and cash as ransom. "The parents gave them what they wanted. The Iraqis told them to come to the police station and asked them, 'Is this your child?' When they said yes, the Iraqis shot her dead in front of them."

Such tales strain credulity, both because they are so shocking and because every war produces stories of atrocities that are later called into question. But similar accounts were common in the liberated city, and there was no reason to doubt them. Almost everyone on the street last week spoke of losing a friend or family member. Resistance fighters who went to Adan Hospital, looking for five of their comrades who had been arrested, found their bodies. Said Tareq Ahmad, 23, a Kuwaiti air force sergeant serving in the resistance: "The Iraqis had drilled holes in their heads, and they had holes in their hands, feet and shoulders as if they had been crucified."

A Kuwaiti doctor too nervous to give his name told arriving journalists that Iraqis often dismembered prisoners before killing them. "Some of the bodies were missing noses," he said. "Some had their eyes taken out. What the Iraqis did was beyond belief."

As they began blowing up the oil wells, the Iraqis extended their scorched-earth policy throughout the city. They shelled and demolished government buildings including ministries and the parliament, the national museum, the main water-desali-

trucks. Saudi soldiers added to the din with bursts of machine-gun fire.

Everywhere the green-white-red-and-black Kuwaiti flag, which had been outlawed during the occupation, fluttered from buildings, bridges and hats. A baby dressed in an outfit made from the flag was held up to be kissed by the liberators. A woman in black robes blew kisses at U.S. Marine Lieut. General Walt Boomer, who rode atop one of the troop carriers. "We'll never see anything like this again in our lifetime," Boomer declared. "Makes you appreciate freedom, doesn't it?"

But with the joy came angry expressions of revenge and hatred. Newly liberated Kuwaitis began a campaign to eradicate every reminder of the occupation. They shredded, burned and even machine-gunned portraits of Saddam Hussein and Iraqi flags. A band of youths used a sledgehammer to demolish a sign marking the REPUBLIC OF IRAQ MINISTRY OF EDUCATION IN THE DISTRICT OF KUWAIT. Others spat on Iraqi bank notes, the only legal

tender under Saddam's rule, and tossed them into a bonfire.

The angry mood was shared by many of the arriving soldiers and civilians. One of them, Mohammed Khayhe, a Saudi Information Ministry official, surveyed the cold, smoky darkness over the city. The electricity had gone off when the allied ground offensive began on Feb. 24, and cars were using their headlights in the choking billows from the oil fires. "It's like a nuclear winter," said Khayhe. "Now that Kuwait is free, it's not fit to live in."

That could be literally true. American specialists warn that the smoke, which is high in sulfur dioxide, can cause serious lung ailments, especially among the elderly and the very young living within 20 miles of the burning oil wells. Some scientists fear that the acrid plumes will climb into the stratosphere, darken the skies, lower temperatures and change the weather pattern of the entire gulf region. And, say oil experts, it might take until the end of 1991 to extinguish all 600 blazes.

The Gulf War

nation plant, electrical generating plants, tank farms and water-storage towers.

A group of 40 Bangladeshis employed at the Meridien Hotel were living in its basement. On Feb. 23, they say, a squad of Iraqi troops stormed in and gave them 10 minutes to get out. "They parked two tanks in front of the hotel and shelled it," says Rafiq Islam Bulu, 29, from Dhaka. "When we came back, it was on fire." The Bangladeshis, he adds, lost everything they owned. That night the Iraqis also destroyed the offices of Air France and Saudi Arabian Airlines, the Gulf Bank and Kuwait's largest building, al-Montana complex.

Captured Iraqi soldiers try to blame the brutalities on Saddam. Last week the resistance was holding 16 of them, ages 18 to 47, at a small house in a Kuwait City suburb. An antiaircraft gun stood in the garden, and the garage was stacked with grenades and ammunition boxes, one of which bore the logo of the Jordanian armed forces.

The prisoners, all reservists, said they had eaten only rice and bread containing sawdust for months. They also claimed they were terrorized by the Kwat al-Khasa, the Iraqi special forces, who threatened to kill them if they tried to desert. How could these pathetic men explain the atrocities committed by Iraqis in Kuwait? "We are the victims of this war," said one soldier who gave his name only as Ali. "One man ruled everything. He sent us to Kuwait, which is a friend and an Arab country. He did it out of envy." Another chimed in,

"Saddam is a bloody man. He likes to see blood everywhere."

To Kuwaitis, though, the Iraqi army is a band of criminals. "Soldiers is not the word for them," said Ali Abdul Karim, one of those celebrating freedom last week. "Thieves is the word." The occupying troops would spot a car or a house they liked and simply seize it, pretending it was being requisitioned for the army.

When the Iraqis finally pulled out on Feb. 26, Kuwait City residents were alerted by the early morning roar of engines revving. "They were in a hurry," says Jemal al-Mansour, a police lieutenant. "They were shouting at one another." Many of them simply stole cars, loaded them with looted television sets, dresses, china or anything else of value they could lay their hands on, and headed toward Iraq. Thousands of them ended up in a gigantic traffic jam, where allied planes and helicopters bombed and burned them into a tangle of wreckage miles long.

Second only to the Iraqis as a target of Kuwaiti rage are the more than 300,000 Palestinians who lived and worked in Kuwait before the invasion. Because the Palestine Liberation Organization allied itself with Saddam, Iraqi forces in Kuwait treated many local Palestinians as a kind of auxiliary force. They helped administer and police the country and were rewarded with special privileges. Palestinians manned checkpoints, for exam-

ple, and were permitted to sell consumer goods in street stalls, something that was illegal before the war.

Kuwaitis today insist that the Iraqis were able to round up and execute large numbers of military and police officers because Palestinian informers led them to the right addresses. "Palestinians are no good," says Hiyam al-Bushehery, 24, a student. "They stood in the street and betrayed people at checkpoints. They told the Iraqis who was in the police."

Now the checkpoints the Palestinians used to man jointly with Iraqis are held by members of the Kuwaiti resistance, heavily armed with captured weapons. Palestinians who are found carrying Iraqi-issued identity cards are arrested and taken to the police stations, which are also controlled by the resistance. Rumors and warnings that a massacre might be in the offing spread through the city.

Preventing bloody reprisals against the Palestinians is one of the returning government's highest priorities. Sheik Saad al-Abdullah al-Sabah, the Kuwaiti Crown Prince and Prime Minister, pointed out in January that "some of the Palestinians did collaborate with the Iraqi troops. We shall check on the names of these people, whom the Kuwaitis inside know very well." But he added, "I don't want to blame all the Palestinians. There are many who stood shoulder to shoulder with the Kuwaitis." Resistance leaders say 5% or so of their members were Palestinians.



An Iraqi torture chamber in Kuwait: the bare metal bed frame, left, was used to deliver jolts of electricity from the device at right

Such reassurances have failed to quiet the fears of the estimated 200,000 Palestinians who remain in Kuwait City, with their doors locked and windows taped. They are afraid of more violence like the resistance's bazooka attack on the P.L.O.'s embassy on Feb. 24, which left the building gutted and blackened. More than 10,000 Palestinians fled to Iraq in recent weeks.

Anarchy has not taken over, but the enforcement of law and order is shaky. In an effort to keep the lid on, the Kuwaiti government-in-exile declared a three-month period of martial law. Returning officials are pushing hard to get policemen and public-security officers back into Kuwait as soon as allied officers have sounded the all clear. The American and British embassies have already reopened, with ambassadors in residence, though U.S. Special Forces insisted on combing the grounds for booby traps. British Ambassador Michael Weston said after a quick look around the city, "Barbaric is too weak a word to describe the behavior of the Iraqis in Kuwait." Other would-be returnees, however, have been told they must wait out the three months needed to re-establish the government and its authority.

This has not gone down well with Kuwaitis outside the country. Embassies in all the gulf states were mobbed by citizens trying to return. They are not persuaded by explanations that repatriation will be arranged on the basis of a Kuwaiti's usefulness to the reconstruction. A group of men at the Kuwaiti embassy in Bahrain complained bitterly. "It is my country as much as it is theirs," said one. "I want to go back and look at my house." Said another: "They say there is no food or water. I will take my own."

Members of the small democratic opposition movement among Kuwaiti exiles are even more outspoken, charging that they are deliberately being kept away so the Sabah family can regain autocratic power. In fact, the return of the royal family is almost automatic, because restoration of the country's legitimate government was demanded by the U.N. Security Council's resolutions. The open question is whether that government will revive its canceled experiment with an elected national assembly and take other steps toward democracy.

For those Kuwaitis who spent the war in their own country, a more pressing concern was repairing their shattered lives. Late one night, 20 of them sat on a carpet in a house in Kuwait City, as General Norman Schwarzkopf's briefing on the war's final offensive flickered on a television set powered by a portable generator. It was confusing, one said, because "the Iraqis lied to us about everything. We don't know what to believe now." The only certainty was that Kuwait at last is free.

—Reported by William Dowell and Lara Marlowe/Kuwait City



The legacy of bitterness: a newly liberated Kuwaiti pelts a portrait of Saddam with rocks

THE DEVASTATION

Rebuilding a Ravaged Nation

U.S. firms lead in the drive to put Kuwait back together—a task that will consume more time and money than did the pillaging it aims to repair

By JOHN GREENWALD



Now that the guns have fallen silent, the pounding of jackhammers will soon replace the din of war. At \$200 billion or more over the next 10 years, the price of rebuilding ravaged Kuwait seems certain to dwarf the \$50 billion or so that it took to liberate the oil-rich country. With that much money at stake, companies around the world began battles of their own long before the shooting war ended, fighting over contracts for everything from hospitals to refineries in one of history's largest reconstruction jobs. "This provides an almost unlimited backlog of good, profitable work," says John Doshier, a Houston energy consultant. "It's a potential gold mine."

So far, U.S. firms have prevailed as decisively as American troops did on the battlefield. Conspicuously absent from the fray: bidders from Japan and Germany, whose soldiers stayed home from the fighting (see box). Huddled in hotel rooms in Saudi Arabia with officials of Kuwait's government-in-exile, executives of U.S. companies have won 70% of initial awards for emergency services during the first three months of rebuilding. Such tasks as putting out oil fires and restoring water and power to blasted buildings could cost more than \$500 million during this period. As part of the effort, Kuwait awarded the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers \$46 million to help assess the damage and lay the groundwork for reconstruction.

The real money will go to the giant construction and oil-service firms that will rebuild Kuwait's shattered petroleum industry. Bechtel Group, based in San Francisco, recently signed a \$150 million letter of intent to manage the mammoth task, a job that analysts say could bring the company \$6 billion in revenue over the next few years. Bechtel, which has operated in Kuwait for more than 40 years, is gearing up to hire 4,300 workers for the project. Other U.S. heavyweights likely to land big contracts include Fluor, based in California, a leader in petroleum projects, and Halliburton, a Dallas firm that built a major Kuwaiti oil refinery.

No one will have much oil to refine until fire fighters extinguish the Iraqi-set blazes that raged last week through more than 500 of Kuwait's 1,000 wells, blacken-



Shattered high life: the burned-out shell of a once luxurious hotel in Kuwait City

In the war's wake, companies are battling for a limitless backlog of profitable work.

ing the country's sky. It will require millions of gallons of water and tons of dynamite and other explosives to snuff out the flames. "It's one gigantic mess," says Red Adair, whose Houston company is one of four Texas firms engaged in the effort. "No one knows what we're really in for. I've never seen anything like this before in my life." Experts say dousing the fires and restoring the fields could cost up to \$15 billion over the next five years. Plenty of U.S. oil-field companies like the sound of that. "The phone's been ringing off the hook with people looking for work," says T.B. O'Brien, president of the oil-field engineering firm O'Brien Goins Simpson, which is coordinating the fire-fighting campaign.

U.S. companies are receiving vigorous help from Washington. For months the Bush Administration has been urging Kuwait to give Americans a leading role in rebuilding the country. Says an insider whose Midwestern firm is part of the reconstruction's first phase: "Bush wanted to be sure that every initiative was made to secure a substantial share of business for the U.S."

Kuwait makes no secret of its gratitude to the Yanks. Sheikh Saud Nasir al-Sabah, Kuwait's ambassador to the U.S., outlined his country's policy in a January letter to Republican Representative Helen Bentley of Maryland. He said Kuwait planned "to award the largest proportion of contracts to U.S. companies, in recognition of the

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Senior residents of Broward County, Florida who can't afford medical services feel lucky they have MediVan—two mobile clinics that visit 22 neighborhoods to provide free care to patients whose average income is under \$4,000 a year.

When she talks about MediVan, Mrs. Allena Peele also speaks for many of her elderly neighbors. "If it weren't for MediVan, I might not be alive," she says flatly.

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"I didn't want to come here and vegetate," says Dr. Hermann Diamant, who retired to Florida after 40 years as a general practitioner. "Working on the MediVan helps me feel useful. I can give something back to medicine."

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Each MediVan has two examining rooms, diagnostic equipment, EKG machines, a nurses' station and a pharmacy. Seniors needing further medical attention are referred to local physicians who provide care at no charge to the seniors. Prescriptions are also free to MediVan patients.

Volunteer Alice Carney, 76, a retired nurse and physical



Dr. Jack Kassan examines Jennie Profeta during a MediVan house call.

therapist explains, "It's not only difficult for our clients to find transportation to a doctor, but for many, it would be literally a choice between buying medicine or food."

An Oasis of Love



Clients such as Irving Thayer find the friendship of the MediVan staff as much a lifesaver as the medical services.

MediVan personnel found him living in one small room, where he had been wheelchair-bound for over 10 years. They immediately arranged for him to move to a nearby three-room apartment, completely wheelchair-accessible.

Mr. Thayer says, "Living here has made all the difference. I owe them my life!"

Success stories like these are all that MediVan volunteers need to keep going. "It's the most rewarding thing I've ever done," says Dr. Kassan. "We found a desert of despair when we started, and now it's an oasis of love."

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The Gulf War



Flames devour a refinery set ablaze by Iraq's retreating army of occupation

With big checks to write, Kuwait must get its oil flowing again—fast.

immense sacrifice the people of the United States are making in the liberation of Kuwait."

Other countries are struggling to claim a share of the profits. British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd journeyed last month to meet with Kuwait's government-in-exile and seek postwar business. "The Crown Prince has said he will look favorably on Kuwait's supporters," says John Lace, managing director of Britain's Babcock Energy, which builds power plants. "So we

are second in the queue." As if to confirm that, Kuwait last week awarded Britain's Attwoods PLC \$1 billion to clear the war's rubble and debris.

French firms have had less luck—not one has clinched a major Kuwaiti award, French officials say. Many companies are waiting to join a trade mission to Kuwait before pressing their bids. "We have wrongly told ourselves that our policies toward Kuwait have been too ambiguous and too varied for our companies to win

contracts," says Antoine Jeancourt-Galigani, chairman of Banque Indosuez, based in Paris. He says Kuwaiti officials have assured him that "Kuwait finds France a solid ally and is prepared to give business to all the coalition members." Just not yet.

Kuwait's Arab neighbors in the multinational force have fared better. Saudi Arabia has furnished \$80 million of emergency food supplies and is bidding on contracts for cement and other building materials. Egypt expects to provide much of the labor to rebuild Kuwait. Workers there before the invasion were largely Egyptians, Palestinians and Yemenites, but the last two groups supported Saddam and won't be welcome for a long time. So the 400,000 Egyptians who fled after the invasion will probably stream back, followed by many compatriots.

To absorb the first blow of expenses, Kuwait will borrow money and sell part of its \$300 billion of foreign holdings. Then it needs to get oil flowing again as fast as possible, because the bills aren't going to let up. Destroying Kuwait took just seven months for Saddam's occupying forces. Rebuilding it could take an army of globe-straddling companies until the next century.

—Reported by William McWhirter/
Chicago and Richard Woodbury/Houston, with
other bureaus

The Superpower That Isn't There

Where's Japan? As the world's corporate giants scramble for contracts to raise a new Kuwait, representatives of the mightiest trading nation on earth have been sitting out the action. Major Japanese companies have not even participated in the bidding for reconstruction work in the devastated gulf country. Government leaders have warned Japanese firms against joining the rush for jobs lest they be seen as *kaisha dorobo*, or thieves who steal from a fire. "We won't take any initiative," says an official of a Japanese engineering company. "If Kuwait approaches us, we'll go. But for now we want to just wait and see."

Japan's sudden reluctance to seek profits abroad reflects the conflicting demands that have swept the country since the gulf crisis began. Japanese leaders have been torn between a constitutional ban against military action and allied insistence that the economic superpower contribute massive financial support, if not troops, to the war effort. Under these pressures, Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu has pledged a total of \$13 billion to the U.S.-led allied campaign.

Now Japanese firms are resigned to losing business to countries that participated in the fighting. Some companies doubt that Kuwait will give them a chance to fix equipment they built and installed themselves. "Repairs would be most efficiently done by the original supplier," says Yujia Wakayama, a spokesman for Toshiba, whose generators provided about half of Kuwait's electricity before the Iraqi occupation. "We are ready to cooperate if Kuwait requests it." But indus-

try insiders concede that Kuwait may give the repair contracts to U.S. firms in recognition of America's leading role in liberating the country.

Some Japanese argue that the same constraints that kept them from sending soldiers to war may now bar them from certain peacetime jobs. They point out that Japan's laws ban the export of military weapons and equipment to manufacture arms. The terms are broadly defined. Under these rules, Japanese firms cannot even export equipment to remove mines (although in the past some companies, feeling less constrained, haven't minded selling high-tech equipment with potential military applications to the Soviet Union). "Japan was bashed for only providing money for the war and not participating directly," says Masao Takemoto, a spokesman for electronics giant Mitsubishi. "But in the reconstruction period we will also be under restrictions."

Japan is not the only trading power that has been reluctant to press for contracts to rebuild Kuwait. Firms in Germany expect to miss out on much of the reconstruction because Bonn did not supply troops to the war effort and German companies illegally helped build chemical weapons for Iraq. But neither country intends to walk away from the region and leave a vast market to foreign firms. Kuwait will have to borrow to finance early projects, and flush Japanese lenders could be an important source of funds. While vowing not to attach strings to such money, Japan could well encourage Kuwait to spend it on the world-class services of Japanese contractors. ■

DIPLOMACY

My Final Visit with Saddam Hussein

As George Bush prepared to launch a ground war, Mikhail Gorbachev made one last attempt to broker peace between Iraq and the allies. Once again he dispatched his personal adviser, Yevgeni Primakov, to Baghdad, and then agreed to see Iraqi Foreign Minis-

ter Tariq Aziz in Moscow. The Kremlin desperately tried to persuade Saddam that he must comply with the U.N. Security Council resolutions or face the terrible consequences of a ground battle. Here is Primakov's account of those last, tense days.

By YEVGENI PRIMAKOV



I had been to Baghdad twice since October to see Saddam, but this time it was much more difficult to get to the Iraqi capital because of the air war. I flew to Tehran on Feb. 11, then drove to the Iraqi border, where I was met by Iraqi Deputy Foreign Minister Saad al-Feisal and Soviet Ambassador Viktor Posuvalyuk. We drove at high speed toward Baghdad. From time to time the cars, which traveled in a tight convoy, switched on their headlights in order to make out the road in the pitch dark.

As soon as we entered the suburbs of Baghdad after more than two hours of driving, the convoy split up. The cars we drove, like all other vehicles of top Iraqi officials, had been spattered with dirt as camouflage. I could not help thinking that perhaps this made these cars more conspicuous, giving away those who were in them.

My meeting with Saddam occurred the following evening, Feb. 12. We thought we would be taken to a bunker, perhaps far out of Baghdad. But everything was much more prosaic. We were escorted to a guest house in the center of the city. A power generator suddenly clicked on, and the house was filled with light. Then Saddam Hussein appeared with the entire Iraqi leadership.

After hearing rebukes that Soviet policy had given the "green light" to the "U.N. war against Iraq" and declarations about Iraq's "unshakable" stand, I asked to be left alone with Saddam. Then I said to him, "The Americans are determined to launch a large-scale ground operation to crush Iraqi forces in Kuwait." Politics, I reminded him, was the art of the possible. On Gorbachev's instructions, I made a proposal: to announce the pullout of troops from Kuwait. The deadline should be the shortest possible, and the withdrawal should be total and without conditions.

We had reached a turning point. Saddam began to ask specific questions—evidence that he was not flatly rejecting the proposals. Would there be guarantees that Iraqi soldiers leaving Kuwait would not be "shot in the back"? Would attacks on Iraq be halted after the pullout?

Would the U.N. sanctions against Iraq then be lifted?

Because I was leaving for Moscow shortly and telephone communications had been knocked out by the bombing raids, Saddam said a "brief reply" to the overall proposal would be brought to the Soviet embassy by Aziz, who would also go to Moscow to continue the contacts. At 2 a.m. on Feb. 13, Aziz brought a written statement declaring that "the Iraqi leadership is seriously studying the ideas outlined by the representative of the Soviet President and will give its reply in the immediate future." Two days later, the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council announced that it was willing to comply with U.N. Security Council Resolution 660. But it also included a whole series of conditions.

Meeting with Gorbachev, Foreign Minister Alexander Bessmertnykh and me in Moscow on the morning of Feb. 18, Aziz said that in spite of the brutal strike inflicted upon Iraq, it would not surrender—and that was final. "Your stand seems very inconsistent," said Gorbachev. "On the one hand, this is an important step toward a political settlement, since you acknowledge Resolution 660, calling for an unconditional withdrawal. On the other hand, your positions seem to include preconditions for that withdrawal." Gorbachev also wanted to know why the withdrawal statement "did not use the word Kuwait."



Moscow, Feb. 18: Gorbachev offers Aziz and the Iraqi leadership a plan

The President offered the Iraqi leadership the following plan: Iraq would announce a total withdrawal from Kuwait (not just in general terms). It would also set a specific deadline for the end of the pullout that should be as short as possible. The withdrawal would begin immediately after the cessation of armed actions and would have "no strings attached." With one exception: a guarantee that troops departing from Kuwait would not be attacked—"shot in the back." Said Gorbachev: "The timing is crucial. If you cherish the lives of your countrymen and the fate of Iraq, then you must act without delay."

Aziz left for Baghdad later that same day, and the tension-filled hours ticked into days as we waited for news from Iraq. On the evening of Feb. 20, we received a message from our embassy in Baghdad: Aziz had requested that a Soviet plane be sent to Iran to take him on to Moscow. The next day, in a clear indication that the talks would not be easy, Saddam Hussein gave an inconsistent and emotional speech over the radio in which he repeated the whole set of accusations and threats. Still, Aziz returned to Moscow around midnight and was brought directly from the airport to the Kremlin for talks. Gorbachev never got to leave the office that night. They blocked out a few general areas of agreement. The main one was that Iraq accepted Resolution 660 and was prepared to remove all its armed forces from Kuwait. However, the Iraqis claimed that they would be unable to complete the withdrawal by the proposed deadline.

We pointed out that Iraq had been able to bring its forces into Kuwait in a matter of hours. But Aziz replied that it had only been two divisions and that approximately 500,000 men had been concentrated in Kuwait during the seven months that followed. Gorbachev took a firm stand: "The proposed deadline can and must be reduced to a minimum."

Since time was passing quickly, presidential press spokesman Vitali Ignatenko held a briefing at 3:30 a.m. to announce the points of agreement that had been reached with the Iraqis. He said work would continue, and we expected further progress to be made. Hope was mounting.

Meanwhile, Gorbachev had a 90-minute telephone conversation with Bush, for which I was present. Bush expressed his appreciation for Gorbachev's efforts. But at the same time, he doubted that the change in Baghdad's position would lead to anything. Moreover, Bush stressed that he was concerned about the fate of the rows. Nor did he think it was possible to ignore the colossal damage inflicted on Kuwait by the Iraqi aggression. The U.S. President was also dissatisfied with the period set for the troop withdrawal. As soon as he hung up, Gorbachev said to Bessmertnykh and me, "Make sure you pay particular attention to these concerns of President Bush's during the talks you will hold over the next hours."

There was practically no time for sleep. At the Foreign Ministry mansion on Alexei Tolstoy Street, Bessmertnykh, Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Belonogov and I met with Aziz and his party. An exceedingly difficult bargaining session began. In fact, it took about an hour to deal just with the issue of the deadline for releasing American and other national rows. The Iraqis kept referring to difficulties of a technical nature. In the end, we insisted: three days after the cease-fire began, and not a single day more.

The debate over the time frame for the troop pullout was also very difficult. The Iraqis insisted on six weeks, stressing technical reasons again. Since we knew that the season of winds and sandstorms would soon set in, making it difficult to carry out military actions, and that the Americans, under these conditions, would consider that Iraq was intentionally "dragging its feet," we proposed setting a separate deadline for the Iraqi troop withdrawal from Kuwait City—during the first four days and no longer. We also managed to squeeze the deadline for

a complete pullout to three weeks. Aziz simply would not go any further.

We failed to reach any agreement over the issue of lifting the sanctions imposed on Iraq in the resolutions adopted by the Security Council, following Resolution 660. These resolutions included the payment of compensation for the damage done to Kuwait. Aziz said he had a "rigid mandate" about how to handle this question, beyond which he could not go. In our view, the lifting of sanctions was a matter for the Security Council to decide. We could talk about the Soviet position only.

Taking President Bush's concerns into account, we had made some progress, even in those areas where the Iraqis seemed absolutely unshakable earlier that morning. For example, they removed the condition that U.N. economic sanctions should be lifted when Iraq had withdrawn two-thirds of its armed forces from Kuwait. Now they proposed that economic sanctions be lifted when the last Iraqi soldiers had left that country. It seemed to me that this shift cleared up any suspicions that Iraq wanted only the partial withdrawal of its troops.

Aziz said that any decisions would have to be taken by the entire leadership, and first of all, Saddam. He proposed that I fly with him to Baghdad immediately for a meeting. Realizing that time was running out, we rejected this plan and urged him to get in touch with the Iraqi leadership directly from Moscow.

But by this time Bush had given Iraq an ultimatum, demanding the withdrawal of the Iraqi forces from Kuwait within a week and from Kuwait City within 48 hours. Moreover, this withdrawal was to begin at noon New York time on Saturday, Feb. 23.

We received a positive reply from Saddam at 2 a.m. Moscow time, on Saturday, Feb. 23 (6 p.m. Friday in New York and Washington). Ten hours later, Aziz announced in Moscow that the Iraqi leadership had agreed to the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all its armed forces from Kuwait. But at the same time, he referred to the entire "complex" of issues, including the need to pronounce invalid all the resolutions that had been adopted by the Security Council after Resolution 660. Then he left the Soviet Union for Baghdad.

Gorbachev immediately dispatched telegrams to the leaders of all the countries on the Security Council. He telephoned Bush again and called the leaders of the multinational coalition and Iran. Gorbachev said the Iraqi decision to withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait had created a new situation. He suggested convening the Security Council to integrate into one package the U.N. demands and the plan adopted by Iraq.

In Gorbachev's view the differences between the formula to which Iraq had agreed and the proposals from a number of other countries were not so great that they could not be worked out in the Security Council in one or two days. Certainly these differences were not so substantial that they justified a further escalation of the war. The Soviet U.N. representative was instructed to request an emergency session of the Security Council. However, as dawn broke on Feb. 24, the ground offensive of the multinational coalition began. ■

“If you cherish the lives of your countrymen and the fate of Iraq,” said Gorbachev, “you must act without delay.”

THE FUTURE

Now, Winning The Peace

An unstable and violence-prone Middle East needs a postwar strategy more sophisticated than the winning game plan for the war

By LISA BEYER



The postwar era is suddenly upon us, arriving like a weekend guest on a Thursday train, sooner than expected. No longer are topics like collective security, political reform and assuaging popular fury in the Middle East the stuff of theoretical rumination. Instead, they are the pressing matters of the day, and their disposition will ultimately determine the region's shape far more than did last week's redrawing of the line that separates Iraq from Kuwait.

In the Middle East, political victories are as important as military ones, and often harder to achieve. Last week President Bush promised there would be "no solely American answer" to the troubles that bedevil the region, but his challenge is to devise a game plan for peacemaking that is as effective as Operation Desert Storm was in war. The partners in the coalition will be looking to Washington to provide a strong lead in securing what Bush also called "a potentially historic peace."

The allies' triumph in the field does make some things easier. The battle was quick enough to prevent the coalition from fragmenting and pro-Saddam passions from boiling over. Yet it lasted long enough to give the allies time to truncate Iraq's military, neutralizing its mischiefmaking potential for some time to come. And by forcing Saddam to swallow bitter terms for a cease-fire, the allies have stripped him of his appeal as an Arab he-man.

Still, this good fortune is not irreversible. When it becomes plain just how badly Iraq has been mauled, Arab rage may again threaten the calm. The coalition, no longer unified by the single aim of liberating Kuwait, will lose cohesion as its members compete to realize their own visions of the future, each guided by a unique set of interests that at some points must clash. Already differences are emerging: the So-

viets, for instance, want a better deal for their old client Iraq than the West does, and the Arabs and Europeans want to be tougher on Israel than the U.S. does.

Nevertheless, all the parties to the war share an interest in grappling with key issues:

Regional Security. The immediate focus is to prevent Iraq—or another Iraq—from waging war again. Everyone favors some kind of regional security apparatus, and nearly everyone agrees it should be mainly Arab. The Western allies are emphatic about extricating their troops quickly to reduce pressure on the Arab partners from citizens angry over the presence of former colonialists and infidels. But the West will continue to lend silent support to the gulf regimes, leaving equipment behind in case allied forces need to return. The long-standing U.S. naval presence in the gulf will be increased, as will joint military exercises with regional states.

Yet the main safeguards will have to be local. To secure Kuwait, Washington's preliminary idea is to establish, at least temporarily, a demilitarized zone on the Iraq-Kuwait border. Arab forces, mainly Egyptian and Syrian, would police Kuwait's side, and U.N. peacekeeping troops would monitor the dmz. One kink is that the border remains disputed, and an indignant Kuwait refuses to negotiate the matter with Iraq.

In one view, the region has already been made safer. "No one should underestimate the deterrent power of this war," says John Roper, military analyst at the Western European Union. "This victory is likely to make any other dictator think twice before he upsets the balance."

But for the gulf states—ripe targets with their oil riches and sparse populations—a doctrine of deterrence is not comfort enough. They intend never to be at risk again. In a meeting in Damascus this week, Egypt and Syria, which have emerged as regional strongmen, and the six gulf states will consider plans for creating an Arab se-



curity force to bolster the defenses of the gulf countries. They envision a semipermanent troop, made up mostly of Egyptians and Syrians.

A more basic source of the region's volatility, however, is its huge oversupply of arms. Israel has demanded that Iraq be stripped of all missiles and nonconventional weapons, but Baghdad is hardly the only possessor of a potent arsenal. Israel and Saudi Arabia have each obtained new high-tech weaponry during the war, and Syria, concerned that the strategic balance has tipped farther in Israel's direction, may seek to accelerate its military program.

The U.S. and Britain will continue to push for strict embargoes on military sales to Iraq. But an arms-control agreement for the entire Middle East is not high on anyone's agenda—and even if it were, it would be unlikely to be realized. As long as Arabs and Israelis believe another war is inevitable, neither side is at all disposed to reduce arms.

The Arab-Israeli Conflict. Everyone agrees this is the No. 1 problem, the throbbing wound at the heart of the Middle East, which must be healed before the region can truly find peace. Expectations are high that the new bonds between the U.S. and moderate Arab states offer the best



opportunity yet for a comprehensive settlement. If only there were as much concord on the answer.

There are few new ideas, but there is fresh interest in pursuing some of the familiar ones. France and the Soviet Union are urging the U.N. Security Council to convene an international conference, but nothing has altered Israel's refusal to attend such a gathering. Washington is proposing instead that the Arab states negotiate directly with Israel on state-to-state peace treaties, just as Israel and Egypt did in the late 1970s. If its Arab neighbors indicate a willingness to live in peace with the Jewish state, the argument goes, Israel might be willing to make concessions to the Palestinians.

But prospects for a resolution of the Palestinian problem are as dim as they have ever been. Yes, the U.S. is committed to pushing extra hard for Israeli flexibility, to pay back Arab governments for their support of the coalition and to cement American credibility in the Arab world. But even Israel's No. 1 patron cannot make Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir budge unless he chooses to. And he does not. "We shall stand firm," says Shamir, against "attempts to establish a new pattern of Middle East arrangements."

While the U.S. has been fighting a ground war, the Israeli leader has been

Arab anger may yet explode: in Egypt student protests sparked by the ground war threaten a period of unease

preparing for a diplomatic one. "There will be an effort to use political means to snatch from Israel what could not be snatched from us by force," Shamir told his party, adding that nothing would shake his refusal to cede land for peace. The Palestinians' feverish support for Saddam made any compromise over the West Bank and Gaza far more unlikely. And Shamir feels that the restraint he displayed in the face of the Scud barrage entitles Israel to freedom from Washington's heavy hand.

Palestine Liberation Organization chairman Yasser Arafat rendered Shamir's obstructionist policy all the more workable by alienating the West, his Arab bankrollers and the Israeli peaceniks. "The Palestinian path no longer goes through Arafat," says a senior U.S. diplomat. Some of the chairman's supporters suggest he may have to step down to restore the Palestinians' shattered credibility. Even that might not help. Though the Arab regimes pay lip service to their cause, blind attachment to Saddam has cost the Palestinians respect and sympathy everywhere. At the same time, the war has intensified the naked hatred between Palestinians and Israelis, making any mutual accommodation harder still.

Money and Democracy. Perhaps the rosiest of postwar propositions is that the oil-rich gulf states will share their treasure more generously with the oil-less poor ones. The idea would be to reduce the envy of, and the enmity toward, the rich while alleviating the poverty that is a constant source of instability.

It is a noble but naive notion. The Arab haves, which were threatened by Saddam, are not especially happy with most of the have-nots—Jordan, Yemen, the Palestinians and the Sudan, all of whom cheered the Iraqi invader. The exceptions are Egypt and Syria, which are likely to receive rewards—for their help in defeating Saddam, not for the misfortune of being impoverished.

With war costs to pay off and with low oil prices, the victorious gulf states are not much interested in sharing their wealth. At a recent meeting in Cairo, they asserted the necessity of "respecting the sovereignty of each Arab country over its own natural resources." Translation: Don't covet your neighbor's oil. The statement was evidence of just how worn the ideal of Arab unity is—the notion that all Arabs are one nation so the gulf oil belongs to all.

Nor is democracy likely to follow in the wake of the war as a means of strengthening Arab societies against radicalism. The hope was that the new Kuwait would lead the way, but the royal family appears less keen about liberalization now than it did when it was courting international support from exile. For their part, Saudi Arabia's King Fahd and the Sultan of Oman, Qaboos bin Said, have promised to create only consultative councils, not parliaments. The U.S. is unlikely to push democratization, knowing fundamentalists are best organized to take advantage of it.

Jordan's Rehabilitation. The great survivor has survived again—just barely. Washington will eventually welcome King Hussein back into the fold despite his pro-Saddam sympathies, though it is not yet prepared to restore his \$55 million 1991 aid package, suspended last month. The Saudis are less forgiving. For them, says a U.S. diplomat, Hussein "has to pay a readmission price, perform some act of obeisance." In a newspaper interview last week, Prince Bandar said those who leaned toward Saddam "must openly admit they were wrong."

In a speech last week, the King did not bow so far, but he did make a plea for reconciliation. Mending bridges with the Saudis is vital for Jordan's shattered economy: in addition to cutting off aid, which amounted to \$200 million last year, Riyadh has refused to resume preferential oil sales to Jordan. The U.S. will press the Saudis to be lenient toward the King lest he be toppled. Despite everything,

Washington prefers Hussein to the more radical regime that might replace him.

Iran's Reintegration. A Western diplomat in Riyadh calls Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani's performance during the gulf conflict a "tour de force." By offering sanctuary to Iraqi planes, he mollified his troublesome right wing. By not returning them, he won points with the allies; he may also get to keep the jets as partial reparation for losses sustained by Iran in its own war with Iraq. In general, Iran's neutrality brought the country some international respectability, and even Washington is assessing

the possibility of more cordial relations.

Like it or not, Iran will insist on a role in the region as payment for its restraint. Iraq's weakness makes Iran stronger, threatening the old balance of power among the big Middle Eastern states. A more confident Tehran could clash with Saudi Arabia over oil-pricing policy. But the country needs Western cooperation to resuscitate its economy, and the U.S. hopes that will encourage continued good behavior.

For all he had wrong, Saddam had one thing right—that the Middle East was due for some major refurbishing. Religious ha-

tred, excessive militarization, economic inequities and entrenched feudalism combine to make it a nasty neighborhood. The region has long been—and remains—violence-prone, politically archaic, oppressive. The jolt of the gulf war, however, may change the physics for a moment. "Maybe the shock," says British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd, "will enable people to think afresh, more constructively." Just as the allies seized the moment to finish off Saddam's army, so too should they seize the opportunity to make lasting changes in Middle Eastern politics.

—Reported by Christopher Ogden/
Washington, Robert Slater/Jerusalem and Robert T.
Zintl/Riyadh

The Palestinians Back Another Loser

The Palestinians tell their own version of the war. An Iraqi Scud missile slammed into Israel's Ben Gurion Airport, killing 400 Soviet Jewish immigrants just off the plane. Thousands of Israelis were slaughtered by the Scuds, and the Dimona nuclear complex in the Negev lies in ruins. The Americans lost 100,000 soldiers in battle. Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait was only tactical, designed to lull the allies, while Saddam Hussein waited for the right moment to incinerate the Jewish state. "Every Palestinian knows that Saddam will emerge victorious," said Abdul Majeed Shahin as he discussed the war with a dozen others gathered in Jerusalem's Muslim quarter last week. "You see, he's got a secret weapon."

Such wild fantasies are remarkably widespread among Saddam's Palestinian supporters, who simply cannot accept that they have once again backed a loser. Even after the Iraqi leader cavalierly jettisoned their cause during last-ditch peace negotiations with the Soviets, many Palestinians refuse to believe that they have been abandoned by yet another Arab leader. "It's very hard for Palestinians to admit that they were sold out," said Mohammed Kamel, a merchant from Jerusalem's Old City. "We are depressed and desperate because we have no friends and no allies. This is the story of our lives."

Palestinians blame everyone but themselves for their latest setback, failing to acknowledge that the enormous political and financial damage they are suffering is largely self-inflicted. By siding with Saddam, they lost sympathy and support among the allies, both Western and Arab, and handed Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir a propaganda windfall. Unless they quickly face up to their mistakes, they will miss a unique opportunity to press their case in postwar negotiations.

But so far the reaction on the streets of the West Bank, Gaza and Jordan is defiant. "Maybe he lost the battle, but that doesn't mean he lost the war," said Faisal al Afghani, whose Amman souvenir shop sells miniature Scud missiles. "We haven't had a leader like Saddam since Saladin." Unable to di-

gest Iraq's defeat, many sought refuge in elaborate rationalizations. "The surrender of Iraqi troops," declared Stawri Khayat, a 30-year-old linguist from Jerusalem, "was staged by the Zionist-controlled media."

This capacity for denial even in the face of manifest evidence may strike Westerners as absurd, but it is deeply rooted in the Arab psyche's mixture of bravado, rhetoric and religious conviction. Arabs denied Israel's existence for decades and believed that Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser had a trick up his sleeve when his air force was destroyed in the first hours of the 1967 war. Fouad Subhi, a butcher at the Baqa'a refugee camp near Amman, still puts his faith in Saddam: "After he rebuilds Iraq, he will try to liberate Palestine again."

Not all Palestinians are capable of such self-delusion. When Iraq retreated from Kuwait last week, many men and women in the occupied territories wept. "I stopped praying for Saddam because he has turned out to be just another lying and cheating Arab leader who doesn't give a damn about us," said Ayyob Saber, a laborer from Hebron. The clandestine leadership of the *intifadah* ordered Palestinians to tune in to Jordanian television, which offered a rosier version of events. Many Arabs avoided the news altogether. Said Thalji Shwaiki, a vegetable seller from the West Bank village of Halhoul, "I can't stand the humiliation."

In Amman, anguish at Iraq's defeat is tempered by the belief that Saddam has succeeded in putting the Palestinian issue at the top of the international agenda. "All the world is looking at our problem now," said Yusef Fawaz, a former Palestine Liberation Organization guerrilla. But as the U.S. begins its postwar diplomacy, Palestinians are less inclined than ever to put their faith in an American-imposed solution. They expect that Israel will exact a high political and financial price from Washington for its restraint, blocking any solution sympathetic to Palestinian desires. Yet the real tragedy is that as long as the Palestinians cling to illusions, they will never be capable of turning their dream of statehood into reality.

—By Jon D. Hull/Jerusalem. Reported by Jamil Hamad/
Nablus and Scott MacLeod/Amman



West Bank Palestinians weep at the news of Saddam's defeat

THIS PHOTO COURTESY OF THE NEW YORK TIMES



Waging the kind of war "the Iraqis wanted them to": in a high-profile Arab role, Saudis blast their way to Kuwait City

WESLEY BOGGE—SIPA FOR TIME

THE ALLIES

A Partnership to Remember

After months of prewar doubts and apprehension, the anti-Saddam coalition proved its mettle and commitment to the common cause

By JAMES WALSH



If General Norman Schwarzkopf did not march into Kuwait City last week proclaiming "I have returned," it was for two reasons. One was that he had never been driven out. The second was more important: the U.S. commander of Operation Desert Storm wanted the ravaged Arab capital to be liberated by Arabs—exiled Kuwaitis as well as Saudis and kindred units in the anti-Iraq coalition. So strongly did Schwarzkopf feel about dramatizing the Arab role that he was expected to pass up any uninvited triumphal visit to Kuwait. In 1944 a jut-jawed General Douglas MacArthur had made a point of being the ceremonial first to wade ashore in the recaptured Philippines. In 1991 Schwarzkopf remained at Desert Storm headquarters in Riyadh extolling his command's "great coalition of people, all of whom did a fine job."

Whether U.S. forces alone could have liberated Kuwait is an academic question. The fact is that from the outset of the Persian Gulf military buildup intended to thwart Iraq, a multinational effort was politically necessary. Designed to demonstrate that the world community opposed Saddam Hussein, it was also meant to show

that the Iraqi strongman was not the leader of an Arab-Muslim holy war against the infidel. That was the symbolism, a display of teamwork that skeptics thought would work only in an internationalist's fantasy. In practice, however, the alliance moved as a smoothly coordinated machine during the stunningly triumphant 100-hour ground war. While U.S. forces were the backbone of the operation, its success relied on the nerve and muscle of a variety of nationalities. Lieut. General Peter de la Billière, commander of British forces, called the alliance's grand-slam performance "one of the greatest victories that we've ever experienced, certainly in our lives and possibly in history."

About half the combatants in the land campaign were non-American: mainly, in descending order of strength, Saudi, Egyptian, British, Syrian and French. The small gulf sheikdoms—including Kuwait's government-in-exile—fielded 11,500 troops with the Saudis, while lesser contingents from 17 other countries carried out some aircraft, ship and behind-the-lines assignments. Most of the 28 coalition members performed noncombat duties or tried, as the 1,700 Moroccan troops did, to stay invisible: their dispatch to Saudi Arabia had become a focus of controversy back home. But Schwarzkopf took pains to tip his forage cap to the chief partners, all of whose

missions he termed "very, very tough."

In the first hour of the ground war, two Saudi task forces launched an assault across the feared "Saddam line" of fortifications into eastern Kuwait. In the northward plunge along the coastline they had an unenviable double duty: to deceive Baghdad into thinking that all of the allies were massed for a frontal assault, and to deflect Iraqi defenders from U.S. Marine crossings farther west. The Saudi-led Arab forces "did a terrific job" in breaching "a very, very tough barrier system," Schwarzkopf said, noting that they had been "required to fight the kind of fight that the Iraqis wanted them to." Some Kuwaitis in the Saudi force kissed the earth on returning to home ground and were among those Arabs eventually privileged to be in the vanguard entering Kuwait City.

Later on G day, another Saudi force crossed into southwestern Kuwait, paralleling an Egyptian-led thrust. The 38,500 Egyptians, second in number only to Saudi Arabia's 40,000 among the allies, ran into Saddam's dreaded oil-filled fire trenches, according to Schwarzkopf; though the trenches were not aflame, it was a position the general called "not a fun place to be." Behind Egypt's two-division tank and paratroop contingents was the 19,000-man Syrian 9th Armored Division, with its 270 Soviet-made T-62 tanks. The two-pronged

The Gulf War

Arab attack took out Iraqi defenders on the U.S. Marines' left flank, then wheeled east in a sweep toward the sea.

But it was the British who took on one of the most specialized chores and earned glory in doing it. In the now celebrated flanking maneuvers launched directly into Iraq from the west, Britain's 1st Armored Division mounted a highly mobile battle against Saddam's best forces, the Republican Guard. British soldiers are no strangers to desert warfare, of course: aided by the heroics of T.E. Lawrence—the legendary Lawrence of Arabia—they helped oust the Ottoman Turks from the Bedouin homeland in World War I and later defeated Rommel's Afrika Korps in the Libyan desert. One tank unit that punched into Iraq last week was the 7th Armored Brigade, World War II's famous Desert Rats, who helped drive the Germans out of North Africa.

The division's task was to accompany U.S. VII Corps armor in destroying the Republican Guard—specifically, to form an advancing blockade from the west that bottled up the Iraqi forces. Schwarzkopf said the British units performed the job "absolutely magnificently." In addition to the gutsy, low-flying attacks on Iraqi airfields by British pilots early in the air war, Britain's partnership in the ground campaign proved the forces to have been what the U.S. commander called "absolutely superb members of this coalition from the outset."

Numbering 35,000 troops in all, British regiments bearing such names as the Royal Scots Dragoon Guards and the Queen's Royal Irish Hussars sped forward into fire fights and swept through Iraqi armor concentrations without losing a single tank. In the ground war's most tragic incident, however, nine British soldiers lost their lives to friendly fire when an American A-10 tank-killer aircraft hit two armored vehicles by mistake.

It was the kind of misadventure that critics had predicted would occur on a wide and bewildering scale once the oddly assorted multinational forces went into battle. Snafus in lines of command, in the coordination of differently trained and equipped soldiers, in attempts to simply speak with one another—all had been pointed up as potentially fatal pitfalls facing such an ungainly coalition. Yet the so-called AirLand strategy, adopted in the 1980s by NATO as a counter to a Soviet invasion of Western Europe, proved to be more than a knockout military punch. Because NATO relies on a central

command of joint forces, the doctrine managed surprisingly well to integrate the polyglot gulf alliance.

U.S. Special Forces teams served with every Arab ground unit from battalion level up, acting as communicators with nearby English-speaking allies. They called in air strikes when necessary and warned off any threatening friendly fire. At least some Green Berets, it turned out, labored under a misnomer in this assignment: a few of their scouts arriving early in Kuwait City were spotted wearing Arab headgear.

In the westernmost assault, the French demonstrated that they were expert at desert combat as well. With its Foreign Legion components, France's 7,600-man 6th Light Armored Division conducted one of the most spectacular feats of the war, racing across 105 miles of Iraqi terri-

sion of some 8,000 Iraqis within 36 hours.

It was when a mine-clearing reconnaissance unit ventured into As Salman's hilltop fort that France suffered its only two deaths in the war. A paratrooper stooped to pick up a greenish, tangerine-shape object, and it exploded in his face, killing him and a soldier standing nearby. Would-be rescuers tripped a similar explosive device, wounding 25. The munitions turned out to be anti-personnel cluster bombs that had been dropped earlier by U.S. aircraft. But after the smoke had cleared and an unchallenged French line lay strung across a third of Iraq's width, Paris felt it had grounds for some chest thumping. Said General Gilbert Foray, the army Chief of Staff: "We can never emphasize enough the excellence of our men and matériel."

Schwarzkopf saluted it as well. If he failed to dwell on Egyptian and Syrian exploits, the omission was probably political. Damascus had all along assiduously downplayed its coalition role because of simmering pro-Iraq sentiments among the Syrian public. Cairo marked Saddam's defeat with red-letter newspaper headlines, but President Hosni Mubarak remained notably mum. Egypt's domestic opposition to the war was milder than Syria's, but explosions of anti-U.S. protest broke out at several Egyptian universities last week. Mubarak also faces a relatively long engagement in the gulf: while all the Arab armies had sworn in advance any invasion of Iraq, Egyptian forces expect to police Kuwait in the immediate post-war term. In return, Cairo awaits handsome Saudi aid and gulf jobs for Egyptians.

What did troops from other nations do in the war? For the most part, their jobs were supportive. Yet it seems certain that some of them will return home feeling that they had upheld national honor. A 225-strong Czechoslovak team of medical and chemical-warfare specialists flew their colors with special pride. Its members resided outside help to the point of refusing desert-camouflage fatigues, resting content with green winter uniforms and caps complete with earflaps. Asian Muslims—including 11,000 Pakistanis, 2,000 Bangladeshis and about 310 Afghan mujahedin guerrillas—were assigned to guard Islam's shrines. As for the inconspicuous Moroccans and other minor units—well, the way Washington was feeling last week, they also served who only stood and waited.

—Reported by Dean Fischer/Riyadh, Frank Melville/London and Farah Nayeri/Paris

If allied pledges of support are made good, U.S. war costs will be more than covered

	1990	1991 Projected		
U.S. cost	\$11.1 billion	\$36.4 billion		
Allied pledges	— \$9.7 billion	— \$43.8 billion		
	\$1.4 billion Paid by the U.S.	\$7.4 billion Possible surplus		
Where the pledges come from (in millions)	Pledged to U.S. 1990	Amount received 1990*	Pledged to U.S. 1991	Amount received 1991*
Germany	\$1,072	\$803	\$5,500	\$2,160
Japan	1,740	1,323	9,000	0
Korea	80	71	305	0
Kuwait	2,506	2,506	13,500	1,004
Saudi Arabia	3,339	1,661	13,500	4,362
U.A.E.	1,000	981	2,000	29
TOTAL	\$9,737	\$7,345	\$43,805	\$7,555

*Includes cash and in-kind receipts. Source: Defense Budget Project

TIME Chart

tory to seal off enemy avenues of retreat. The flanking movement blitzed to capture an airfield at the fortified town of As Salman. French Defense Minister Pierre Joxe boasted that impressed U.S. officers likened the troops to a "high-speed train."

Before they settled in to form a long defensive cordon, the French units had their hour in the sun of gulf victories. Together with some U.S. paratroop and artillery units, a French regiment with dune-dodging Gazelle helicopter gunships carrying HOT air-to-ground missiles led an attack on a fortified position, code-named Rochambeau, 30 miles inside Iraq. Defenders resisted for some time, but hundreds of them raised white flags as soon as they spied the approach of French tanks. As in a Foreign Legion adventure film of old, the force ended up neutralizing a divi-



Deadly force: French gunners go into action on the allied flank

FRANCE

"Fighting for the Same Cause"

French forces showed that their presence in the gulf was much more than a beau geste

By **FREDERICK UNGEHEUER** PARIS



When a French force under General Jean Baptiste Rochambeau linked up with George Washington's revolutionary army in 1781 to fight the British, France became America's first wartime ally. Thus it was fitting that the code word assigned to the first target in the French-U.S. thrust into Iraq was Rochambeau. The choice not only saluted France's fighting commitment to the allied cause but also symbolized France's newfound solidarity with the U.S. when war came.

Nowhere was the sight of the French tricolor flying above advancing armor greeted with more relief than at allied headquarters in the gulf. When Desert Storm began, there had been fears that the 12,600-strong French contingent, reluctant to accept U.S. leadership, might stand aloof from the coalition's integrated command structure, much as France does in NATO, perhaps even disdaining to fight. During the countdown to hostilities, President François Mitterrand had courted British and American anger by launching an eleventh-hour peace proposal that would have handed Saddam Hussein a diplomatic victory by rewarding an Iraqi withdrawal with the convening of a Middle East peace conference.

But as the first air strikes were launched against Iraqi targets, the French, under General Michel Roquejeoffre, closed

ranks with the other allies, putting themselves under U.S. operational command. Guided by U.S. AWACS aircraft, French pilots flew their Jaguar fighter-bombers on combat missions deep into Iraqi territory, while French ground forces, including Foreign Legion units, committed themselves wholeheartedly to the battle.

Mitterrand was the deciding influence in France's fortitude. There were understandable reasons for his initial go-it-alone diplomacy. Iraq had long been France's best customer in the Middle East arms bazaar: Paris was owed about \$3 billion for past weapons deliveries when Iraq invaded Kuwait. But more than markets and money was at stake. Mitterrand had to consider the legacy of General Charles de Gaulle, who believed it was part of France's destiny to develop a special relationship with the Arab world. The President also had to weigh the probable impact of his actions on neighboring Arab states around the Mediterranean—not to mention 4 million North Africans living in France.

But in the end Mitterrand's fine-tuned political instincts told him that in the face of battle, talk of French independence—"la différence française"—could not be maintained without loss of credibility at home and abroad. Once Saddam had rejected France's last-minute peace bid, Mitterrand put everything behind securing an allied victory, telling aides, "We are face-to-face with history." He forced the resignation of his anti-American Defense Minister, Jean-Pierre Chevènement, a co-

founder of the Franco-Iraqi Friendship Association who had tried to limit any military action by France strictly to Kuwaiti territory. French forces in the gulf were not only placed under General Norman Schwarzkopf's overall command but were also integrated with other allied contingents. Overflights of France by U.S. B-52 bombers on their way to Iraq were promptly permitted, as was the big planes' refueling at a French air base. Braving critics who accused him of becoming "a vassal" of the Americans, Mitterrand endorsed the need "to destroy Iraq's military-industrial potential."

"It is true that France insists on her differences," he said last week, "but during combat, when soldiers are down there together, like brothers, fighting for the same cause, when the safety of one depends on that of the other, are we going to engage in games of divergence or opposition?"

With each week of war, French approval of Mitterrand's stand deepened, despite perceptible unease about the ultimate objectives of the conflict. The conservative opposition backed him; the only sniping came from the far right, the Communists, and pacifists within his own Socialist Party. But as a member of the so-called Munich generation, which witnessed the West's failure in 1938 to nip Hitler's deadly ambitions in the bud, Mitterrand stood firmly against appeasement. Elysée Palace aides noticed a deep anger taking hold of him as he watched Saddam's cynical maneuvering, his wanton destruction and his contempt for human life.

Frequent telephone contact with President Bush brought the two leaders closer and helped reinforce their resolve. Differences emerged mainly in the kind of language they used. A master of innuendo, Mitterrand never called, as did Bush, for Saddam's "overthrow," but described the Iraqi's "political, moral and military authority" as "seriously weakened"; privately, Mitterrand is known to believe Saddam has little chance to survive as head of state. Nor did Mitterrand reject Mikhail Gorbachev's belated peace plan outright: Foreign Minister Roland Dumas called it a step in the right direction—and then sliced it to shreds with diplomatic "corrections" and an insistence on deadlines that helped Bush fashion the ultimatum.

With victory in hand, France may become a more difficult ally once again. There is a national consensus in the country that a homeland for the Palestinians must be part of any new order in the Middle East; thus Mitterrand will push not for one but several international conferences on the Middle East. "We will spell out the objectives we consider just, and no one will give us orders," he declared a few days before the fighting stopped. Having done his part in the war, the President clearly expects France's voice to be heard—and heeded—now that it is over. ■

THE HOME FRONT

Exorcising an Old Demon

A stunning military triumph gives Americans something to cheer about—and shatters Vietnam's legacy of self-doubt and divisiveness

By STANLEY W. CLOUD



Hello, Kuwait. Goodbye, Vietnam. Next month 16 years will have passed since Americans and their friends scrambled from rooftops into helicopters and left Saigon to Vietnam's victorious communists. The pain of that and so many other Vietnam memories—the dead children of My Lai, the shock of Tet '68, the coups and countercoups, the fraggings, the drugs, the invasion of Cambodia, the killing of American students at Kent State—somehow only increased as the years passed. When the U.S.-led forces raced across Kuwait and Iraq last week, however, they may have defeated not just the Iraqi army but also the more virulent of the ghosts from the Vietnam era: self-doubt, fear of power, divisiveness, a fundamental uncertainty about America's purpose in the world.

The need for such an exorcism must have been felt by the anonymous U.S. Marine who, shortly after Kuwait City's liberation, paid a call on the deserted American embassy. He carried with him an old American flag, which he left at the gate of the embassy compound. Asked why by an Associated Press reporter, the Marine said the flag had been given to him 23 years earlier by a dying comrade in Vietnam. For the Marine in Kuwait City, and for many Americans who took justified pride in the U.S.'s military performance in the gulf, a circle had been completed, a chapter closed.

The crowds across the country that cheered the President's cease-fire announcement—and his declaration that “by God, we’ve kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all”—were celebrating far more than Saddam Hussein's defeat. They were savoring the country's first major military victory since 1945. “This largely puts Vietnam behind us,” says political-science professor Joe Cooper of Rice University. “We have the confidence now that we can define foreign policy objectives and carry them out. This will have the same effect as World War II.”

In Vietnam, says Tip Hale, a Chicago insurance salesman, “we didn’t have a cause that united everyone. Bush did it right. He got the cooperation of other countries, brought the U.N. in and let the experts run the war... If there was a war



you could be proud of, this was it.” Republican pollster Robert Teeter predicts that the gulf victory will especially affect the attitudes of young Americans. “These are people who had not seen the country either lead or succeed in a big way on anything for a long time, whether it was Vietnam or economic competition,” says Teeter. “Now they’ve seen us succeed.”

The Vietnam experience has been on the minds of Americans from the day George Bush dispatched troops to Saudi Arabia last August. The President took pains to vow that the mistakes of the only war the U.S. ever lost would not be repeat-

ed in the gulf. And they were not. From the massive and rapid military deployment to Bush's decision to seek formal congressional approval for the war, from the Pentagon's avoidance of macho rhetoric to the insistence by antiwar protesters that they supported U.S. troops, Americans of all sorts seemed determined to get it right this time. To the extent that any of Vietnam's bitter aftertaste was present, it was in the tension between the press and the military. And even that had dissipated to some extent by last week, when General H. Norman Schwarzkopf delivered his extraordinary briefing in Riyadh.

During Vietnam, generals like William Westmoreland and politicians like Lyndon Johnson paid a heavy price for their errors, misjudgments and deceptions. In contrast, the U.S.'s gulf war leaders—especially Bush, Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, Joint Chiefs Chairman Colin Powell and Schwarzkopf—will reap rich political and professional rewards. The odds favoring Bush's re-election have increased dramatically in the past few days, and the silence from Demo-

be received as heroes. From New York City to San Diego, local officials are laying plans for mass rallies and parades for the returning troops. "It's going to be a hell of a welcome bout," says Jim Schroder, president of the chamber of commerce in Oceanside, Calif., home of Camp Pendleton. The brass bands, speeches and ticker tape are a far cry from the shame and silence that greeted Vietnam veterans, who came home feeling they had no choice but to slink back into "the world."

ham says. "I don't think we could have had a better cause to fight for."

Some will doubtless conclude that the rightness of the cause and the swiftness of the victory have restored America to its pre-Vietnam place in the world, and that potential adversaries should consider themselves fairly warned. "Anyone will have to think twice about messing with the U.S. again," says Detroit advertising executive William Miller, who had initially opposed the gulf war. "Before a dictator attacks another country, he will have to look down the barrel of Uncle Sam's gun." It has been some time since talk like that has been heard, and believed, in the U.S. Wrote humorist Lewis Grizzard in the *Atlanta Journal* and the *Constitution*: "I think there ought to be a national day of gloating."

In the early '60s, John F. Kennedy claimed that the U.S. had "a problem in making power credible, and Vietnam is the place." Vietnam was not the place. But was the gulf? Last week George Bush declined to say so. Rather, he described the military result as "a victory for all the coalition partners... for the United Nations, for all mankind, for the rule of law and for what is right." The President was merely being diplomatic, of course, which was only fitting, since diplomacy had played an important part in assuring Iraq's defeat. But the fact is that this war fulfilled the dream John Kennedy had enunciated for Vietnam: it demonstrated not just that America is powerful but that it is credibly so.

There is a potential danger that the U.S., having rapidly and easily defeated Iraq, might be tempted to go for its guns too quickly in the future. "I don't think the nation's shame about Vietnam was such a bad thing," says Harvard Law School student Morris Ratner, 24. "To the extent that it kept the U.S. from playing international cowboy, it was a good thing. Unfortunately, I think this war will make future Administrations far less reticent in using force to deal with international problems."

Other voices of caution can be heard in the midst of all the cheering. "I'm not convinced that our military will be invincible forevermore," says Patrick Santana, a graphic designer in Boston. Los Angeles city councilman Zev Yaroslavsky, a liberal antiwar activist in the '60s who has supported the gulf war, takes a somewhat different tack: "If the Vietnam experience prevented the United States from asserting itself in issues of high moral purpose, and some people would say that it has, then this diminishes that reluctance. But if Vietnam has made us careful about asserting our influence—I hope that doesn't leave us."

Probably it won't. Americans were haunted by Vietnam, but they also learned from it. For proof of that, there is no need to look any further than the meticulous way in which George Bush and his military and civilian team went about engineering their stunning, quick triumph in the desert. ■



Collective euphoria: in Cincinnati relatives of servicemen cheer the President's cease-fire announcement

crats who were once thought all but certain to run against him has become conspicuous. In fact, the only jarring political news for Bush out of the war so far has been the finding in some recent polls that a lot of Americans would like to see Colin Powell replace Dan Quayle as the President's running mate next year.

Bush and the brass aren't the only ones who will benefit. In towns across the nation, troops from the gulf war are sure to

The terrible feeling of having been abandoned by a nation that had sent them to war caused a certain ambivalence in some Vietnam veterans and their families as they witnessed the sudden victory in the gulf. Louisville attorney Pat Durham, whose husband Ronald was killed in Vietnam, recalls how their son Billy tearfully concluded that "my dad died for nothing." Billy Durham is now 28, and served with the 1st Infantry Division in Saudi Arabia. His mother is confident that the memory of Vietnam will not dampen the celebration or mute the hurrahs when he returns. "This country can be very proud," Pat Dur-

DOMESTIC IMPACT

Bush's Republican Guard

Hoping to reap big political gains from a spectacular military victory, G.O.P. strategists draw up an electoral battle plan for 1992

By DAN GOODGAME



George Bush proved last week that he's not reluctant to press an advantage on the battlefield—and the same is true in the domestic political arena. With Bush's public approval rating having soared to around 90% since he declared victory, his handlers are already working to sustain that support into 1992 and translate it into Republican gains across the board. Their battle plan calls for at least three aggressive thrusts:

- ▶ Exploit the vote by most congressional Democrats against the war by contrasting the Democrats' "carping pessimism" with Republican can-do confidence in America's armed forces, industrial competitiveness, schools and future role in the world.
- ▶ Encourage the swelling national mood of celebration and renewed optimism as an engine to pull the economy out of recession and eliminate the only potential obstacle to Bush's re-election.
- ▶ Recruit potential new Republican candidates for Congress and other offices from among the 539,000 returning heroes of the war against Iraq.

The President is attempting to appear

above the fray. In declaring military success, he stressed that this was "not a time to gloat." Yet even as Bush's victory address was being composed, his chief of staff, John Sununu, was meeting with the half a dozen top Republicans who help plot political strategy and are known informally as the Wednesday Group. The day after the speech, Sununu summoned Republican lawmakers to the White House to consider ways to link Bush's foreign success to his domestic policy.

In fact, Bush and Defense Secretary Dick Cheney had already begun that effort in little-reported passages of recent speeches. "We hear so often how our kids and our schools fall short, and I think it's about time that we took note of some of the success stories," Bush said on Feb. 15 in a speech to the Massachusetts workers who built the Patriot missile system. "For years we've heard that antimissile defense won't work... Some people called it impossible. But you called it your job. And they were wrong and you were right."

Two days earlier, Cheney had told a business group, "It's important to remember that virtually every one of these [weapons] programs and systems was targeted somewhere along the line in the early stage of its development by critics." He added

that observing highly competent U.S. soldiers in the gulf had left him "less pessimistic about our basic educational systems." Summarizing the Administration's new line of attack, Cheney said, "We need to be less critical of ourselves than we have been... We have done a better job as a nation than we often give ourselves credit for, and the proof of that is what we're able to do over there in the gulf today."

By lashing out at naysayers, says Republican Party spokesman Charles Black, Administration officials are highlighting "some of the policies that we've supported and that are proving successful despite the opposition of the Democrats." Says party chief of staff Mary Matalin: "The Democrats are going to try to beat us on domestic policy, but they're so divided that they can't speak with one voice and put forward a coherent plan of their own. They'll end up just complaining, and I don't think people want to hear that right now."

G.O.P. strategists and pollsters have been impressed during the war by opinion surveys and focus groups that show strong public revulsion toward expressions of criticism or even skepticism by Democrats in Congress and by news reporters. "We're seeing a rejection of the cynicism that's been with us for so long," says Bush pollster and adviser Robert Teeter. "The most important thing that has occurred as a result of this war is a watershed change in the way the country thinks about itself."

Most Democrats in Congress voted against the resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq, but many say they did so only because they wished to give economic sanctions more time to work; once the resolution passed, they voiced clear support for U.S. troops. Republican spokesmen have made it clear, though, that they will not let the Democrats off the hook. Says former Drug Control Director William Bennett, who now serves informally as a G.O.P. adviser: "The votes for or against this war were important political acts, and they should have consequences."

Several Democratic Senators who opposed the force resolution have already seen



their ratings drop as much as 17 points in state polls. And two potential presidential candidates, House majority leader Richard Gephardt and New York Governor Mario Cuomo, badly wounded themselves before the war started by suggesting, respectively, that Congress might cut off funds for the war and that Saddam might go away if given part of Kuwait. "The best part," cackled one White House official, "is that they did it on camera." Republicans have obtained copies of those tapes for use in campaign spots and might also rebroadcast Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz's thinking lawmakers who opposed President Bush.

Republican strategists doubt that the President's skyrocketing approval ratings will translate into clout with the Democrat-controlled Congress. Thus Bush will not squander his popularity in bold attacks on the country's myriad domestic problems. Instead, he will submit modest domestic proposals like last week's warmed-over housing and educational "opportunity" initiative, so that, in the words of one White House official, "nobody can say we don't have a domestic agenda." Still, Bush will try not to let the Democrats shift the national focus to social issues.

The President's only real domestic concern will be the economy, which Republicans hope will get a boost from increased consumer and investor confidence, lower oil prices and freespending soldiers back from the gulf. Those returning G.I.s are also expected to offer a fertile new field for candidate recruitment, especially considering that retirement and redrawing of districts will result in 50 to 100 open seats in Congress by 1992. Says David Carney, a White House political operative: "It's a tremendous phenomenon that we haven't seen since World War II, where you have hundreds of thousands of soldiers returning as war heroes." Many of the reserve officers were prominent in their communities before the war and now have a valuable new credential. Though the Democrats may also try to woo returning soldiers, observes Republican pollster Linda DiVall, "we will have the upper hand because of the clear party division on this war and the President's popularity."

Party spokesman Black says that while some "research" on recruitment of soldier-statesmen "can and will be done by the Republican National Committee," there is no central plan to court potential candidates—at least not yet. Most of the effort, he says, is concentrated in local party organizations, which know "who's over in the Persian Gulf who might make a good candidate."

One good prospect might be the unnamed U.S. officer who colorfully described his mission last week as "pursuit and exploitation" of fleeing enemy forces. For the Iraqis, that unhappy fate ended with a cease-fire. For the Democrats, it's just beginning. ■

The Presidency

Hugh Sidey

Of Force, Fame and Fishing

Never before has an American President stood so grandly astride this capricious world as George Bush does these days. Historians scratched their heads last week and looked back for something comparable. There was nothing.

"Woodrow Wilson had a dominant position in world affairs after World War I," notes former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. "But there were other players on that stage." The aging tiger Georges Clemenceau, France's Prime Minister, still prowled the premises, as did Britain's Prime Minister David Lloyd George, another heavyweight. "No nation in any historical period has had the spectacular success of the U.S. these past two years," adds Kissinger, who was a professor of history before he became a shaper of policy and then a wealthy consultant on international relations.



With Colin Powell: How long can good times last?

"There may be some similarity with the emergence of the U.S. at the end of World War II," suggests foreign affairs scholar Kenneth Thompson. But again there were other major figures shaping events: the Kremlin's Joseph Stalin, a menacing but victorious war leader; and Britain's Winston Churchill, the man of the half-century.

In June 1945, just after the German surrender, George Gallup's polling organization registered an 87% job-approval rating for Harry Truman, the highest Gallup figure for any President on record even today. But researchers acknowledge that Truman himself had little to do with that endorsement, having taken

office only two months before, when Franklin Roosevelt died. The unknown Truman rode the crest of relief and joy.

A number of current polls show that Bush's rating has soared into the 80s and 90s. But Gallup, perhaps the most respected sampler, waited until the gulf victory had sunk in and then launched its canvass over the weekend. The figures will be announced this week. The Gallup experts predict that Bush will equal the Truman mark and perhaps even top it.

Bush's ascendancy is quite different from that of any other President. He had extraordinary luck in the timing of the gulf war. Kissinger points out that the collapse of the communist system and all its ripples through the client states rendered the Soviet leadership virtually helpless when Iraq invaded Kuwait. "There was no able leader comparable to Bush around," says one of the President's advisers. "Gorbachev for all his peace efforts was a sideshow. Margaret Thatcher was gone." The widespread notion that Bush would forever remain in the charismatic shadow of Ronald Reagan or be viewed as a foreign policy amateur compared with Richard Nixon has evaporated. It will probably never rise again.

But the hazards of such an exalted position in the world are obvious. War is almost always easier to run than peace, especially when you have such a magnificent military machine. The tributes to Bush last week in the U.S. Congress will endure about as long as it takes to say "pork barrel." The instantaneous maneuvering of the diplomatic corps for Bush's favor was heard at dozens of dinner tables through the week.

Fortunately, Bush knows better than anyone else the fragility of exaltation and has warned about it since his Inauguration. Even better, Barbara plans to drag him off to a fishing vacation as soon as possible. Herbert Hoover, who never had Bush's luck or touch, nonetheless left some pertinent wisdom for Presidents. He urged them to go fishing at every opportunity. "It is discipline in the equality of men," said Hoover. "For all men are equal before fish." ■

The Gulf War

THE PRESS

It Was a Public Relations Rout Too

The Pentagon did a masterly job of controlling coverage of the war. Now journalists have an image problem.


By RICHARD ZOGLIN



In the days leading up to the ground war, reporters were so frustrated by their lack of access to the battlefield that they jumped at the chance to cover rehearsals for a massive amphibious landing on the Kuwaiti coast. As the exercises carried on, press coverage mounted and anticipation grew. Only one problem: the landing never came. The amphibious assault was a diversionary tactic intended to fool the Iraqis. And the press coverage, as General Norman Schwarzkopf pointedly observed, was a big help.

Amid the jubilation of victory last week, many journalists had an uneasy feeling that they had been routed nearly as decisively as the Iraqis. Throughout the war, the Pentagon did a masterly job of controlling the flow of information. The success of the military on the public relations front was a textbook campaign that may serve as a model for wars to come. The press, in the meantime, has a major job of image rebuilding ahead.

Tense relations between the media and the military were one of the most publicized sideshows of the gulf war. The battle lines were drawn early and hammered repeatedly. The Pentagon forced reporters to work in pools and imposed other restrictions on coverage; journalists, naturally, objected that they couldn't do their job. CNN's Peter Arnett and other TV reporters sent back dispatches from Baghdad showing civilian casualties; the public, naturally, complained that such reports were aiding the enemy. CBS correspondent Bob Simon, who had bucked the pools to strike out on



Limiting access: pool reporters pursued the story, as the military defined it

his own, was captured, along with three colleagues, by Iraqi soldiers and spent 40 days in captivity before being released in Baghdad last week.

Through it all, one fact was nearly obscured: the gulf war was covered exhaustively. Last week's fast-moving ground offensive left many pool reporters unhappy as renegades like CBS's Bob McKeown (the first American journalist to reach Kuwait City) beat them to the big story. But for the people back home, it mattered little. Pictures of liberated Kuwait, give or take a few hours, reached TV in abundance. The allied battle plan, after having been kept secret for weeks, was eventually laid out in lavish detail. The bulk of the story was told, or soon will be.

Yet news about the war was carefully managed in a variety of ways. By herding reporters into pools, subjecting their stories to censorship and imposing other restrictions like the total news blackout at the start of the ground war, the Pentagon claimed it was making sure no confidential military information was revealed. The restrictions, however, gave the military a major say in where journalists could go and what they could report. A ban on showing pictures of coffins arriving at Dover Air Force Base, for example, was aimed at

softening the coverage of U.S. casualties.

With little access to the battlefield, reporters had to depend on the daily briefings in Riyadh and Washington for news. Those were handled with extraordinary skill. The briefings were filled with facts and figures (number of missions flown, Scuds fired), and the men who conducted them were cooperative, usually candid and, when it came to estimates of enemy damage, very cautious. The goal was to avoid excessive optimism and reduce expectations.

If the Pentagon did not spread actual disinformation, it certainly welcomed the media's help in confusing the Iraqis. Schwarzkopf facetiously praised the press for making the initial allied buildup in Saudi Arabia seem greater than it was—thus helping to discourage an Iraqi attack. A report early in the war that 60 Iraqi tanks had defected, it was later disclosed, was falsely planted by the CIA to try to lure more defectors. In the days before the ground offensive, reporters were frequently taken to see troops near the Kuwait border in order to distract the Iraqis from the hidden buildup going on far to the west.

Two important factors helped make the Pentagon's public relations campaign a success. First, the story was nearly all positive for the allies: courting favorable press cov-

crage is much easier when there is little bad news to downplay or counter. Second, the war was short. Managing the news would surely have grown tougher if the ground war had dragged on.

The pool system, for one thing, would probably have broken down. Although the number of journalists allowed into the field in pools grew as the war went on (some 200 were with the troops during the ground campaign), editors and reporters continued to complain about the slowness with which pool reports were sent back from the front. "The system suffered from a lack of logistics," says Eric Schmitt of the *New York Times*. "We were constantly fighting the system." Others argue that the pool arrangement should not have lasted as long as it did. "The pool was never intended to be the be-all and end-all of coverage," says Fred Hoffman, a former Pentagon spokesman who helped devise the pool setup. "It shouldn't have been used beyond the earliest stages of the war." A

HOW THE NEWS WAS RATIONED

- **POOLS** limited news from the field by forcing reporters into chaperoned groups.
- **CENSORSHIP** weeded out information that the Pentagon claimed might help the enemy.
- **BRIEFINGS**, at least two a day, were packed with numbers to fill reporters' notebooks.
- **CAUTIOUS ESTIMATES** lowballed damage to the enemy to avoid overoptimism on the war's progress.
- **SAVVY SPOKESPEOPLE** won the public's trust with apparent candor. Good sound bites too.

lawsuit has been filed by several writers and magazines, including the *Village Voice* and the *Nation*, charging that the Pentagon restrictions violated the press's First Amendment rights.

The Pentagon's public relations savvy was fitting for a war that was waged as much on the propaganda front as on the battlefield. "The campaign in Saudi Arabia was managed like an American political campaign," says Robert Manoff, director of the Center for War, Peace, and the News Me-

dia. "Imagery was a dominant concern." Many in the military also wanted to redress what they regard as unfair press coverage of the Vietnam War. "It's obvious the government has been planning for a rematch since Vietnam," says Jon Katz, a former CBS News producer who writes about TV for *Rolling Stone*. "They were brilliantly successful."

Now the press corps must try to regroup. "There is probably greater public anger with the press than at any time since the end of the war in Vietnam," says First Amendment lawyer Floyd Abrams. In the wake of a successful war, reporters—who ask tough questions and sometimes bring bad news—can seem to many Americans like the nerdy hall monitors at a senior prom. To others, journalists covering the war appeared all too eager to accept the military's version of the story. The press's job, however, is not necessarily to please either side—only to look for the truth. —*Reported by Ann Blackman/Washington, Dean Fischer/Riyadh and Leslie Whitaker/New York*

A Review: Performin' Norman at Center Stage

He lacks the heroic mien—steel forged in Camelot—of central casting's great military strategists: Wellington, MacArthur, Corderman. His stare, which can be ferocious, is undercut by a fretful brow; the small, almost gentle features are stranded in his moon of a face. And no fellow shaped like a nose tackle is going to cut a chic figure in those desert jammies. You look for John Wayne, and you find Jonathan Winters crossed with Willard Scott: a lunch-pail lug who should be shuffling into the *Cheers* bar to a chorus of "Norm!" Norm? Is that any name for a general? And is it absurd or poetic that the successor to Arnold Schwarzenegger as America's favorite macho man should be H. Norman Schwarzkopf?


Poetic will do. For in his briefing last Wednesday, the coalition commander showed Americans not their handsomest face but their best one. Gruff and compassionate, speaking in flinty, illuminating sentences, Schwarzkopf made sense of the battle plan in its grandeur and awful human cost. Though he is the first U.S. general since Ike to earn gloating rights, he refused to preen. Perhaps he tacitly recognized that Iraq was not the most formidable foe—closer to Grenada than to Nazi Germany in war-making savvy and casualties inflicted. But one suspects that this man's tone would be the same at the end of any war: a powerfully plainspoken mixture of triumph, requiem and relief.

For 57 minutes, without toupee or TelePrompTer, Schwarzkopf dis-

played all the seductiveness of the performer's art. He prowled like a stand-up comic, permitted himself the occasional thin smile, inflected his stats with Bob Hope-style throwaway lines ("But I gotta tell ya . . ."). When asked to appraise Saddam's soldiering skills, he snorted a "Hal," then launched into a catalog of caustic irony. He tamped his rage into questions intimidating ("Have you ever been in a minefield?") and rhetorical ("Do I fear a cease-fire?"). But the most moving moment came when he caught himself describing the low allied casualty rate as "miraculous." Then his emotions briefly stumbled over his eloquence. "It will never be ra . . . miraculous to the families of those people," and here he drew in a taut breath, "but it is miraculous." He was the grieving father to every lost allied soul.

Americans, it is said, insist on reducing politics to show biz. And in the gulf, the theater of war was also, maybe mainly, a theater. As the *New York Times's* Malcolm Browne notes, "This

war seemed to smell more of greasatant than of death." In time, other odors may rise, as the nation weighs the war's cost in American dollars and Arab lives. But last week Schwarzkopf gave the U.S. a warrior to be proud of. Others might see glamour in the allied victory; he would carry the memory of the dead on his burly shoulders. His Great Performance was so convincing, not because he knew it would be the finest speech of the war, but because he hoped it would be the last. —*By Richard Corliss*



Making points at the big briefing: a powerful mixture of requiem and relief

The Gulf War



West Point's 1990 graduating class: looking sharp and using the right fork

THE ARMED FORCES

A New Breed of Brass

From the ashes of Vietnam, the Pentagon has shaped a sophisticated military that speaks well and fights smart

By **JESSE BIRNBAUM**



In the catalog of astonishments that will forever mark the chronicles of the gulf war, none is more dramatic than the remarkable professionalism of the U.S. soldiers who planned and fought the battles. That was exemplified most visibly by the smooth TV performances of top military officers in Washington and Saudi Arabia. Intelligent, frank, sometimes eloquent, these men seemed to personify a new class of American military leaders who not only have a thorough grasp of their trade but also demonstrate broad political and worldly sophistication—not to mention p.r. savvy.

It was not always thus. During the Vietnam era, many Americans came to regard the U.S. officer class as a band of dissemblers and incompetents. As for the grunts, their ranks had long been considered a repository for society's dropouts. From the Revolutionary War to the early 1900s, it was not only common but legal for a conscript to pay someone else to take his place in the armed forces. Some criminal court judges even sentenced miscreants to military service.

But the armed forces have undergone a top-to-bottom transformation since the end of Vietnam. Nowadays, says U.S. Air Force Academy spokesman Colonel Mike Wallace, "the military is a different breed

of cat. It is no longer a place to hide society's misfits; it represents a large section of America's middle class, who are better informed and better trained than before." Today every man and woman entering the armed forces has at least a high school diploma, and nearly all officers have earned at least a bachelor's degree in subjects ranging from political science to European history. Lieut. General Thomas Kelly, who skillfully led the Pentagon's Washington briefings on Operation Desert Storm, has a B.S. in journalism; Marine Brigadier General Richard Neal, the main briefer in Saudi Arabia, has a master's degree in education. Allied Commander H. Norman Schwarzkopf has an M.S. in mechanical engineering. General Colin Powell, who never attended a military academy, has earned a B.S. in geology and a master's degree in business administration.

For senior military officers, the intellectual challenges hardly end with their college days. Some attend a two-week national-security program at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government that is held every year, as well as numerous seminars on a variety of political and military issues. In addition, the Council on Foreign Relations provides an internship program for military officers. The Pentagon even runs a "charm school" (properly called the General Officer Orientation class), where freshly baked brigadiers are taught social graces that include the proper choice of forks as well as the finger-bowl ritual.

The new emphasis on the culturization of the officer corps came with a reassessment that followed the Vietnam War and the subsequent changeover to an all-volunteer military. One distressing result of the Vietnam experience was that large numbers of disillusioned officers resigned from the services. The Pentagon needed not only a new infusion of talent but also a major overhaul in organization and training. Most important, the traditional interservice bickering that often hobbled performance in the field and sowed distrust between officers and men had to end.

What helped make the changes possible was the advent of the all-volunteer military, which lured educated and motivated young men and women with promises of good pay, first-class training and career advancement. As a consequence, says Anthony Cordesman, professor of national-security studies at Georgetown University (and now something of a minor celebrity as a result of his sophisticated military analysis on ABC television), the Pentagon can boast of "an unprecedented level of professionalism that in every way is superior to the old conscript." This, says Cordesman, has bred "a new civil-military relationship" that permitted Schwarzkopf and his commanders to pursue their goals with a minimum of political interference.

In addition, the Pentagon made major revisions in key military practices. Items:

- The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, thanks to the little-noted 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act, was given new powers, changing his role from head of the service chiefs to that of the sole, authoritative military adviser to the President.
- Training was revised from "doing it by the book" to "training to win." In place of the customary set pieces that passed for classroom exercises, officers were encouraged to roam a figurative battlefield intellectually, looking for tactical possibilities.
- Command activities changed from isolated service-based operations—which in Vietnam had often seemed to permit each service to fight its own war—to close, integrated cooperation.

These revisions were accompanied by a curriculum reform at the military academies. Today's future officers are allowed more flexibility in their studies. They can take elective courses either in their major subjects or in the humanities and sciences, and of course spend a good deal of time absorbing the new battlefield thinking that has emerged over the past two decades. The Pentagon, says Martin Binkin, a defense expert at the Brookings Institution, "literally rewrote the textbook on war. It's a new ball game in every way. The battle cry is 'Fight smart!'" The merits of that approach are written all over Operation Desert Storm.

—Reported by Bruce van Voorst/
Washington

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HISTORY

"A Man You Could Do Business With"

In Washington's eyes, Saddam was not always an enemy. In fact, three Presidents counted on him to keep Iran's brand of Islamic radicalism in check.

By TED GUP




Even at the edge of the abyss, U.S. policy toward Iraq ran headlong into contradiction with itself. On July 25, 1990, as Iraqi tanks and troops were massing along the border of Kuwait, U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie told President Saddam Hussein in Baghdad that the U.S. had little to say about Arab border disputes and was eager to improve relations with Iraq. That same day in Washington, anxious State Department officials urged the Pentagon to dispatch the aircraft carrier U.S.S. *Independence* and its battle group, then in the Indian Ocean, to the mouth of the Persian Gulf—as a signal to Saddam that the U.S. would not sit idly by if Iraq crossed into Kuwait.

Days passed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff resisted sending the *Independence*, arguing that such a force, obviously no more than a token, would be no match for Saddam's giant war machine. Just before the invasion, with the Iraqi army now poised for assault, the White House overruled the Pentagon's concerns and ordered the warships toward the gulf. The decision probably came too late to impress Saddam.

The episode was typical of a U.S. policy toward Iraq that was marked by mixed signals, interagency disputes, intelligence failures, errors of judgment and flights of wishful thinking. Behind the specific failures lurked—and still lurks—a general policy dilemma the U.S. has yet to resolve: Must America dance with the devil to promote its strategic interests? When is the enemy of your enemy your friend?

While it took months for Desert Shield to be transformed



1979: Islamic fundamentalists led by Ayatullah Khomeini overthrow the Shah of Iran, whose regime has been a bulwark against Soviet "expansionism."

into Desert Storm, U.S. policymakers were scrambling for cover within days of the invasion, trying to defend their actions from the harsh judgments of hindsight. The great "Who lost Kuwait?" debate was on. Revisionism was rampant. But what was clear was that the roots of a failed policy went back more than a decade. The American embrace of Saddam Hussein began on Nov. 4, 1979, when the Islamic revolutionaries who had overthrown the Shah of Iran seized the U.S. embassy in Tehran and took 66 Americans hostage. That cataclysmic event—and the growing fear that Islamic fundamentalism would spread throughout the region—became the driving force behind U.S. policy not only toward Iran but Iraq as well. Three U.S. administrations and both political parties shared responsibility for this view.

1 "A Counterbalance To the Iranians"

Says Graham Fuller, a Middle East specialist with the CIA during the 1980s: "There was a genuine visceral fear of Islam in Washington as a force that was utterly alien to American thinking, and that really scared us. Senior people at the Pentagon and elsewhere were much more concerned about Islam than communism. It was an almost obsessive fear, leading to a mentality on our part that you should use any stick to beat a dog—to stop the advance of Islamic fundamentalism." That stick was to be Iraq.

1979

Shah of Iran is ousted; Iranians seize U.S. embassy, taking hostages

1980

Iraq invades Iran

1981

Israel destroys Iraqi nuclear reactor

1982

U.S. takes Iraq off list of countries supporting terrorism

TIME Chart by David Holt

The Gulf War

Washington had few illusions about Saddam. Says Harold Brown, Jimmy Carter's Secretary of Defense: "The intelligence reports all said he was a thug and an assassin." Says Gary Sick, then a Middle East expert on the staff of the National Security Council: "I don't recall reading anything other than that this was a man who was ruthless and dangerous, but who nonetheless, as with the Shah, was a man you could do business with." But if there were grave misgivings about Saddam, there was also an early appreciation for the strategic role he could play in the gulf. According to Sick, then National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski "talked quite openly, saying that Iraq provided a counterbalance to the Iranians, and we should cultivate that."

It was not the first time the U.S. had relied on a repugnant regime to advance its interests in the gulf. For years the U.S. had supported the Shah of Iran, whose security apparatus used torture and terror but whose country was seen as a bulwark against Soviet "expansionism" from the north.

By 1979 Iraq was already a formidable military power. Brown recalls that when the Pentagon prepared classified contingency studies matching U.S. forces against a potential Persian Gulf adversary, the standard of measurement and the imagined enemy was always Iraq. To Brown's consternation, Defense Department analysts actually used "Iraq" in their reports. Brown repeatedly asked the Pentagon to delete the country's name for fear the studies might be leaked and America would be seen as preparing for war with Baghdad—a nondesirable and less than credible scenario at the time.

Howard Teicher, a policy analyst in Brown's office, conducted a six-month study of Iraq for the Defense Department in 1979. "Nobody at a policy level had a good understanding of what was then the nature of the regime and what were its long-term goals," says Teicher. He produced a secret 50-page report that warned nine months before war broke out that Iraq would attack Iran in a bid to become the world's arbiter of oil supplies and pricing.

Teicher's study ended up on Brown's desk. The Secretary rejected the analysis, says Teicher, and insisted that the Iraqi leadership had somewhat moderated its behavior. "They are not the nasty guys you claim they are," was the gist of Brown's comments, Teicher recalls. As personally brutal as Saddam undoubtedly was, Brown says, Iraq had until then not been outwardly aggressive toward its neighbors. Its economic and educational development, as well as its secular approach to nation building, made it more familiar and less threatening to the West than was Iran.

Others were less certain. Robert Hunter was on the staff of

the National Security Council under Carter. While recognizing the need to sometimes deal with dictators, he cautions from the vantage point of hindsight, "If you're going to sup with the devil, use a long spoon." But keeping one's distance from a tyrant while relying on him to advance U.S. interests would not be easy under any circumstances. Although the Carter Administration remained mostly neutral, the State Department allowed General Electric to sell eight jet engines for four warships being built by Italy for Iraq.

2 "We Created This Monster"



1979: Seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran ignites fears that Iran will destabilize the region. The U.S. turns to Baghdad as a counterbalance.

By 1986 the struggle between Iraq and Iran had degenerated into a bloody stalemate. To assist Iraq, the U.S., along with Israel and Egypt, began providing Baghdad with intelligence data on Iranian troop movements. Over the next year the U.S. became more directly involved in protecting shipping in the gulf. Thirty-seven American sailors perished after an Iraqi warplane accidentally attacked the frigate U.S.S. *Stark* with an Exocet missile.

As Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for International Economic Trade and Security Policy in the Reagan Administration, Stephen Bryen was responsible for protecting American security interests by preventing the transfer of sensitive technology to potential enemies. Most of his attention

was directed at exports to the Soviet Union, but he also reviewed export licenses for Syria, Libya, Iran and Iraq—countries that were jokingly referred to in Washington as "the Happy Four" because of their penchant for troublemaking.

In 1986 Bryen learned of an application to export an advanced computer manufactured in New Jersey. Intelligence reports indicated that the computer's final destination was a research facility in Mosul, Iraq, known as Saad 16. There researchers were working to develop a ballistic missile with a longer range than the now familiar Soviet-supplied Scud.

Bryen raised his concerns with the Commerce Department, which insisted nonetheless on going ahead with the sale. Paul Freedenberg, then the Under Secretary for Export Administration, insists that there were simply no grounds for stopping the transaction. "At the time," he says, "the State Department had no particular concerns in this area, so the national policy and the policy of President Reagan was normal trade with Iraq." While the transfer of purely military items

1982

Iran repels Iraqi advances raising concerns that Iran will win war



1984

U.S. establishes diplomatic relations with Iraq



1985-86

U.S. supplies vital military intelligence to Iraq



1987

U.S. loans to Iraq for commodities double in 5 years

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The Gulf War

was banned, sales of "dual use" technology, with both civilian and military applications, were reviewed on a case-by-case basis. Only infrequently, for example in situations involving extremely advanced computers, were sales not approved.

In this instance, the Commerce Department's technical analysts raised no red flags. "Our analysts said the computer was old and unsophisticated," says Freedenberg. "Just because it was in use at White Sands doesn't mean it was advanced." Today he concedes that the sale was "a mistake" that could have been avoided had the Reagan Administration taken a tougher stance against Iraq.

The issue assumed greater urgency in August 1988 when the Iraqis used poison gas to kill thousands of their own citizens—Kurdish men, women and children. At a White House meeting sponsored by the NSC, Freedenberg, troubled by the gassings, asked the State Department to impose "foreign policy controls" on exports to Iraq, which would have blocked the sale of militarily useful items like the computer. The Defense Department concurred. Although both the State Department and the White House acknowledged the atrocities of Saddam's regime, they argued that Iraq still played a vital strategic role and that U.S. influence to moderate Baghdad's conduct would be strengthened most by encouragement and trade, not bluster and confrontation. "They said, 'We have no concerns about Iraq; there is no reason to ask for foreign policy controls,'" Freedenberg remembers. "I was overruled by the State Department and the White House."

Since 1986, says Freedenberg, sales of American goods to Iraq have totaled more than \$1.5 billion. All the while, other nations, including France, were feverishly selling weapons to Saddam—without opposition from Washington. Reason: the U.S. was obsessed with making sure Iran would not win the war.

Bryen still ponders the question of the computer, which was sent to Iraq over his protests. "We created this monster," he says. "If you want to know who's to blame for all this, we are, because we let all this stuff go to Iraq."

3 "The Intelligence Was Limited"

Despite deepening American involvement with Iraq, the CIA had trouble predicting what Saddam was up to. Part of the problem was the nature of Iraq's political structure. Saddam

ran a ruthless, highly centralized regime. Says Richard Murphy, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs in the Reagan Administration: "The intelligence was limited, always has been, and still is today. The access to Iraqi officialdom and private citizens was extraordinarily limited." The U.S. had few intelligence assets within Iraq; as one American official says, analysts were reduced to "dealing with a welter of contradictory, fragmentary and incomplete information, and then trying to make sense out of that mess."

Washington looked to moderate Arab governments for help in understanding Saddam, but their assessments were distorted. Like the U.S., Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Jordan were counting on Iraq to hold the line against the spread of Islamic fundamentalism from Iran. Their leaders repeatedly assured the U.S. that Saddam was turning moderate and merited continued American support.

Teicher, a member of the National Security Council staff under Reagan, remembers an April 1982 meeting between Walter Stoessel, then Deputy Secretary of State, and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. At the time, Iranian troops had recaptured much of the territory Iraq had seized in the first weeks of the war. At the end of the meeting, Teicher recalls, "Mubarak held my hand and wouldn't let go. He talked to me about the desperate situation Saddam Hussein was in, and the absolute necessity for America to find ways to help him. He wanted me to take his message back to President Reagan."

Such appeals, which continued up to the eve of the 1990 invasion of Kuwait, skewed U.S. assessments toward an unrealistically sanguine view of Iraq. The Reagan Administration seemed only too eager to accept the optimistic appraisals, which provided a basis, albeit shaky, for its—and later the Bush Administration's—inclination to play down Saddam's human-rights violations and bellicose rhetoric because of Iraq's strategic importance. A senior State Department official reflects on the lesson: "One of the things we've probably learned is to put more stock in our own analysis and less confidence in what other nations are telling us. We listened to them, and we gave it considerable weight. In retrospect, that was an error."

Arab leaders were not alone in suggesting that Saddam could be lured into behaving with more restraint. In the spring of 1984, Teicher accompanied Donald Rumsfeld, then Reagan's special Middle East envoy, on a visit to Israel. Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir told Rumsfeld that Israel considered Iran, not Iraq, to be the greatest threat in the region. Accord-



1980: Backed by moderate Arab states that fear Iran's radicalism, Iraq launches an offensive against Iran. The war drags on for eight years.

1987

U.S. reflags Kuwaiti tankers; Iraqi missile hits U.S.S. *Stark*, killing 37

1988

Iran-Iraq war ends; Saddam uses chemical weapons on thousands of Kurds

1989

To prod Saddam toward moderation, the Administration urges economic ties with Iraq

The Gulf War

ing to Teicher, Shamir proposed the construction of an oil pipeline from Iraq to the Israeli port of Haifa as a goodwill gesture. When the U.S. relayed the offer to Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, he refused to pass it along to Saddam, saying the President would kill him on the spot.

Five years later, in the fall of 1989, the U.S. began a sweeping reassessment of its policies in the Persian Gulf. According to an official with access to secret intelligence analyses, the CIA, a major contributor to the review, concluded that Iraq's war-weariness and heavy international debt of \$65 billion made it likely that Baghdad would concentrate on rebuilding its crippled economy and increasing its oil production rather than embark on foreign adventures. Moreover, the assessment held, Iraq would feel beholden to those countries that had helped finance its fight against Iran, among them Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. There was one cautionary note, sounded almost in passing: Saddam was spending millions of dollars to build up chemical- and biological-weapons capacity.

Intelligence assessments were only part of the review. State Department and other government policymakers made much of Iraq's relaxation of travel restrictions for its citizens, as well as Saddam's plans for drafting a new constitution—something that never materialized. Bush Administration officials claim that they were not predisposed to arrive at an assessment of Iraq that was rosier than the facts warranted. But if they were, there were familiar, if somewhat amended, strategic arguments to seduce them.

Now Saddam reigned over the region's dominant military power, an emerging political force and a country whose rich oil fields promised to make it an economic giant. Already, 8% of America's petroleum came from Iraqi wells, and American corporations were eager to help rebuild Iraq's shattered infrastructure. The Bush Administration decided to edge still closer to Iraq and to deal with the issue of Saddam's egregious human-rights record by using private pressure and the benefits of trade to gently prod him along a more responsible path.

range of Israel. He railed against the long-established U.S. naval presence in the gulf. He had an Iranian-born British journalist executed as a spy. He attempted to smuggle in triggering devices used in nuclear weapons.

In the midst of these developments, on April 12, six U.S. Senators arrived in Iraq on a regionwide fact-finding mission. The group included Republicans Bob Dole of Kansas, Charles Grassley of Iowa, Alan Simpson of Wyoming and Frank Murkowski of Alaska as well as Democrats Howard Metzenbaum of Ohio and James McClure of Idaho. The group was taken to a hotel along the Tigris River, ushered into a suite and presented to Saddam. They were asked to surrender their tape recorders and cameras.

The meeting drew much attention in the U.S. 10 months later after Baghdad released a partial transcript of the conversation. When Saddam raised the issue of the 1981 Israeli

bombing of an Iraqi nuclear reactor, Dole reminded him, "We condemned the Israeli attack." Simpson, in particular, came off badly: "I believe that your problems lie with the Western media and not with the U.S. government," he advised Saddam.

Simpson does not deny making the remark but says the transcript reflects only 15 minutes of a three-hour meeting and omits the Senators' remonstrations with Saddam about the use of poison gas by Iraq, its efforts to build super-long-range artillery weapons and its threats against Israel. Saddam offered to take the group via helicopter to the Kurdish region. "I will show you that I am beloved by the Kurds," he said. Outside in the hotel parking lot, five helicopters were ready. When the Senators declined, uniformed officers

in the room laughed derisively, Simpson says. (Later the Senators spoke among themselves of the hazards of flying in Iraqi helicopters.) Saddam told them that should Israel ever attack, his generals had instructions to launch everything in their arsenal at the Jewish state—even if he were dead.

Dole spoke last. He put forward his withered right arm, injured in 1945 by German mortar and machine-gun fire, and looked Saddam in the eye. "I have a daily reminder of the futility of war," Dole said. Recalls Simpson: "Saddam didn't respond to that. He was taken aback."



1987: The U.S. becomes more directly involved in protecting shipping in the gulf. An accidental Iraqi attack on the U.S.S. Stark kills 37 sailors.

4 "Your Problems Lie With the Media"

By the spring of 1990 Saddam had become more belligerent. He threatened to incinerate half of Israel if attacked. He moved Scud missiles to the border with Jordan, within striking

5 "Take a Tyrant At his Word"

U.S. officials with access to classified intelligence reports

1990 March

Intelligence reports that Iraq has missile launchers near Jordan border capable of hitting Israel

British seize Iraqi-bound electronic devices for triggering nuclear bombs

April

Saddam threatens to incinerate Israel with chemical weapons if attacked

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The Gulf War

for the month preceding the invasion of Kuwait say they provided precise details of Iraqi troop movements, logistics and air activity. But for most of that crucial period the reports remained vague on a fundamental question: Was Saddam bluffing the Kuwaitis, planning a short cross-border raid, or about to swallow the country whole? One explanation: intelligence assessments tend to be cautious and shy away from firm predictions. But there were other reasons why the Administration was so slow to come to terms with threats from Saddam. Policymakers who had spent years offering sanguine assessments of his regime were reluctant to accept the fact that the policies they had promoted had so dismally failed.

Saddam can be accused of many things, but masking his intentions is not one of them. In May 1990 he told a gathering of Arab leaders in Baghdad that he considered oil production above the limits set for each producer nation by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries to be an act of war. Kuwait was exceeding its OPEC limits at the time. But a senior State Department official dismissed the statement as "typical exaggerated rhetoric." Says the same official today: "I guess there is a lesson here: Take a tyrant at his word."

If the U.S. was slow to discern Saddam's intentions, Saddam was worse at understanding the U.S. He knew little of America and drew many a false conclusion. U.S. Ambassador Glaspie told State Department colleagues how Saddam had marveled at some earthworks constructed in Iraq by Vietnamese workers. Saddam had been amazed that a Third World people could defeat a superpower and may have been emboldened by the thought. He seemed to repeatedly conclude from America's experience in the Vietnam War that the U.S. lacked will. "He thought he knew more about us than we knew about ourselves, and that was ultimately his most severe miscalculation," observes a senior State Department official.

But given the mixed signals the U.S. was sending Saddam, no wonder he misread Washington's intentions. On July 25, a week before the invasion, Glaspie was summoned to a hasty meeting with Saddam even as his troops threatened the border with Kuwait. She told him, "We don't have much to say about Arab-Arab differences, like your border difference with Kuwait." After the invasion Glaspie was severely criticized for her remarks, which were seen by many foreign policy analysts as having given Saddam a virtual green light for invasion. The criticism was misplaced. "She was an ambassador operating on the basis of instructions," says Representative Lee Hamilton, chairman of the

House subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East.

The mistake was compounded on July 31, two days before the invasion, when Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs John Kelly told a congressional subcommittee, "We have no defense-treaty relationships with any of the [gulf] countries. We have historically avoided taking a position on border disputes or on internal OPEC deliberations, but we have certainly, as have all administrations, resoundingly called for the peaceful settlement of disputes and differences in the region." Says Hamilton: "The Administration still believed Saddam was a guy they could work with. They were still taking that position right up to the day of the invasion." Like Saddam, Hamilton and other Congressmen had concluded that the U.S. would not fight on behalf of Kuwait.

By then, cautious intelligence estimates had been replaced by loud alarms. In mid-July, Iraqi supply buildups were considered large enough for a military operation in northern Kuwait, possibly to take disputed border oil fields or Bubiyan Island. A week before the invasion, at the very time Glaspie was meeting with Saddam, senior officials at the White House, Pentagon and State Department were advised in intelligence briefings that Saddam was not bluffing. His patience with Kuwait was growing thin. Intelligence summaries cited Iraqi air exercises indicating preparation for a massive ground assault.

At 3 p.m. on Aug. 1, Iraqi Ambassador Mohammed al-Mashat sat across from Kelly and other U.S. officials in Kelly's sixth-floor office at the State Department. The

conversation was tense. Kelly warned Mashat that the U.S. was deeply concerned about the military buildup, that the massing of forces had created anxiety throughout the area. Mashat blamed U.S. rhetoric for increased fears. Preposterous, answered Kelly, noting that 100,000 Iraqi troops were deployed along the Kuwait border. Iraq, said Mashat, had the right to move its troops within Iraqi territory as it pleased; he also assured Kelly that press accounts of negotiations with Kuwait were unduly pessimistic. "You don't need to worry," the ambassador declared. "We are not going to move against anybody."

Two hours later, at 5 p.m., senior State Department officials, joined by representatives from the Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the White House and the CIA, met behind closed doors in Secretary of Defense James Baker's conference room. There, CIA Deputy Director Richard Kerr made an ominous prediction: Iraq would invade within six to 12 hours. At 8:30 that evening, Kerr's prediction came true. ■



1990: U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie tells Saddam that America has little to say about his dispute with Kuwait. One week later the invasion begins.

1990 April

6 U.S. Senators advise Saddam on how he can improve U.S.-Iraq relations

July 25

U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie tells Saddam that the U.S. takes no position on Iraq's quarrel with Kuwait

August 2

Iraq invades Kuwait

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
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CONSUMER CONFIDENCE IS UP: Shoppers crowded Bloomingdale's in Manhattan last week. Many economists expect a retail buying spree.

Victory's Dividend

Don't expect miracles, but victory in the gulf should boost the economy

By RICHARD BEHAR



When Johnny comes marching home, will the rest of us celebrate by tramping off to the mall or auto showroom? Businesspeople and investors across America are pondering that question, trying to balance widespread forecasts of at least one more recessionary quarter against the euphoria of a swift battlefield victory. Does peace mean prosperity? If the gulf war didn't start this recession, what role will Kuwait's liberation play in ending it?

War, not peace, typically stimulates huge demand for goods and services. That didn't happen this time, in part because this war was fought mostly with stockpiled off-the-shelf weapons and munitions. Now a growing number of economists and businesspeople are predicting, suggesting, hoping—praying—that the cease-fire will trigger an improvement in the economy by boosting consumer confidence and spending. "Peace is a jump-starter," says John Tuccillo, chief economist of the National

Association of Realtors. "This is the catalyst that can get the thing cooking. It's not the whole story, but it is a spark, and that's important because this is an economy that needs a spark."

No experts are foolish enough to predict that peace will obliterate America's severe economic woes—its mountains of debt, its banking crisis, its depressed real estate market. But a consensus holds that peace and national pride will at least erase the preoccupation with war and TV bulletins that has turned the slush of a winter's recession into a frozen economic tundra. Among the areas showing signs of a peace-prompted thaw:

Consumer Confidence. It plunged after the gulf crisis began and in January finally dragged consumer spending down with it. That's important because such expenditures account for two-thirds of America's economy—so it's heartening that confidence suddenly reversed course in February, posting a small improvement. For the first time in five months, the closely watched monthly consumer confidence in-

dex of the Conference Board, a business research group, rose 2.6 points, to 57.7. That's still way below last July's 101.7, but it's a start. It also fails to reflect consumer reaction to the cease-fire, which was announced after the survey was completed. Says economist Paul Erdman: "The American nation refound its confidence on the Persian Gulf battlefield. That confidence is seeping down into the national psyche and could help bring on an economic renewal. The war showed we don't have to play second fiddle to anybody, that we don't need the Germans and the Japanese to help us accomplish something."

Wall Street. Victory had been discounted for several weeks by the stock market, where a raging bull can help trigger a speedy recovery. The Dow Jones industrial average closed this week at 2909.1, up 6.3% in the past four weeks and up 544 points, or 23%, since its October low. Daily trading volume since January has averaged 195 million shares, 19% higher than a year ago. If this keeps up, the securities industry will post its most profitable quarter in

Business



OIL PRICES SHOULD STAY LOW: A worldwide glut means continued cheap gasoline, as at these Kentucky filling stations.



WAR COSTS LOOK MANAGEABLE: Budget Director Darman told Congress that commitments from allies may cover most expenses.

nearly a year. Assets of mutual funds—including risky small-company and junk-bond funds—grew a record \$59 billion in January, and the frenetic pace continued in February. "This is the first popular war since World War II," explains Bill LeFevre, senior stock-market strategist for Tucker Anthony. "You could very well see the consumer celebrate by buying that postponed car, TV or refrigerator. This will go a long way toward turning the recession into recovery." Stocks have accurately forecast seven of the eight recoveries since 1949, while the biggest bull market in history started in the 1982 recession.

Oil. Say goodbye to fears of \$50-per-bbl. oil. World oil supplies are greater than they were a year ago despite the lack of production from Iraq and Kuwait. With the war over, most experts foresee a temporary plunge to as low as \$15, which can only help consumers. Even if OPEC reins in production and maintains a price of \$21 per bbl. or so, as it apparently would like, most consumers can live with that, and business had been forecasting such a price for 1991 before Iraq's invasion of Kuwait last summer. Gasoline prices are lower than before the invasion, if the effect of a new nickel-per-gal. federal tax is discounted. Cheaper jet fuel is welcome news for the nation's tortured airline industry.

Housing. Tuccillo of the National Association of Realtors says the biggest impact of peace on the housing market may be regional. Most of the American troops in the gulf were pulled out of the southeastern U.S., he says, where merchants have suffered and housing markets have stagnated as a result. Says he: "Maybe the biggest bump we'll see in the housing market will be in that section of the country, when we repatriate the troops and they get on with

the lives they've put on hold for six to eight months." Thanks to falling interest rates and softer prices, the housing industry's Home Affordability Index is at a 14-year high.

Trade and Manufacturing. With exports growing impressively, the U.S. merchandise trade deficit shrank to \$101 billion last year, the smallest imbalance since 1983. Resolution of the gulf conflict may have set the stage for further improvement. Kuwait will apparently be buying billions of dollars' worth of U.S. goods, giving the trade balance a strong, if one-shot, boost.

Cars. The nation's Big Three automakers plan to lay off 29,000 workers this week as they close all or parts of 16 assembly plants. Blessedly, traffic through dealer showrooms has begun to show signs of revival in recent weeks. "It's up 30% to 40%," beams Mark Hutchins, general sales manager for Ford's Lincoln-Mercury Division. "We're ready for things to turn around, and we think they're turning." An unexpected bonanza: Kuwait may need to replace 100,000 cars and trucks in 1991.

Travel. With the cease-fire, tourists have at last begun making reservations rather than having them. The Thomas Cook travel agency recorded a marked increase in new bookings last week. Confidence should rise higher as carriers resume flights they suspended when the crisis escalated. Air France and Lufthansa have announced they are flying to Tel-Aviv again. On Madison Avenue, advertising executives are optimistic that improvement in the travel sector could spark a slow recovery in their industry as well.

Even without this swift victory, the U.S. economy was angled upward. A sur-

vey by the National Association of Business Economists conducted last month shows that 73% of the professional business forecasters share President Bush's expectation that the recession will be shorter and less severe than the typical one and should be over by midyear. Some 25% are pessimistic and point to the country's undeniable fundamental ailments—most notably debt defaults and the bank credit crunch—as reasons why it will be hard to recover from the downturn. And then there's the war's cost, which White House Budget Director Richard Darman estimates at \$40 billion, not counting ground combat. He says the U.S. has offsetting commitments of \$53.5 billion from allies, though many in Washington doubt those countries will pay in full.

Against all that, a surge of pride might not be strong enough to move the economy far. "Most Americans feel very good about the war and the fact that the U.S. did something very important," says Leo Melamed, chairman emeritus of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, "but I don't believe they are going to use those feelings to go out and buy a Cadillac or a washing machine."

Even if consumers don't celebrate the troops' safe return with an assault on local retailers, some analysts see a longer-lasting, if still unquantifiable, benefit from this war. "We built and fought well with some of the most sophisticated instruments ever designed," points out Walter Scott, a professor of management at Northwestern's Kellogg Graduate School of Management. "The biggest dividend at home may be instilling that same kind of aggressiveness into our own business competitiveness. People may be willing to roll up their sleeves and think Japan isn't such an indomitable rival after all."

—Reported by Bernard Baumohl/
New York, Gisela Bolte/Washington and William McWhirter/Chicago

Then There Was One

The Senate ethics panel spears Cranston but spares the rest

The timing almost seemed designed for minimum exposure, like putting a rerun of *Nova* up against *Cheers*. The day the whole world was watching the gulf war end was the moment the Senate Select Committee on Ethics chose to issue its long-delayed report on the Keating Five. The committee found that only the aged, ailing California Senator Alan Cranston, 76, had engaged in "impermissible conduct" in which "fund raising and official activities were substantially linked." The case of the Keating One will be referred to the whole Senate for possible action. The other four are officially off the hook.

The findings came after a 14-month investigation detailing how more than \$1 million in contributions, four trips to the Bahamas and all-expense-paid stays at resort hotels found their way from indicted savings and loan executive Charles Keating, who needed protection from federal regulators trying to shut him down, to five U.S. Senators and their staffs. The committee found Senators John Glenn of Ohio (\$234,000 in Keating contributions) and John McCain of Arizona (\$112,000) the least culpable, engaging only in "poor judgment" because they gave Keating less help than did the others. Senators Donald Riegle of Michigan (\$76,000) and Dennis DeConcini of Arizona (\$55,000 along with more than \$50 million in real estate loans from Lincoln Savings to top campaign aides) gave the "appearance of being improper" because their intervention for Keating was more extensive.

Fred Wertheimer, president of the citizens' lobby Common Cause, which initially demanded the investigation, was outraged at the lenient treatment, and angrily commented: "The U.S. Senate remains on the auction block to the Charles Keatings of the world." Joan Claybrook, president of Public Citizen, called the report a "whitewash."

The committee's ruling offered no guidance as to what is legal and illegal. All five helped Keating and all five ac-

Wright, was deemed merely to have "exercised poor judgment."

The committee recommended that the Senate draw up new guidelines governing constituent service and campaign finances. For now, there are no written rules distinguishing between the sort of constituent service that helps a citizen collect Medicare benefits and service that consists of organizing secret meetings and high-level luncheons or making threatening calls to federal regulators.

While large sums changed hands, the report pointed out, no one was personally enriched by Keating's largesse. Nonetheless the committee seemed to overlook the fact that, among those who lust for power, money in the campaign treasury is a much bigger carrot than money in the pocket.

It may be left to the voters to decide the ultimate fate of the Keating Five. Citing health reasons, Cranston decided last November not to seek re-election in 1992; but his support has fallen so precipitously that half of California voters polled believe he should resign now. Bolstered by their national-hero status, former astronaut Glenn and former POW McCain, the group's lone Republican, have recovered from the beating they took in the polls right after the Keating affair became public. DeConcini and Riegle have not been so lucky. Polls show that if they were up for re-election today, any challenger with a pulse could beat them.

—By Margaret Carlson



Concluding its investigation, the ethics committee unanimously pronounces judgment on Alan Cranston (inset).



cepted money during the same period of time. But only Cranston, who received \$982,000 from the S&L kingpin, failed to observe a respectful amount of time between service rendered and money collected. DeConcini hosted a high-level meeting at which he outlined Keating's demands, which gave an "appearance of being improper" in the eyes of the ethics panel. Glenn, who arranged a luncheon for Keating with then Speaker Jim

Milestones

BORN. To Deborah Norville, 32, perky co-host of NBC's *Today* show, and her husband, businessman **Karl Wellner**, 37: their first child, a son; in New York City. Name: Karl Nikolaï. Weight: 7 lbs. 5 oz.

SENTENCED. **Christian Brando**, 32, burly son of actor Marlon Brando; to 10 years in prison for voluntary manslaughter in the shooting death last May of his pregnant half-sister's lover, Dag Drollet; in Santa Monica, Calif. Brando claimed that the gun went off accidentally during a struggle.

PAROLED. **James Brown**, 57, self-styled "Godfather of Soul," after serving 26 months of a six-year sentence for aggravated assault, failing to stop for police and carrying a gun; in Columbia, S.C. Brown, whose 100-plus hit singles include *Please,*

Please, Please and I Feel Good, has been in a work-release program since April.

DIED. **George Gobel**, 71, diminutive comedian and *Hollywood Squares* panelist; after surgery on a leg artery; in Encino, Calif. Gobel, who started in the 1930s as a featured singer on a Chicago radio show, parlayed his folksy humor and guitar playing into a popular 1950s TV show.

DIED. **Bulee ("Slim") Gaillard**, 75, jazz musician; in London. As the 1930s duo Slim and Slam, Gaillard and bassist Slam Stewart recorded such hits as *The Flat Foot Floogie* and *Cement Mixer*, whose nonsensical lyrics sparked a college craze.


DIED. **John Charles Daly Jr.**, 77, affable moderator of the television game show

What's My Line?; in Chevy Chase, Md. Daly, whose trademark "Sign in please" was heard weekly in millions of American homes for 17½ years, began as a radio reporter for CBS, serving as White House correspondent and later broadcasting accounts of World War II from North Africa, the Middle East and Europe.

DIED. **Edwin Land**, 81, an inventor of instant photography and founder of the Polaroid Corp.; in Cambridge, Mass. Land, whose idea for the no-wait camera and film was triggered by his three-year-old daughter, patented more than 500 inventions, including instant X rays, polarized sunglasses and a 3-D movie projector.




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
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


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


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Books

Life Up North


THE PROMISED LAND

by Nicholas Lemann

Knopf; 410 pages; \$24.95

By RICHARD LACAYO

There were two great migrations that transformed America in this century. The first brought millions of arrivals through the gates of Ellis Island. The second, which began in the 1940s, saw more than 5 million blacks move from the farms and small towns of the South to the cities of the North. Because it took place entirely within U.S. borders, that second massive relocation slipped by with less notice than the first, until the nation woke to find itself



Lemann: blacks came as the jobs went



A war on poverty fought on the wrong front.

transformed. By the time their numbers had tapered off, around 1970, many of the travelers were embarked upon another journey — up the ladder of class advancement. But almost as many were rattling in the dungeons of the underclass, causing reverberations throughout American life.

Nicholas Lemann, a national correspondent for the *Atlantic*, tries to fathom the course of that great surge by linking the personal experiences of a few migrants to a tale of big-city politicking in Chicago, one of their chief destinations. He frames that story within an account of how three successive White House administrations, from Kennedy through Nixon, were consumed by a debate over federal antipoverty efforts — a Washington policy war that

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


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


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combined the worst features of academic detachment and fang-baring political ambition. His heroes are the migrants who managed to clamber into the middle class, mostly on the narrow foothold of modest government jobs. His villains—and there are more of those—are the politicians and policymakers of both left and right who botched the War on Poverty.

Much of the book focuses on a few blacks from rural Clarksdale, Miss., some of the hundreds of thousands of sharecroppers and their families who were forced off the fields of the Mississippi Delta after the widespread adoption of the mechanical cotton picker. Lured by the promise of decent pay in the North, they flowed upward along the lines of the Illinois Central Railroad, their ears ringing with the Bible accounts of the children of Israel making their way to the promised land.

Lemann deals directly with the messy question of whether the sharecropper culture the migrants left behind helped lead them into the trap of ghetto poverty. He sides with those who believe that a high number of unwed mothers, female-headed households and short-lived marriages were characteristics of sharecropper life that were reproduced in the Northern slums. But he stops short of the conclusion that often follows: broken families or a "culture of poverty" created the disaster of the ghettos. He puts the blame instead on the disappearance of unskilled manufacturing jobs, a problem misguided federal policies did little to remedy.

The book's sharpest commentary is reserved for Washington. In the city Lemann describes, the real corridors of power are the margins of agency memos, where bureaucrats fight a war of ideas in scribbled asides. *The Promised Land* is indispensable for understanding how the War on Poverty advanced along the wrong front, favoring panaceas like community action and higher welfare payments while devoting too little attention to job creation. In the end, Lemann insists, the federal effort had its greatest impact by employing ghetto blacks in antipoverty agencies. For many that government paycheck was their ticket out of the ghetto.

Lemann concludes by arguing against the conservative truism that federal antipoverty programs are doomed to failure—and by wondering how long it will be before the national will to defeat poverty can be summoned again. "In American life," he writes, "the underclass is stuck in the antechamber where policy issues rest until they become political crusades." Perhaps someday the great trek northward will at least have a monument like the one that stands at Ellis Island to commemorate the first great migration. Meanwhile, *The Promised Land* is an important cornerstone in the effort to understand why so many travelers in the second migration never reached the land of milk and honey. ■

Cinema

Come On, Baby, Light My Fizzle

THE DOORS Directed by Oliver Stone
Screenplay by J. Randal Johnson and Oliver Stone

By RICHARD CORLISS

At Père-Lachaise cemetery in Paris, Jim Morrison's grave site pulls in the biggest crowds: pilgrims, rockophiles, ragged hippies who look as if they stepped out of a Woodstock Portosan 20 years too late. Last spring, while Oliver Stone's rock-drama on Morrison's group the Doors was still in production, with Val Kilmer in the

his casting denies *The Doors* the chance to be a meditation on the lure of sexual power. What else can the movie be? Morrison and his band were not political pathfinders, and musically they were close to negligible, with one compelling tune (*Light My Fire*) and an ambitious, pretentious attitude. The Doors had a good world when they died—their albums sell almost as well now as they did in the group's brief eminence—but not enough to base a movie on.

So Stone turned *The Doors* into a display of pop culture's wretched excess. "The appeal of cinema lies in the fear of death," Morrison wrote when he was a student at the UCLA film school, and *The Doors* latches onto this fear in the first scene—when five-year-old Jim sees a car wreck—and rides the snake right to the end. In between come dozens of set pieces in which Morrison makes a spectacular, suicidal fool of himself: insulting his audience, trashing hotel rooms, dangling from 10th-story windows, engaging in a



Getting Stoned: Morrison (Kilmer) is arrested during a concert
Wretched excess and suicidal spectacle at \$10 million a Door.

lead role, one possessive admirer etched this graffiti into the Père-Lachaise headstone: VAL KILMER N'EST PAS JIM.


The scrawler was right. Morrison was a gorgeous creature—face by Michelangelo, a mouth made for pouts and pleasures, his entire persona an erogenous zone—with an electrifying stage presence. He saw himself, though, as a Romantic poet trapped in a pop star's body and worked hard at punishing that body with all-life binges of alcohol, drugs and heavy sex. "I'm rich and famous, smart and pretty," he must have mused. "Now how can I screw it up?" He did so by speeding up the physical and mental decay that aging forces on mere mortals. Like his hero Rimbaud, he raced death to the finish line. When he died in 1971, at 27, he was ravaged, depleted, spent. But for a few years Morrison was Satan's seraph—the golden stud of '60s rock.

Kilmer is just conventionally good-looking; he can't prowl like Blake's Tiger or pose with the sultry arrogance of a Beat poet. Nor does he have the intellectual seductiveness that made Morrison a toy of the hip literati. In short, Kilmer is not Jim, and

blood-sipping ritual with his witchy mistress (Kathleen Quinlan, who gets it right), locking his wife-to-be (Meg Ryan, who has no character to play) in a closet and setting it on fire. Perhaps Stone wants to show that Morrison was the victim of sensuality—death's hunkiest groupie—rather than its agent. But the film really proves only that Jim was a bad drunk and a worse friend, and that in no way was his life exemplary.

Stone has relived the Vietnam War in two bold, woozy melodramas, *Platoon* and *Born on the Fourth of July*; his next movie is about the assassination of J.F.K. In subject and style he is the last director of the '60s, finding truth in rage, beauty in psychedelic sunsets, politics in self-destruction. His movies make people edgy, and that's a good thing. But this time Stone is a symptom of the disease he would chart. It is folly to lavish \$40 million of somebody's money (that's \$10 million a Door!) and 2 hr. 15 min. of your time on a proposition—some guys can't handle fame—that was evident two decades ago. Maybe it was fun to bathe in decadence back then. But this is no time to wallow in that mire. ■

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Essay

Lance Morrow

The Holy War of Words



Fairy tales in the West begin, "Once upon a time." In the Arab world they start, "*Kan ya makan*." The words mean "There was, there was not." That is, maybe it happened. On the other hand, maybe it didn't happen. Now you see it, now you don't.

Kan ya makan: the Arabic language is capable of magical effects. On a squalid Cairo street early on a cold, foul day, people greet each other with small bouquets of words: "Morning of blessings! Morning of light!" They have conjured a moment, and smiled, and passed, and then, *poof!* they are back on a miserable street among the pariah dogs. If people are poor and live in the desert, language may be their richest possession: Why not? It opens miraculously onto other worlds. The Koran, with its bursts of sonority and light, describes a paradise that has everything the desert does not: the sweetest water, cool shade, silken couches, wines that one can endlessly drink without getting drunk.

Kan ya makan is intoxication enough. It was out of the desert that humans conjured monotheism—absolute God to suffuse utter emptiness. When *kan ya makan* enters politics, its genius makes language a reality superior to the deed—even renders the facts of the objective world unnecessary and graceless. The vivid hallucination becomes the act: the prophecy is more satisfying than its literal fulfillment. If the demagogue-bard says the infidel will swim in his own blood, then words have preempted the work of armies. Ambiguity has an ancient history in the West, but the Middle East has its special genius for mirage. There, the dreariest, basest impulses go dressed up in poetry. Aggressive greed may swagger around as jihad. "Arab dignity and honor" shine in the mind with a radiant life of their own, forever beleaguered and violated and crying for revenge—visions really, not things to be struggled toward, to be earned.

Westerners, who have wandered through centuries of darkness and enlightenment and rationalism and scientific method and then the various neo-darknesses of the 20th century (Auschwitz, Hiroshima and so on), have some difficulty with these dreamy effects in which reality and illusion float back and forth interchangeably. Americans have a special longing of their own. They need to know they are working in a scheme of virtue. Americans feel a moral unease when they sense that their power is banging around loose in the world without being, in a sort of theological sense, justified. The antiwar slogan "No Blood for Oil" proclaimed that unease, as if oil were Miller High Life and not the stuff that powers most of the world's economies. Americans felt the chill of that wrongness when Iraqi women and children were carried, charred by American bombs, out of a Baghdad bunker.

But Americans understand even less the cultural-moral scheme in which Saddam Hussein, career murderer and im-


presario of atrocity, gets somehow transformed into an Arab hero. Or in which Iraqi horrors committed in Kuwait become invisible to the Arab eye and so vanish from its calculus of right and wrong. It seems to Westerners that some amorality is at work in the way Arabs judge atrocities and measure the worth of human lives—or at least that a connection is broken in the apparatus of cause and effect. Sympathizers trying to explain an enthusiasm for Saddam Hussein sometimes remark that few Arabs like the Kuwaitis anyway. In Europe during the '30s, no one cared about the Jews all that much either—what the hell. During Black September in 1970, King Hussein of Jordan had his soldiers kill Palestinians wholesale. When Syria's Hafez Assad wanted to silence the Muslim fundamentalists in Hama in 1982, his army slaughtered more than 10,000. Ever since 1948, the Arabs have shed bitter, angry tears over the Palestinians, yet one of the secrets of the Middle East is that Arabs routinely

treat Palestinians worse than Israelis do. Other Arabs do not trust Palestinians, think they are troublemakers—overly pushy, political. *Shhh.*

Most Arab countries are essentially police states imposed upon peasants. On the level of everyday reality, fear—of the government and its secret police, the *mukhabarat*—is the beginning and end of citizenship. The real law in people's minds is not government at all but an organism growing from the social traditions and precepts of Islam, which as a social system for the poor has an admirable kindness and simplicity. As for national boundaries, those were drawn generations ago by colonialists, aliens from some other part of the universe.

But above the level of the Arab everyday, there floats a dimension of grand design, the high plane on which jihad and other transactions with the miraculous occur in the Islamic world. It is there amid the language with its efflorescent or bloody metaphors that Arabs, unexpectedly enough, resemble Americans. It is there they share the affliction of the immature, an obsession to think of themselves as righteous in the exertion of their power.

An Arab may behold the unsavory mess of the West—drugs, AIDS, serial murders, shattered families and lives—and think of Satan. He may be repelled and tempted simultaneously, just as Westerners can be charmed and appalled by the Arab world and what passes for reality there. But war is not symbolic. It is a savage lesson in the limits of gaudy rhetoric, of fairy tales. It would be pretty to think that the war that has now ended, after being played so fiercely before a global audience, might at last break the cycle. Germany and Japan ended in ashes after World War II, but in the apocalypse they expunged the worst of themselves—their fascists and militarists, their evil dreamers—and were reborn as new societies. Perhaps, perhaps. More hallucination will yield only more terrible slaughter.



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